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Abstract: The fallacy of Complex Question (traditionally known as fallacia plurimum interrogationum) is discussed and explained with illustrative examples and self-grading quizzes. The “fallacy” is said to occur when an answer is demanded in response to a question composed of several questions. In logic textbooks the fallacy is also cited as the Many Questions, Loaded Question, False Question, Double Question, Assumption of the Previous Question, Trick Question, or, in law, the Compound Question Fallacy). Contents
Links to Online Quizzes with Complex Questionpostscript “The fallacia plurium interrogationum consists in trying to get one answer to several questions in one. It is sometimes used by barristers in the examination of witnesses, who endeavour to get yes or no to a complex question which ought to be partly answered in each way, meaning to use the answer obtained, as for the whole, when they have got it for a part. …We are often reminded of the two men who stole the leg of mutton; one could swear he had not got it, the other that he had not taken it. … The answer of the owner of the leg of mutton is sometime to the point, ‘Well, gentlemen, all I can say is, there is a rogue between you.’” Augustus De Morgan, Formal Logic: or, the Calculus of Inference, Necessary ad Probable (London: Taylor and Walton, 1847), 270. Notes[Most links connect to page cited.] John A. Oesterle, Logic: The Art of Defining and Reasoning 2nd. ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1964), 259. Frances Howard-Snyder, Daniel Howard-Snyder, and Ryan Wasserman, The Power of Logic 4th ed. (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2009), 186. T. Edward Damer, Attacking Faulty Reasoing 6th ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2009), 167. Irving M. Copi, Carl Cohen, and Kenneth McMahon, Introduction to Logic 14th ed. (London: Routledge, 2016), 134-136. Stan Baronett, Logic 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016),153-154. Patrick J. Hurley and Lori Watson, A Concise Introduction to Logic 13th ed. (Boston: Wadsworth, Cengage, 2018), 169-170. However, for a fallacy to occur, the question and its presupposition must be part of an argument. The presupposition itself must be not only unwarranted but also objectionable to the respondent because as Lauri Karttunen, David Lewis, and Robert Stalnaker point out, presuppositions are introduced often in conversational contexts and are usually accepted once the previously unspoken assumption is accommodated. Stalnaker writes: “Accommodation is an essential feature of any communicative practice. If common ground is (at least close to) common belief, then it will adjust and change in the face of manifest events that take place, including events that are themselves speech acts.” [Robert Stalnaker, Context (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 58. doi 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199645169.001.0001] See also Lauri Karttunen, “Presupposition and Linguistic Context,” Theoretical Linguistics 1 no. 1-3 (1974), 191. doi: 10.1515/thli.1974.1.1-3.181" and David Lewis, “Scorekeeping in a Language Game,” Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 no. 1 (January 1979), 340. doi 10.1007/bf00258436" Presuppositional failure occurs whenever the question implies the truth of the false presupposition. Not all cases of false presupposition in complex questions are unwarranted; those that are unwarranted are called “catastropic, if fallacious.“ Stephen Yablo writes: “Failure is catastrophic if it prevents a thing from performing its primary task, in this case making an (evaluable) claim.” [Stephen Yablo, “Non-Catastropic Presupposition Failure,” in Content and Modality: Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker eds. Judith Thomson and Alex Byrne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 164. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199266487.003.0012] In sum, since a complex question fails in its purpose because of its failure of presuppositional reference, the complex question has no direct answer.↩ 2. Charles Hamlin, Fallacies (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1970), 39. Hamlin notes that most questions, not just complex questions, involve presuppositions which have need of different kinds of answers. Christopher W. Tindale sums up: “[F]ew theorists are inclined to include ‘Complex Question’ in any stable of fallacies.” Fallacies and Argument Appraisal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 69. doi: 10.1017/cbo9780511806544↩ 3. Douglas Walton, “The Fallacy of Many Questions,” Logique et Analyse 24 no. 95/96 (Septembre-Décembre 1981), 291-313. Another link here: The Fallacy of Many Questions. Many other logicians do not consider complex question to be a fallacy. See for example: Jaakko Hintikka, “The Fallacy of Fallacies,” Argumentation 1 no. 3 (September, 1987), 225. doi: 10.1007/bf00136775 Gilbert Ryle, “The Academy and Dialectic,” in Critical Essays: Collected Papers Vol. 1 (1971 London: Routledge, 2009), 121. doi: 10.4324/9780203101667-12 F. C. S. Schiller, Formal Logic: A Scientific and Social Problem (London: Macmillan, 1912), 363-364. H.S. Sheldon, “A Theory of Material Fallacies,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society series 2, vol. 12 (1911-12), 113. doi: 10.1093/aristotelian/12.1.105↩ 4. Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst, Argumentation, Communication, and Fallacies: A Pragma-Dialectical Perspective (1992 London: Routledge, 2016), 214. doi: 10.4324/9781315538662↩ 5. Aristotle writes: “In dealing with those who make several questions into one, you should draw a distinction immediately at the beginning. For a question is single to which there is only one answer, so that one must not affirm or deny several things of one thing nor one thing of several things, but one thing of one thing. But just as in the case of equivocal terms, a predicate is sometimes true of both meanings and sometimes of neither, and so, though the question is not simple, no detriment results if people give a simple answer, so too with these double questions. When, therefore, the several predicates are true of one subject, or one predicate of several subjects, no contradiction is involved in giving a simple answer, though he has made this mistake. But when the predicate is true of one subject but not of the other or several predicates are true of several subjects, then there is a sense in which both are true of both but another sense, on the other hand, in which they are not; so one must be on one's guard against this.” Arist. Soph. El. 29 181a37–30 181b2, trans. Forster. doi: https://doi.org/10.4159/dlcl.aristotle-sophistical_refutations.1955 ] This passage well describes the “workout” example cited in footnote references 8 and 9 below.