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Log in through your institution journal article Political Science Quarterly Vol. 122, No. 2 (Summer, 2007) , pp. 257-285 (29 pages) Published By: The Academy of Political Science https://www.jstor.org/stable/20202849 Read and download Log in through your school or library Alternate access options For independent researchers Read Online Read 100 articles/month free Subscribe to JPASS Unlimited reading + 10 downloads Journal Information The Political Science Quarterly is the oldest and most widely read political science journal in the country. Published since 1886, PSQ offers crucial and timely analysis of both domestic and foreign policy issues as well as of political institutions and processes. PSQ has no ideological or methodological bias and is edited to make even technical findings clear to political scientists, historians, and other social scientists regardless of subfield. Each issue consists of five or six insightful articles by leading scholars as well as 30 to 40 scholarly and useful book reviews. To browse and search through issues published in the last five years, please visit http://www.psqonline.org. Publisher Information The Academy of Political Science is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization founded in 1880 with a threefold mission: (1) to contribute to the scholarly examination of political institutions, processes, and public policies, (2) to enrich political discourse and channel the best social science research in an understandable way to political leaders for use in public policy making and the process of governing, and (3) to educate members of the general public so that they become informed voters in the democratic process. The major vehicles for accomplishing these goals are its journal, Political Science Quarterly, Academy conferences, and the publication of proceedings or symposia based on conference presentations. The prestige and authority of the Academy are such that statesmen and scholars of all political persuasions have enrolled as members, participated in its conferences, and contributed to its publications. Former presidents Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and George Bush are honorary members of the Academy. For information about institutional subscriptions, individual membership, back issues, reprints, permissions, or manuscript submissions contact The Academy of Political Science. This information is also available at http://www.psqonline.org/. Rights & Usage This item is part of a JSTOR Collection. Abstract In this article we highlight a formal basis for presidential power that has gone largely unappreciated to this point, but has become so pivotal to presidential leadership and so central to an understanding of presidential power that it virtually defines what is distinctively modern about the modern presidency. This is the president's formal capacity to act unilaterally and thus to make law on his own. Our central purpose is to set out a theory of this aspect of presidential power. We argue that the president's powers of unilateral action are a force in American politics precisely because they are not specified in the Constitution. They derive their strength and resilience from the ambiguity of the contract. We also argue that presidents have incentives to push this ambiguity relentlessly to expand their own powers-and that, for reasons rooted in the nature of their institutions, neither Congress nor the courts are likely to stop them. We are currently in the midst of a research project to collect comprehensive data for testing this theory-data on what presidents have done, as well as on how Congress and the courts have responded. Here we provide a brief history of unilateral action, with special attention to the themes of our theoretical argument. We also make use of some early data to emerge from our project. For now it appears that the theory is well supported by the available evidence. This is a work in progress, however, and more is clearly needed before definitive conclusions can be justified. Journal Information The Journal of Law, Economics & Organization is an interdisciplinary exercise. It seeks to promote an understanding of many complex phenomena by examining such matters from a combined law, economics, and organization perspective (or a two-way combination thereof). In this connection, we use the term organization broadly - to include scholarship drawing on political science, psychology and sociology, among other fields. It also holds the study of institutions - especially economic, legal, and political institutions - to be specifically important and greatly in need of careful analytic study. Publisher Information Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. OUP is the world's largest university press with the widest global presence. It currently publishes more than 6,000 new publications a year, has offices in around fifty countries, and employs more than 5,500 people worldwide. It has become familiar to millions through a diverse publishing program that includes scholarly works in all academic disciplines, bibles, music, school and college textbooks, business books, dictionaries and reference books, and academic journals. Rights & Usage This item is part of a JSTOR Collection. What kind of power does the president have to convince Congress to do something?By threatening a veto, the President can persuade legislators to alter the content of the bill to be more acceptable to the President. Congress can override a veto by passing the act by a two-thirds vote in both the House and the Senate. (Usually an act is passed with a simple majority.)
What are the different ways a president has to reject a bill quizlet?1) To sign it - becomes a law 2) To veto it - refuse to sign it, must be returned to original house with a veto message 3) To allow the bill to become a law without signing - not acting on it for 10 days 4) Pocket Veto - If congress adjours its session within 10 days of submitting and the president does not act, the ...
How does the presidential veto influence legislation quizlet?Veto-The President can veto any bill signed by Congress - preventing it from passing unless both Houses can muster a 2/3rd majority in favor of passing the bill. In most cases, a veto will kill a proposed bill.
What would be the effect of granting the president line item veto power quizlet?The Line Item Veto Act would likely have what effect on executive authority? the increased number of bills that the president introduces to Congress.
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A president may persuade recalcitrant members of Congress to vote for a particular bill by
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