Identify and explain ONE geographic factor that dictated the Allied offensive strategy in Europe

When the full history of the great World War is written geography will be understood as one of the fundamental causes. When white people migrated into Europe from west central Europe they found a land divided by mountain ranges and arms of the sea into small geographic provinces. This led to the growth of numerous small countries. Physical geography, by isolating peoples, leads to national strength and often to international animosity.

As the population increased the great coal and mineral resources of Europe were discovered, and industrial life began to develop. Then the economic geography became of vital importance to each nation. Political boundary lines have been shifted to include special resources. Later, when greater supplies of raw material were needed at the manufacturing plants and new markets desired, the geography of the world became vital to the life of the nations in western Europe. A period of colonization followed, until almost all the lands of the world have been taken. The nations of western Europe have been most active in this work of colonization.

Geography Determined Strategy.

When the Germans planned their invasion of France the physical geography determined their lines of approach. When actual fighting took place the physical features became of the greatest strategic importance. The east-facing escarpment in France formed natural defenses of Paris. In the effort of the German army to approach Verdun from the east fully 500,000 men were sacrificed in trying to capture the heights east of that city. The war became a "War of Positions". The topographic situation of each town was important. The position of the Chemin des Dames was important because of its elevation, so the positions of Vimy Ridge and the Messines Ridge were fought for most bitterly. Each river valley in northern France played a part in determining campaigns. The great strategy of Marshal Foch in the final drives, was laid out with a full knowledge and a full appreciation of the importance of geography. The German army was crowded back toward the Ardennes, through which there was but one narrow pass, the valley of the Meuse. The retreat of such a vast army through that gorge would be impossible and when the route of transportation east and west was cut the situation for the enemy was desperate. The physical features held them on one side, the army of the Allies on the other. Disaster faced them, and the ratification of the terms of the armistice came with expected promptness.

Peace Conference Problems Difficult.

Many of the most difficult problems before the Peace Conference involve questions of physical, economic and commercial geography. They involve problems in ethnic geography. The French, British and American geographers have been at work for months preparing maps of the physical features, of the present and past boundaries, of race distribution, of the distribution of coal, iron, oil, forests, and various other natural resources within the continent. There are a score of geographers available as experts at the Peace Conference. We fully expect a new geography for Europe, a new geography for western Asia, and changes in the geography of Africa and in the distribution of the islands of the Pacific.

The war has awakened in the American people an interest in geography, an appreciation of the significance of geographic factors in the control of industrial and commercial life. Every man interested in large business enterprises should be trained in geography; every man who expects to travel in foreign lands or to enter government service should understand the geography in his own country and that of the world.

journal article

Arms Versus Allies: Trade-Offs in the Search for Security

International Organization

Vol. 47, No. 2 (Spring, 1993)

, pp. 207-233 (27 pages)

Published By: The MIT Press

https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706889

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Abstract

Nations have two methods of increasing their security: building arms and forming alliances. Both methods present different political costs that must be incurred to raise security. Building arms requires shifting economic resources to the military. Forming alliances requires abandoning interests that conflict with those of the ally. Each of these strategies produces domestic opposition. A nation's response to a threat to its security must weigh the relative attractiveness of arms versus allies, both in terms of their effects on internal politics and on their external benefits. Three cases are examined in the light of this argument. The response of Austria and France to the unification of Germany in the 1860s is the central case. Theories of alliance formation based on neorealism and the offense-defense balance predict that Austria and France should have allied against the mutual threat of Prussia. This article argues that they did not form an alliance because arming separately presented lower political costs. World Wars I and II likewise are analyzed from the perspective of the argument above.

Journal Information

International Organization is a leading peer-reviewed journal that covers the entire field of international affairs. Subject areas include: foreign policies, international relations, international and comparative political economy, security policies, environmental disputes and resolutions, European integration, alliance patterns and war, bargaining and conflict resolution, economic development and adjustment, and international capital movements. Guidelines for Contributors at Cambridge Journals Online

Publisher Information

Among the largest university presses in the world, The MIT Press publishes over 200 new books each year along with 30 journals in the arts and humanities, economics, international affairs, history, political science, science and technology along with other disciplines. We were among the first university presses to offer titles electronically and we continue to adopt technologies that allow us to better support the scholarly mission and disseminate our content widely. The Press's enthusiasm for innovation is reflected in our continuing exploration of this frontier. Since the late 1960s, we have experimented with generation after generation of electronic publishing tools. Through our commitment to new products—whether digital journals or entirely new forms of communication—we have continued to look for the most efficient and effective means to serve our readership. Our readers have come to expect excellence from our products, and they can count on us to maintain a commitment to producing rigorous and innovative information products in whatever forms the future of publishing may bring.

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