↩ 6. Frans H. van Eemeren and A. Francisca Snoeck Henkemans, Argumentation: Analysis and Evaulation 2nd ed. (2002 New York: Routledge, 2017), 114. doi: 10.4324/9781315401140↩ 7. J. Woo, “Many-Questions Fallacy” The Oxford Companion to Philosophy ed. Ted Honderich (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 553.↩ 8. “About You,” Women's Fitness (January 2021), 8.↩ 9. “About You,” 8.↩ 10. For example, from an empirical study of the multiple ways question can function for speakers in casual conversation, Alice F. Freed states: “The taxonomy developed illustrates how questions vary along an information continuum; those which seek factual information, characterized as public information, are situated at one end of the continuum; at the other end are questions which are the expressive choice of the speaker, and communicate rather than elicit information. [Alice F. Freed, “The Form and Function of Questions in Informal Dyadic Conversation, Journal of Pragmatics 21 no. 6 (June, 1994), 625. doi: 10.1016/0378-2166(94)90101-5] Some critical thinking texts indicate that expressive language is, in itself fallacious when viewed rhetorically. The view taken in these notes is that fallacies can only be viewed as characteristic of the informative function of language when viewed as statements in an argument.↩ 11. Plato Euthyd., 275d. trans. W.H.D. Rouse. doi: 10.1515/9781400835867↩ 12. Don Hiers, “An Open Letter to Football Players,” Index-Journal 99 no. 247 (November 20, 2017), 6A.↩ 13. Morris R. Cohen and Ernest Nagel, An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1946), 380. Preview ↩ 14. Cal Thomas, “Kathleen Sebelius: Scapegoat,” Index-Journal 95 no. 329 (April 17, 2014), 8A.↩ 15. Much of the literature of the Amsterdam School and other dialogical interpretations of the complex question fallacy assume that “the fallacy of many questions occurs in argumentative interactions between two or more discussants.” Quite so, but occurrences of the fallacy are also present in disparate discursive contexts. The quotation is an excerpt from pragma-dialectical theorists Roosmaryn Pilgram and Leah E. Polcar in “Questioning the Fallacy of Many Questions,” in Proceedings of the Sixth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation eds. F.H. van Eemeren et al. (Amsterdam: Sic Sat, 2007), 1062. Persistent Identifier: urn: nbn:nl:ui:29-407602↩ 16. Nuel Belnap, Jr. and T. Steel, Jr. The Logic of Questions and Answers (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale, 1976), 111.↩ 17. Analyzing informal fallacies by means of differing nonclassical logics results in an unsystematic theory of philosophy. As Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst state: “This approach amounts to applying an appropriate logical system in analyzing a particular fallacy.… For practical purposes this approach is not very realistic. In order to be able to carry out the analyses, a considerable amount of logical knowledge is required … one only gets fragmentary descriptions of the various fallacies, and no overall picture of the domain of the fallacies as a whole.” [Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst, Argumentation, Communication, and Fallacies: A Pragma-Dialectical Perspective (1992, London: Routledge, 2016), 152. doi: 10.4324/9781315538662 (preview)] The introduction of a few conventions might be beneficial for understanding some terminology in the logic of questions (i.e., erotetic logic). Questions are studied syntactically, semantically and pragmatically. The foundational issues of semantic and pragmatic accounts of the context of discourse remain contentious. Syntactical study is the study of interrogatives and their denotation without consideration of their use within a context. Interrogative sentences normally express questions just as declarative sentences normally express statements. Interrogative sentences, as a grammatical formula, can perform other actions than questioning, and questions can be stated without interrogatives. E.g. How questions can function in deductive arguments is discussed in Andrzej Wiśniewski, “The Logic of Questions as a Theory of Erotetic Arguments,” Synthese 109 no. 1 (October, 1996) 1-25. doi: 10.1007/bf00413820 The semantical study of questions deals with the content and meaning of questions, their grammar and syntax, rather than consideration their form or their implied meaning. Robert Stalnaker regards “semantics to be the study of propositions,” in particular, their truth conditions. [Robert N. Stalnaker, Context and Content: Essays on Intentionality in Speech and Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 32. doi: 10.1093/0198237073.001.0001 And also Stalnaker, “Context” (2014), 23.] Jerrold J. Katz writes semantics consists in “taking senses or meaning, as they present themselves in our ordinary linguistic experience, to be the proper objects of study ….” (italics original) [Jerrold J. Katz, “Common Sense in Semantics,” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 no.2 (April 1982), 174. doi: 10.1305/ndjfl/1093883626] Question pragmatics attends to the use, contextual interpretation, and conveyed meaning of questions by users of language. Pragmatics are based on semantics. Essential to the logical analysis of questions is the notion of a true, direct answer; otherwise, even though a reply can be given, the question is not answerable. Consequently, a question without a direct answer is not considered a legitimate question. Questions with false presuppositions or non-existent entities are not meaningless and are still considered questions. Nuel Belnap and T. Steel point out that asking a question with a false presupposition is “very much like making a false statement.” They note that the notion of question-presupposition must differ somewhat from the usual concepts for sentence-presupposition: “A question, q, presupposes a statement, A, if and only if the truth of A is a logically necessary condition for there being some true answer to q.” By this analysis, the complex question … Have you stopped beating your spouse? can be a proper question, i.e., a question with true, direct answers of either “You have stopped beating your spouse” or “You have not stopped beating your spouse,” given the truth of the presupposition “You used to beat your spouse.” The situational context under which the question is asked are pragmatic conditions involving dependent presuppositions (not the unique presupposition of the question) and include “You are married“ and “You used to beat someone.” [Belnap, Logic of Questions, 108-15.] Belnap also proposes that “a sentence expresses the presupposition of a question if its truth is both necessary and sufficient for the question's having some true answer,” so “a question[is] ‘true’ just when some direct answer thereto is true.” [Nuel D. Belnap, Jr., “Questions, Answers, and