journal article Show Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization Vol. 12, No. 1 (Apr., 1996) , pp. 119-166 (48 pages) Published By: Oxford University Press https://www.jstor.org/stable/765041 Read and download Log in through your school or library Purchase article $51.00 - Download now and later Purchase a PDFPurchase this article for $51.00 USD. How does it work?
Abstract In the past 15 years a scholarly debate has developed in the United States over the question "Who controls the bureaucracy?" Some have argued that Congress has a dominant influence on the bureaucracy, some that the president plays the major role in managing the bureaucracy, and others have emphasized the role of legal constraints on the bureaucracy, as enforced by the courts. Still others have asserted that the bureaucracy has a substantial amount of autonomy from the president, Congress, and courts. This article presents a formal model of multi-institutional policy-making that illuminates several key aspects of this debate. The model shows that there are conditions under which an agency will have considerable autonomy and conditions under which it will have virtually none. The model also shows that when an agency lacks autonomy, control of the agency usually cannot be attributed to just one institution. Finally, the model has some important implications for empirical tests of hypotheses about who controls the bureaucracy; among them is the fact that the empirical literature on control of the bureaucracy is based on a logic that gives a seriously incomplete picture of how the bureaucracy is controlled and who controls it. Journal Information The Journal of Law, Economics & Organization is an interdisciplinary exercise. It seeks to promote an understanding of many complex phenomena by examining such matters from a combined law, economics, and organization perspective (or a two-way combination thereof). In this connection, we use the term organization broadly - to include scholarship drawing on political science, psychology and sociology, among other fields. It also holds the study of institutions - especially economic, legal, and political institutions - to be specifically important and greatly in need of careful analytic study. Publisher Information Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. OUP is the world's largest university press with the widest global presence. It currently publishes more than 6,000 new publications a year, has offices in around fifty countries, and employs more than 5,500 people worldwide. It has become familiar to millions through a diverse publishing program that includes scholarly works in all academic disciplines, bibles, music, school and college textbooks, business books, dictionaries and reference books, and academic journals. Rights & Usage This item is part of a JSTOR
Collection. journal article Explaining Federal Bureaucratic Compliance with Supreme Court OpinionsPolitical Research Quarterly Vol. 50, No. 3 (Sep., 1997) , pp. 567-593 (27 pages) Published By: Sage Publications, Inc. https://doi.org/10.2307/448918 https://www.jstor.org/stable/448918 Read and download Log in through your school or library Read Online (Free) relies on page scans, which are not currently available to screen readers. To access this article, please contact JSTOR User Support. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.With a personal account, you can read up to 100 articles each month for free. Get StartedAlready have an account? Log in Monthly Plan
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Abstract Past research on bureaucratic compliance with Supreme Court opinions offers few comprehensive theoretical frameworks and even fewer rigorous empirical tests. I argue that bureaucracies comply based on the costs or benefits of alternative ways of responding to the Court. Agencies develop these expectations from the environments within which they implement opinions, which I conceptualize as attributes of Court opinions, agency characteristics, and external actors. I show that federal bureaucracies generally comply with the Court, though they sometimes respond to the Court in self-interested ways. Using a probit model of agency implementation of Court opinions from the 1953 through 1990 terms, I also demonstrate that several factors explain whether agencies comply, including the nature of the Court's opinions, the characteristics of the responding agency, and support by societal interests. I further illustrate that the absence of defiance or evasion most likely results from the interdependencies between federal agencies and the Court. The implication is that legal rules are important, setting up referents for behavior, and their ability to encourage compliance stems in part from their actual content. Journal Information Political Research Quarterly (PRQ) is a refereed scholarly journal publishing original research in all areas of political science. PRQ is published by the University of Utah and is the official journal of the Western Political Science Association. Most issues also feature field essays integrating and summarizing current knowledge in particular research areas. PRQ is published in March, June, September, and December. Publisher Information Sara Miller McCune founded SAGE Publishing in 1965 to support the dissemination of usable knowledge and educate a global community. SAGE is a leading international provider of innovative, high-quality content publishing more than 900 journals and over 800 new books each year, spanning a wide range of subject areas. A growing selection of library products includes archives, data, case studies and video. SAGE remains majority owned by our founder and after her lifetime will become owned by a charitable trust that secures the company’s continued independence. Principal offices are located in Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore, Washington DC and Melbourne. www.sagepublishing.com Rights & Usage This item is part of a JSTOR Collection. How does Congress influence the bureaucracy?Congressional bureaucratic influence results from legislative and investigative oversight functions, personnel selection and staffing, and the budget. The public, especially professional associations and individual policy experts, exercises a great deal of influence over the Federal bureaucracy.
How does Congress control the bureaucracy quizlet?Congress can control bureaucrats through the legislative veto. It refers to the power of a legislature, or one house of a bicameral legislature, to repeal an action of the executive authority. It gives Congress a second chance to examine decisions.
How can Congress exert influence on the federal bureaucracy quizlet?How does Congress exert influence over the bureaucracy? Congress controls government spending and must approve the President's appointments.
How does Congress hold the bureaucracy accountable quizlet?Congress can hold the bureaucracy accountable through its powers to , giving Congress a chance to evaluate federal agencies and to withhold funds if there are dissatisfactions.
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Which of the following possible actions illustrates a way Congress interacts with the bureaucracy?
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