Presuppositions,” Journal of Philosophy Vol. 63 no. 20 (October 27, 1966), 610-611. doi: 10.2307/2024255] As an improper question, there is no true, direct answer. Instead of an answer, replies are such as “I am not married, so there is no spouse to beat” or “I am married and I have never beaten anyone” are possible. So, the reply in this case is an explanation why there is no answer to the question. There is no true, direct answer to the complex question. The kind of fallacy, then, can be viewed as unreasonably leading the respondant to an improper conclusion from imposed, restricted “premises.” Very often recognition of the pragmatic implications of a complex question are essential in its analysis. The pragmatic circumstances under which a question is posed can be the determining factors of its fallaciousness. Since, following Belnap and Steel, there is no correct or true answer to a complex question, C.L. Hamlin's objection to David Harrah's or Henry S. Leonard's analyses that questions are not statements does not pose a problem for this manner of viewing complex questions since these theories describe direct questions only. Hamlin writes, “[T]he difference between questions and statements is at least in part pragmatic, whence we should find it in the difference between the pragmatic implications of an act of question-asking and an act of statement-making.” [C.L. Hamlin, “Questions Aren't Statements,” Philosophy of Science 30 no. 1 (January, 1963), 63. doi: 10.1086/287913]↩ 18. Mikael Sundström and Anders Sigrell, “The Doughnut Fallacy as Deliberative Failure,” Cogency 3 no 1 (Winter, 2011), 151. Randal Marlin describes his experience with a yes-no question during this cross-examination: “Our community association was fighting (unsuccessfully, as it turned out) a proposed seat expansion to Lansdowne Park Stadium, which is in our area. We had presented a petition of 2,000 signatures opposing the expansion to the Ontario Municipal Board. The grapevine had alerted me to the fact that the Ottawa Rough Riders (a team in the professional Canadian Football League) had sent an opposing petition to all Rough Riders season ticket subscribers. In the witness box during the OMB hearing I was asked by the Rough Riders' lawyer: ‘Are you aware that there was another petition that obtained 8,000 signatures in favour of the seat expansion?” If I answered ‘Yes’ I would have appeared to be confirming numbers that I had no knowledge of, and discrediting my own petition to boot so far as numbers were concerned. If I answered ‘No’ I would merely have seemed factually ignorant, or perhaps suppressing knowledge of a petition whose existence I did not wish to face.” [Randal Marlin, “The Rhetoric of Action Description: Ambiguity in Intentional Reference,” Informal Logic 6 no. 3 (1984), 29. doi: 10.22329/il.v6i3.2737] To answer the compound question with “Yes” would be either false or misleading.]↩ 19. Eugene Robinson, ” Over-the-Top Victims,” Index-Journal 95 no. 257 (February 2, 2014), 8A.↩ 20. Ganpat Rai, ed., Famous Speeches and Letters of Subhas Chandra Bose (Lahore, India: Lion Press, 1946), 216.↩ 21. Thomas Sowell, “ Random Thoughts On the Passing Scene,” Index-Journal 97 No. 14 (March 5, 2015), 6A.↩ 22. In accordance with some U. S. laws of evidence in the 19th century, such questions were lawful in cross-examination: “When a witness is cross-examined, he may … be asked any questions which tend … [t]o shake his credit, by injuring his character. (And to this end … his interest, his motives, his way of life, his associations, his habits, his prejudices, his physical defects and infirmities, his mental idiosyncrasies, if they affect his capacity … (Com. v. Shaw, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 593.) He may be compelled to answer any such question, however irrelevant it may be to the facts in issues, and however disgraceful the answer may be to himself, except in the case of self-incrimination.” [James Fitzjames Stephen, A Digest of the Law of Evidence 3rd. ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1877), 185.] Compound questions (questions involving two or more questions) are subject to objection. Leading questions (questions which suggest the answer) are not allowed in direct examination of a witness (except for testimony development) but are allowed in cross-examination. See “Rule 403: Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Ground of Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time”Rule 611: Mode and Order of Interrogation and Presentation Public Law 93-595: Federal Rules of Evidence↩ 23. “Lysias Against Eratosthenes,” in William Jennings Bryan, ed., The World's Famous Orations: Rome (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1906), I: 61.↩ 24. Plato, Gorg., 502e–503a, trans. W.D. Woodhead. doi: 10.2307/j.ctt1c84fb0.15↩ 25. Suitable paraphrases for the same question given in an interrogative sentence can also be expressed using an imperative or a declarative sentence. Consider the following example: Interrogative: When did you start so many atrocious habits? The varieties of questions include many question-types, so this guide is only suggestive. Differing catalogs of question-types are provided by Mary Prior and Arthur Prior, “Erotetic Logic,” Philosophical Review 64 no. 1 (January, 1955), 58-63. doi: 10.2307/2182232; Greg P. Kearsley, “Questions and Question Asking in Verbal Discourse: A Cross-Disciplinary Review,” Journal of Psycholinguistic Research 5 no. 4 (October, 1976), 365-375. doi: 10.1007/BF01079934; Nuel Belnap and T. Steel, The Logic of Questions; David Harrah, The Logic of Questions in D. Gabbay and F. Guenther eds. 2nd. ed. Handbook of Philosophical Logic (Dordrecht: Springer Science, 2002), 716, doi: 10.1007/978-94-010-0387-2_1; and many others. Confusion about the meaning of presuppositions in a complex questions are often due to syntactical ambiguity in their interpretation. This point was recognized early on by Aristotle as he wrote: “Fallacies connected with the union of several questions in one are due to our failure to differentiate or distinguish the definition of the term ‘proposition.’ For a proposition is a single predication about a single subject. … If, therefore, a man has given an answer as though to a single question, there will be a refutation … for we fail accurately to carry out the definition of ‘proposition’” [Arist. Soph. Re., 169a 6-8, 14-18; 169b 16-18 trans. Forster.] Some problematic presuppositions are made explicit for complex questions are negative existential statements. For Strawson and others (including Aristotle), the existence of the subject class is a necessary condition of the truth or falsity of statements. [See P.F. Strawson, Introduction to Logical Theory (rpt. 1964 London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1952), 175 doi: 10.4324/9780203828779. ] Otherwise, the negative existential statement simply reflects a “confusion” for Aristotle and others taking this approach.↩ 26. Dana Milbank, “Susan Rice's Tarnished Résumé,” Index-Journal 94 no. 202 (November 20, 2012), 6A. Also see Washington Monthly here↩ 27. Froma Harrop, “Donald Trump is Mentally Ill,” Index-Journal 98 no. 202 (October 14, 2016), 7A.)↩ 28. W.D. Wilson, An Elementary Treatise on Logic (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1856), fn 184.↩ 29. Although there is no direct answer to the question, the short reply, “Neither“ would be appropriate if one had no bad habits. However, in some constricting circumstances, this answer would be judged non-responsive in use. Examples such as this one perhaps illustrate why courses in symbolic logic do not seem to help much for facility in the logic of questions. Although this example seems to make sense from the standpoint formal logic, it does not seem to pass the test of conversational implication. Classically, Menedemus provided such an account.[Diogenes Laërtius, “Menedemus” The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers trans. C.D. Younge (London: George Bell and Sons, 1901), ii.135 (p. 109)]. A similar account outlined by John Woods, et al. appears to say in response to a disjunction such as this one that: “Eliciting this answer does the questioner no good. It gives him no information as to whether I now have bad habits or whether I ever did. …[A] ‘no’ answer still does the respondent no dialectical harm whatsoever.” [John Woods, A.Irvine, and D. Walton, Argument: Critical Thinking, Logic and the Fallacies 2nd. ed. (Toronto: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2004), 55]. It might be supposed that since the question, “Have you left off your bad habits” means …
Aulus Gellius replies to an answer like this that “[O]ne need not answer catch questions.” Aulus Gellius, Noctium Atticarum ed. John C. Rolfe, (1927), Bk. 16, II. The Perseus Catalog]. Peter Geach's analysis shows how an answer along the lines explained by Menexenus and John Woods, and others, would simply be “out of place.” [P.T. Geach, “ Russell's Theory of Descriptions,” Analysis 10 no. 4 (March, 1950), 84-86. doi: 10.2307/3326446]. Mary and Arthur Prior write with respect to a similar example, the answer of “Neither … would be a correction of the question rather than an answer to it. With a false antecedent, there is no proper question present. If the interrogative were to be evaluated in accordance with material implication, the conditional would always be evaluated as true regardless of any consequent being provided. Thus, the form of the statement to which (2) applies is not a material conditional. [Mary Prior and Arthur Prior, “Erotetic Logic,” The Philosophical Review 64 no. 1 (January, 1955), 51-4. doi: 10.2307/2268271↩ 30. For example, Jaakko Hintikka explains the possibility of understanding the complex question fallacy in this manner: “There can be a separate, nonpsychological theory of fallacies [i.e. a theory apart from violations of definitory rules of logic] only so far as fallacies are thought of as strategic mistakes, not violations of the ‘rules of inference’ in logic” [Jaakko Hintikka, Inquiry as Inquiry: A Logic of Scientific Discovery (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer Science+Business Media, 1999) 5. doi: 10.1007/978-94-015-9313-7] Traditionally, the fallacy of complex question was not thought to be a fallacy of rhetoric in the same sense of a proponent asserting the complex question in the manner of a rhetorical question expecting no reply. Instead, the fallacy was noted by Aristotle and defined in terms of its origin in the oral disputations of cross-examination in the dialectic of the Socratic Schools. As Hintikka points out: “[F]or the Aristotle who wrote the Topics and De Sophisticis Elenchis … what we now call logical inferences were merely a species of question-answer steps.” [Jaakko Hintikka, “What Was Aristotle Doing in His Early Logic, Anyway? A Reply to Woods and Hansen” Synthese 113 no. 2 (November, 1997), 241. doi: 10.1007/1-4020-2041-4_11] With Richard Whately's assumption of “the Fallacy of Interrogation” occurring in written argumentation (rather than in question-and-answer oral disputation) in the early 19th century, the fallacy became no longer viewed in many logic textbooks as an inference error per se but a fallacy of ambiguity. Whately appears to take the fallacia plurium interrogationum as a rhetorical question. For him, a complex question as a premise within the context of an argument becomes the syllogistic four-term fallacy.[Richard Whatley, Elements of Logic 2nd. ed. (London: J. Mawman, 1826), 162-4.] On Whately's transition from his Fallacy of Interrogation to an ambiguous middle term, see also Edward Poste's objection that the fallacy is syntactic rather than semantic. Aristotle on Fallacies or the Sophistici Elenchi with a Translation and Notes (London: Macmillan and Co., 1866), 160.↩ 31.William and Mary Kneale, The Development of Logic (1962 Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 114.↩ 32. See Nicholas Rescher, Paradoxes: Their Roots, Range, and Resolution (Chicago: Open Court, 2001), 140.↩ 33. Robert Stalnaker, Context (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 54-55. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199645169.001.0001 I.e., semantic presupposition is computed from the meanings of the parts of complex sentences, and truth functional connectives here prove to be problematic. Lauri Karttunen states: “[O]rdinary discourse is not always fully explicit … I think we can maintain that a sentence is always taken to be an increment to a context that satisfies its presuppositions. If the current conversational context does not suffice, the listener is entitled and expected to extend it as required.” [Lauri Karttunen, “Presupposition and Linguistic Context,” Theoretical Linguistics 1 no. 1-3 (1974), 191. doi: 10.1515/thli.1974.1.1-3.181. Pragmatic presupposition involves the shared background assumptions of the persons in dialogue.↩ 34. Donald Davidson, “Truth and Meaning,” Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation: Philosophical Essays (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), 32. doi: 0.1093/0199246297.003.0002↩ 35. Asbjøhrn Steglich-Petersen, “Knowing the Answer to a Loaded Question,” Theoria 81 no. 2 (February 2015), 107. doi 10.1111/theo.12045 A presupposition is not an entailment; usually a complex question implies its presupposition is true. Strictly speaking, presuppositions are not made by sentences, but are made by speakers. Bart Geurts writes: “[W]henever it is said that sentence φ presupposes that χ, what is actually meant is that normally speaking a speaker who utters χ would thereby commit himself to the presupposition that χ is true.” [Bart Geurts, “Presupposition and Givenness,” in The Oxford Handbook of Pragmatics ed. Yan Huang (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 182. doi 0.1093/oxfordhb/9780199697960.013.21] Of course, the presupposition of truth would not be necessarily the case in instances of trying to force a confession in cross-examinations or trying to cajole an innocent person to confess an indiscretion.↩ 36. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosiphicus (1921 London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961), ¶ 6.51.↩ 37. Nuel D. Belnap, Jr. and Thomas B. Steel, Jr. The Logic of Questions and Answers (New Haven: Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1976), 87.↩ 38. John Leechman Logic: Designed as an Introduction to the Study of Reasoning 4th ed. (1842 London: William Allan & Co., 1864), 117↩ 39. Jaakko Hintikka, “The Fallacy of Fallacies,” Argumentation 1 no. 3 (September, 1987), 224. doi: 10.1007/bf00136775 A U.S. Army field manual defines this type of question differently: “Leading questions are questions that are constructed so to require a yes or no answer rather than a narrative response. … They make it easier for the source to lie … A source … will tend to answer in the way that he thinks the … collector wants him to answer.” [Headquarters, Department of the Army, Human Intelligence Collector Operations Manual FM 2-22.3 (September 2006), 9.4.] Yes-no type questions are usually to be avoided in interrogation since they make deceit more likely.↩ 40. Arist. Soph. El. 30 181b4–8 trans. Poste. [Aristotle, Aristotle on Fallacies: Or The Sophistici Elenchi trans. Edward Poste (London: Macmillan and Co., 1866), 83.] The fallacy of many questions in Aristotle's De Sophisticis Elenchis is not viewed by him specifically as a mistaken inference — the fallacy lies in the confusion when “several questions are united as one.” Arist. 7 Soph.El. 6 169b14.↩ 41. More precisely, he writes, “If one does not make two questions into one then the fallacy which depends on equivocation and ambiguity would not exist …” Arist. Soph. El.17 175a, trans. Forster. Aristotle discusses the many questions fallacy in these passages: Soph. El. 5 (167b38–168a17), 6 (169a6–18), 7 (169b13–17), 17 (175b39–176a19), and 30.↩ 42. Arist. Soph. E. 8 173a–175, trans. Poste. Aristotle writes, “Fallacies connected with the union of several questions in one are due to our failure to differentiate or distinguish the definition of the term ‘proposition.’ for a proposition is a single predication about a single subject.” [Soph. El. 6 169a, trans. Forester].↩ 43. Example adapted from Ran Canetti, ed., Theory of Cryptography: Fifth Theory of Cryptography Conference (Berlin: Springer, 2008), 504. ↩ 44. Kelly W. Saunders, “Informal Fallacies in Legal Argumentation” South Carolina Law Review 4 4 Rev. 343 (1992-1993), 372.↩ 45. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 2-22.3 Human Intelligence Collector Operations (6 September 2006), §9-17.↩ 46. Douglas Walton, “The Fallacy of Many Questions: On the Notions of Complexity, Loadedness and Unfair Entrapment in Interrogative Theory” Argumentation 13 (1999), 381. See also the disjunctive discussion by Noak K. Davis, Elements of Deductive Logic (New York: American Book, c. 1883), 150-152; 197-198.↩ 47. Henry Tyrell, The History of the War with Russia (London: London Printing and Publishing Company, 1857) II:94.↩ 48. Douglas Walton, “Judging How Heavily a Question Is Loaded: A Pragmatic Method,” Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 17 no. 2 (Winter, 1997), 60. doi: 10.5840/inquiryctnews199717228↩ 49. Cory S. Clements explains, “When an investigator uses loaded language to question an eyewitness immediately after an event, the cognitive bias of suggestibility makes the eyewitness's account prone to distortion. This is particularly true after a highly traumatic event because the eyewitness's emotional levels are already aroused. Investigators may feel they are attempting to help the eyewitness to recall the event; the truth is that the investigator is helping the eyewitness to reconstruct the event. The formal rules that guard against leading questions in the court room cannot prevent an interviewer on the scene from inadvertently changing the witness's memory. 355. Cory S. Clements, “Perception and Persuasion in Legal Argumentation: Using Informal Fallacies and Cognitive Biases to Win the War of Words,” BYU Law Review no. 2 article 9 (May, 2013), 357.↩ 50. Richard Robinson states, “Every question implies a proposition. … A question is fallacious, therefore, when the proposition which it implies is false.” [Richard Robinson, “Plato's Consciousness of Philosophy,” Mind 51 no. 202 (April, 1942), 97-98.] Normally the use of the terms “fallacious question” and “false question” are eschewed in today's logic jargon but is occasionally present in debating texts.↩ 51. Wendy A. Schweigert, Research Methods in Psychology 3rd. ed. (Waveland Press, 2011), 205. ↩ 52. Dana Milbank, “ Trump Rams Greatness Down Our Throats,” Index-Journal 99 no. 286 (December 29, 2017), 8A. ↩ 53. Joseph McCarthy, “‘Enemies from Within’ Speech Delivered in Wheeling, West Virginia (1950),” University of Texas at Austin Thomas Jefferson Center for the Study of Core Texts & Ideas↩ 54. L.B. Curzon and P.H. Richards, The Longman Dictionary of Law 7th ed. (1979 Harlow, England: Pearson Education Ltd., 2007), 342.↩ 55. Thomas A. Mauet, Trial Techniques and Trials, 10th ed. (New York: Wolters Kluwer, 2017), 137. “[C]ourts will permit leading questions on direct examination in cases involving children as witnesses or where the inquiry is directed at delicate topics such as sexual matters, where a witness may have difficulty testifying in the absence of prompting leading questions.” [Jefferson L. Ingram, Criminal Evidence 12th ed.(New York: Elsevier, 2015), 310.] Even so, complex or compound questions would not be allowed.↩ 56. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Human Intelligence Collector Operations Manual FM 2-22.3(September 2006), 9.4.↩ 57. Jeff Nance, Conquering Deception (Kansas City: Irvin-Benham, 2004), 131.↩ 58. Adapted from Zachariah Atwell Mudge, Witch Hill: A History of Salem Witchcraft (New York: Carlton & Lanahan, 1870), 85-86.↩ 59. Patricia I. Coburn, The Effects of Cross-Examination on Children's Reports, (Vancouver: Simon Fraser University, 2020), 7.↩ 60. Angela D. Evans, Kang Lee, and Thomas D. Lyon, “Complex Questions Asked by Defense Lawyers But Not Prosecutors Predicts Convictions in Child Abuse Trials,” Law and Human Behavior 33 no. 3(June, 2009), 258-264. doi: 10.1007/s10979-008-9148-6↩ 61. Irvin D. Yalom, The Gift of Therapy (New York: Harper Perennial, 2009), 140.↩ 62. Hereward Carrington, Modern Psychical Phenomena (New York: Dodd, Mean and Company, 1919), 35.↩ 63. Examination of Witnesses: Hints for Conducting a Trial (Des Moines: Mills, 1877), 5.↩ 64. Francis L. Wellman, “Art in Direct Examination,” Case and Comment: The Lawyers Magazine 17 no. 1 (June 1910), 64.↩ 65. Francis Lewis Wellman, The Art of Cross-Examination (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1904), 150. But this technique can backfire in some cases: ”To ask a complex question … will give the witness an opportunity to play games. If they can say no to a part of the question, the other parts fall, as well. The correct way to form the cross-examination question, therefore, is to break it up into one fact at a time.” Lynne Z. Gold-Bikin and Stephen Kolodny, The Divorce Trial Manual: From Initial Interview to Closing Argument (Section of Family Law, American Bar Association: 2003), 73.↩ 66. Thomas A. Mauet, Trial Techniques and Trials, 10th ed. (New York: Wolters Kluwer, 2017), 545.↩ 67. Austria v. Bike Athletic Co., 810 P. 2d 1312 - Or: Court of Appeals 1991, 1314-1315.↩ 68. James McCosh, The Laws of Discursive Thought: Being a Text-Book of Formal Logic, (London: Macmillan, 1870), 184. Diogenes Lärtius provides a similar argument attributed the disputatious Menedemus of Eretria: “‘Is the one of two things different from the other?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘And is conferring benefits different from the good?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘Then to confer benefits is not good.’” [Diogenes Laërtius, “Menedemus” The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers trans. C.D. Younge (London: George Bell and Sons, 1901), ii.135 (p. 109)].↩ 69. “Wagner v. Gilsonite Const. Co. (No. 21163 )” Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1 (April 10, 1920), Southwestern Reporter 220 (May 12 — June 9, 1920) (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1920), 893.↩ 70. Randolph Quirk, et al. A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language (Longman: London, 1985), 581n (8.97n); 808-810 (11.6-8). doi: 10.2307/415437 The presumptions of conducives usually initially influence the persuasive effect of the question and later can influence the recall of their answers. E.g., see Samuel Fillenbaum, “Recall for Answers to ‘Conducive’ Questions,” Language and Speech 11 no. 1 (January, 1968), 46-53. doi: 10.1177/002383096801100107. ↩ 71. Quirk, 814 (11.12).↩ 72. Wolfram Bublitz, “Conducive Yes-No Questions,” Lingistics 19 no. 9 (1981), 886. Abstract: doi: 10.1515/ling.1981.19.9-10.851. Dawn Archer notes in her historical study of the English courts: “[T]he controlling capacity of question (in the historical courtroom, at least) had more to do with the institutionally/legally inscribed roles of the participants than any inherent characteristic of the question-types themselves.” [Dawn Archer, Questions and Answers in the English Courtroom (1640-1760): A Sociopragmatic Analysis Amsterdam, The Netherlands: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2005), 143. doi: 10.1075/pbns.135.] See also Richard Kortum's study of the effects of intonation and verbal mood in conducive questions: Varieties of Tone: Frege, Dummett and the Shades of Meaning (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), § 2.18. Gillian Brown et al. points out that using a low terminal tone can produce a conducive question, but ”the resources of intonation are very limited.” Questions of Intonation (1980, London: Routledge, 2015), 36-37. Abstract: doi: 10.4324/9781315688664.↩ 73. Croake James (pseud. for James Patterson), Curiosities of Law and Lawyers, New enlarged ed. (Samson Low, Marston, 1896), 467.↩ 74. George F. Bishop, et al. “Opinions of Fictitious Issues: The Pressure to Answer Survey Questions” The Public Opinion Quarterly 50 no. 2 (Summer, 1986), 240-250. Preview: doi: 10.2307/2748887↩ 75. Brian C. Jayne and Joseph P. Buckley, eds, “The Reid Technique,” The Investigator Anthology: A Compilation of Articles and Essays about the Reid Technique of Interviewing and Interrogation, 2nd.ed. (John Reid and Associates, 2004), ch. 1. The Supreme Court held in Bram v. United States (1897), that a confession “must not be … obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight,” and Bram was cited in the landmark Miranda v. Arizona (1966) with the rejection of the Reid Technique which, according to the court, uses tactics that: … are designed to put the subject in a psychological state where his story is but an elaboration of what the police purport to know already — that he is guilty.” But this ruling was short-lived, and the Bram decision was held to “not state the standard for determining the voluntariness of a confession.” [Saul M. Kassin, et al,“Police-Induced Confessions; Risk Factors and Recommendations,” Law and Human Behavior 34 no. 1 (February, 2010), 12. Abstract: doi: 0.1007/s10979-009-9188-6.. A justification for using the “alternative question” is offered by Fred E. Inbau, et al.: “A defense attorney may criticize the use of an alternative question, arguing that the investigator offered his client only two choices and thus his client was forced to incriminate himself. The investigator should explain that the defendant had three possible choices. He could have accepted either one of the alternatives presented or as happens frequently, reject them both.” [Fred E. Inbau, et al., “The Reid Nine Steps of Interrogation,” Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 5th. ed. (Chicago, Jones & Bartlett Learning, 2013), 294.] However, of course, an uneducated client might not be aware that the question as posed can be rejected.↩ 76. Arthur Sterngold, et. al., “Do Surveys Overstate Public Concerns?,” The Public Opinion Quarterly 58 no. 2 (Summer, 1994), 256. Abstract: doi: 10.1086/269421 ↩ 77. Donald S. Tull and Del I. Hawkins, Marketing Research: Measurement and Method (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1984), 379.↩ 78. Stanley Le Baron Payne, The Art of Asking Questions (Princeton, New Jersey, 1951), 100-102. doi: 10.1515/9781400858064↩ 79. Howard Schuman and Stanley Presser, Questions and Answers in Attitude Surveys (London: Sage Publications Inc., 1996), 298-299.↩ 80. Rohde Hannah, “Rhetorical Questions as Redundant Interrogatives,” San Diego Linguistic Papers, 2. (accessed October 16, 2018)↩ 81. E.g., see the summary provided by Daniel J. Howard, “Rhetorical Questions Effects of Message Processing and Persuasion: The Role of Information Availability and the Elicitation of Judgment,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 26 no. 3 (May, 1990), 217-239. Abstract: doi: 10.1016/0022-1031(90)90036-L↩ 82. Star Parker, “The DNC's Keith Ellison Dilemma,” Index-Journal 98 no. 282 (January 07, 2017), 9A.↩ 83. Robert Powell, reporter, “Jones v. State 92 South 578 No. 22193,” Cases Reported: Cases Argued and Decided in the Supreme Court of Mississippi 127 (March & September, 1922), 459.↩ 84. Randolph Quirk and Sidney Greenbaum, et al, A University Grammar of English (London: Longan, 1973), 200, and Quirk, Comprehensive 826 (11.23↩ 85. Anita Shirm, “The Role of Questions in Talk Shows,” in Advances in Discourse Approaches, ed. Marta Dynel (Newcastle on Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009), 166.↩ 86. E.g., see the “General Discussion” in Kevin L. Blankenship and Traci Y. Craig, “Rhetorical Question Use and Resistance to Persuasion: an Attitude Strength Analysis,” Journal of Language and Social Psychology 25 no. 2 (June, 2006) 111-128. Abstract: doi: 10.1177/0261927X06286380. ↩ 87. Dana Milbank, “Same-Sex Marriage Can't Be Stopped by Courts,” Index-Journal 94 no. 331 (March 28, 2013), 8A.↩ 88. Kathleen Parker, “Dissecting Hillary,” Index-Journal 94 no. 227 (March 24, 2013), 11A. ↩ 89. Payne, “Art of Asking Questions,” 8-9. ↩ 90. Elizabeth F. Loftus and Guido Zanni, “Eyewitness Testimony: The Influence of he Wording of a Question,” Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 5 no. 1 (1975), 86-88. doi: 10.3758/bf03336715↩ 91. Danny Weathers, Subhash Sharma, and Ronald W. Niedrich, “The Impact of the Number of Scale points, Dispositional Factors, and the Status Quo Decision heuristic on Scale Reliability and Response Accuracy” Journal of Business Research 58 no. 11 (November, 2005), 1516-1524. doi: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2004.08.002 and Madhubalan Viswanathan, Seymour Sudman, and Michael Johnson, “Maximum versus Meaningful Discrimination in Scale Response: Implications for Validity of Measurement of Consumer Perceptions About Products,” Journal of Business Research 57 no. 2 (February, 2004), 108-124. doi: 10.1016/s0148-2963(01)00296-x ↩ 92. Michael A. Genovese and Matthew J. Streb, Polls and Politics: The Dilemmas of Democracy (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York, 2004), 102-103. ↩ 93. Harvey Sacks, “On the Preferences for Agreement and Contiguity in Sequences in Conversation” in Talk and Social Organisation eds. Graham Button and John R.E. Lee (Clevedon, England: Multilingual Matters), 54-69. Also here:. doi: 10.4324/9781003060994-2↩ 94. Ray Wilkinson, “Changing Interactional Behaviour: Using Conversation Analysis in Intervention Programmes for Aphasic Conversation,” in Applied Conversation Analysis: Intervention and Change in Institutional Talk ed. Charles Antaki (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 19-31. doi: 10.1057/9780230316874_3 ↩ 95. “This House Believes Science is a Threat to Humanity,” Idebate Idea: International Debate Education Association↩ 96. W.H.F. Henry, The Practical Debater: An Outline of Instruction in the Law … (Indianapolis, IN.: J.E. Sherrill, 1883), 57.↩ 97. Charles A. Mercier, Psychology: Normal and Morbid (London: Swan Sonneschein, 1901), 114.↩ 98. Question taken out of context from “Evolutionary Origins and Dynamics,” FQEB 2009-2014: Foundational Questions in Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University.↩ 99. Payne, “Art of Asking Questions,” 16.↩ 100. Nikolai G. Chernyshevsky, What Is to Be Done? trans. Michael R. Katz (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 462. doi: 10.2307/20044072↩ 101. Jaakko Hintikka, “Semantics and Pragmatics for Why-Questions,” Journal of Philosophy 92 no. 12 (December, 1995), 636. doi: 10.2307/2941100↩ 102. Lawrence H. Powers, “Equivocation” in Fallacies: Classical and Contemporary Readings eds. Hans V. Hansen and Robert C. Pinto (University Park, PA: University of Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995),289.↩ 103. Gilbert Ryle, “The Academy and Dialectic,” in Critical Essays: Collected Papers Vol. 1 (1971 London: Routledge, 2009), 121. doi: 10.4324/9780203101667-12↩ 104. Jaakko Hintikka, “The Fallacy of Fallacies,” 225. doi: 10.1007/bf00136775↩ 105. Douglas Walton, Logical Dialogue-Games and Fallacies (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc.: 1984), 33.↩ 106. Some examples of logic textbooks covering informal fallacies without including discussion of complex questions or the complex question fallacy: Max Black, Critical Thinking (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1946). Wesley Salmon, Logic (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1963). Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony Blair, Logical Self-Defense U.S. ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994). Trudy Grovier, A Practical Study of Argument (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, 2010). Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Robert Fogelin, Understanding Arguments 9th ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadworth, Cengage Learning, 2015). Merrrilee H. Salmon, Introduction to Logic and Critical Thinking 6th ed. (Boston: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, 2013). John Chaffee, Thinking Critically 12th ed. (Boston: Cengage, 2019). David Zarefsky, The Practice of Argumentation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019). ↩ 107. Hamlin, 217, and Gerald Gazdar, Pragmatics: Implicature, Presupposition, and Logical Form (New York: Academic Press, 1979), 26. ↩ 108. New Church General Conference, The Intellectual Repository 41 no. 214 (July/September, 1871) (London: General Conference of the New Church, 1871), 473.↩ 109. Diogenes Laërtius, “Chrysippus” Lives of Eminent Philosophers (Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1959), vii.187 (p.297). ↩ 110. Bertrand Russell, “On Denoting,” Mind14 no. 56 (October, 1905), 489-490. doi: 10.1093/mind/xiv.4.479↩ 111. P.F. Strawson, “On Referring,” Mind 59 no. 235 (July, 1950), 320-344. doi: 10.1093/mind/lxviii.272.539 ↩ 112. P.F. Strawson, “Singular Terms and Predication,” The Journal of Philosophy 58 no. 15 (20 July 1961), 397. doi: 10.2307/2023052 ↩ 113. P.F. Strawson, “A Reply to Mr. Sellars,” Philosophical Review 63 no. 2(April, 1954, 216-231. doi: 10.2307/2182347↩ 114. Anne Bezuidenhout, “Presupposition Failure and the Assertive Enterprise,” Topoi 35 no. 1 (30 November 2014), 24. doi 10.1007/s11245-014-9265-4 ↩ 115. Diogenes Laërtius, “Chrysippus,” Lives, xii.187 (p.297).↩ 116. Hamlin, Fallacies, 12. Irving M. Copi and Carl Cohen, Introduction to Logic 13th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson: Prentice Hall, 2009). 657.↩ 117. This is implied by what Carl Prantl indicates when he writes:
Carl Prantl,Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande (Leipzig: Verlag Von S. Hirzel, 1855), I:53.↩ 118. Diogenes Laërtius, Lives 41. For a contemporary account, Samuel Wheeler analyzes how the horns-example “is the problem of accounting for intuitions about presupposition in two-valued logic.” Samuel C. Wheeler III, “Megarian Paradoxes as Eleatic Arguments,” American Philosophical Quarterly 20 no. 3 (July, 1983), 290-291. doi: 10.2307/20014009↩ 119. Douglas D. Walton and Erik C. W. Krabbe, Commitment in Dialogue: Basic Concepts of Interpersonal Reasoning (New York: State University of New York, 1995), 180.↩ 120. Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst, Argumentation, Communication, and Fallacies: A Pragma-Dialectical Perspective (1992 London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2016), 214.doi: 10.4324/9781315538662↩ 121. Jaakko Hintikka, “The Fallacy of Fallacies,” Argumentation 1 no. 3 (September, 1987), 225.↩ 122. Cynthia Gibas and Per Jambeck, Developing Bioinformatics Computer Skills (Sebastopol, CA: O'Reilly & Associates, 2001), 38.↩ 123. John E. Kelly III and Steve Hamm, Smart Machines: IBM's Watson and the Era of Cognitive Computing (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 1.↩ 124. Thomas P. Devereaux, Cases Argued and Determined in the Supreme Court of North Carolina from December Term, 1826, to June Term, 1828 (Raleigh: J. Gales and Son, 1829-1836), 481-482.↩ 125. Kent Bach, Exit-Existentialism: A Philosophy of Self-Awareness (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth,, 1973), 4. The presuppositions to Kent Bach's complex question either suffer from the problem of existential import (his “working assumption”) or suffer from the problem of a false dichotomy.↩ 126. Vernon Howard, The Mystic Path of Cosmic Power (Nottingham, U.K.: New Life Foundation, 1999), 64.↩ 127. Randall W. Forsyth, “This Time, Gold Bugs May Have a Point,” Barron's 43 no. 20 (May 20, 2013), 7. The meta-claim in this passage is intended to provide a reason for the adequacy of the explanation of the high price of the sale of a work of art. Converse accident does not occur since the Pollock painting would be an appropriate example of “all manner of stuff. The false presupposition in this passage is that the explanation provided is the only credible account for the facts provided concerning the sale of Pollock's painting.”↩ 128. “Up Against the Wall,” Wall Street Journal 165 (June 18, 1979), 22.↩ 129. Frank Caplan, The Second Twelve Months of Life (New York: Random House, 1982), 188.↩ 130. Edward Thompson, Reconstructing India (New York: Dial Press, 1930), 144.↩ 131. Mona Charen, “Capitalism Did It,” Index-Journal 94 no. 98 (August 7, 2012), 6A. Also here. See also story quoted: Manasi Gopalakrishnan, “Asia: Man on Rampage Kills Six in China,” DW (September 14, 2011).↩ 132. Paul Lindberg, “The End is Near,” Barron's 92 No. 31 (July 30, 2012), 34.↩ 133. Isaac Disraeli, The Quarrels of Authors (New York: Eastburn, Kirk, 1814), I: 133.↩ 134. Attributed to Plutarch quoted in Francis Bacon, Apophthegms in The Works of Francis Bacon ed. Basil Montagu (Philadelphia: Parry & McMillan, 1859), Vol. I, 109.↩ 135. Yalom, 140.↩ 136. Cokie and Steve Roberts, “Women Have Seen This Trump Before,” Index-Journal 98 no. 192 (October 4, 2016), 6A.↩ Readings: Complex Question; Many QuestionsDawn Archer, Questions and Answers in the English Courtroom (1640-1760): A Sociopragmatic Analysis (John Benjamins Publishing, 2005). doi: 0.1075/pbns.135 Angeliki Athanasiadou, “The Discourse Function of Questions,” revised ed. of paper 9th World Congress of Applied Linguistics, April 15-21 1990, Halkidtk, Greece. Beaver, David I., Bart Geurts, and Kristie Denlinger, “Presupposition,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2021 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. Nuel D. Belnap, Jr., “Questions, Answers, and Presuppositions,” The Journal of Philosophy 63 no. 20 (27 October 1966), 609-611. doi: 0.2307/2024255 Susanne Bobzien, “How to Give Someone Horns. Paradoxes of Presupposition in Antiquity,” Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 15 (2012), 159-184. Also available in the Special Issue: “Fallacious Arguments in Ancient Philosophy,” Christof Rapp and Pieter Sjoerd Hasper, eds. Analysis and History of Philosophy / Philosophiegeschichte und Logische Analyse 15 (Münster, Germany: Springer-Verlag GmbH, 2013), 159-184. All versions of paper here. doi: 10.30965/9783897858589_002 Marie Duži and Martina Čihalová, “Questions, Answers and Presuppositions,” Computaciō y Sistemas 19 no. 4 (2015), 647-659. doi: 10.13053/CyS-19-4-2327 Angela D. Evans, et al., “Complex Questions Asked by Defense Lawyers But Not Prosecutors Predicts Convictions in Child Abuse Trials,” Law and Human Behavior 33 no. 3(June, 2009), 258-264. doi: 10.1007/s10979-008-9148-6 Frank Fair, “The Fallacy of Many Questions: Or, How to Stop Beating Your Wife,” The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 4 no. 1 (Spring 1973), 89-92. doi: 10.5840/swjphil19734111 Charles L. Hamlin, “Questions,” in Encyclopedia of Philosophy ed. P. Edwards (New York: Macmillan:, 1967) 7:49-53. Charles L. Hamlin, Fallacies (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1970), 38-40, 73-77. Hans Vilhelm Hansen, “The Straw Thing of Fallacy Theory: The Standard Definition of ‘Fallacy,’“ Argumentation 16 no. 2 (2002), 133-155. doi: 10.1023/a:1015509401631 David Harrah, “The Logic of Questions,” in D. Gabbay and F. Guenther eds. 2nd. ed. Handbook of Philosophical Logic (Dordrecht: Springer Science, 2002), 8: 1-60. doi: 10.1007/978-94-009-6259-0_12 Jaakko Hintikka, “The Fallacy of Fallacies,” Argumentation 1 no. 3 (September, 1987), 211-238. doi: 10.1007/bf00136775 Also, “The Fallacy of Fallacies,” in Analyses of Aristotle (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2004), 193-218. doi: 10.1007/1-4020-2041-4_13 Jaakko Hintikka and Ilpo Halonen, “Semantics and Pragmatics for Why-Questions” Journal of Philosophy 92 no. 12 (December, 1995), 636-657. doi: 10.2307/2941100 and “Semantics and Pragmatics for Why-Questions,” Inquiry as Inquiry: A Logic of Scientific Discovery (Dordrecht: Springer Science, 1999), 183-204. doi: 10.1007/978-94-015-9313-7_9 Peter Charles Hoffer, “Historians and the Loaded Question,” The Historians/ Paradox: The Study of History in Our Time (New York: New York University Press, 2008), 52-64. Dale Jacquette, “Many Questions Begs the Question (but Questions Do Not Beg the Question),” Argumentation 8 no. 3 (August, 1994), 283-289. doi: 10.1007/bf00711194 Stanley L. Payne, The Art of Asking Questions (1951 New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980). doi: 10.1515/9781400858064 Roosmaryn Pilgram and Leah E. Polcar, “Questioning the Fallacy of Many Questions,” in Proceedings of the Sixth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation eds. F.H. van Eemeren et al. (Amsterdam: Sic Sat, 2007), 1059-1064. Persistent Identifier: urn:nbn:nl:ui:29-407602 Richard Robinson, “Plato's Consciousness of Fallacy,” Mind 51 no. 202 (April 1942), 97-114. doi: 10.2307/2250768 Jügen Schmidt-Radefeldt, “On So-Called ‘Rhetorical’ Questions,” Journal of Pragmatics 1 no. 4 ( December, 1977), 375-392. doi: 10.1016/0378-2166(77)90029-7 Asbjøn Steglich-Petersen, “Knowing the Answer to a Loaded Question,” Theoia 81 no. 2 (February, 2014), 97-125. doi: 10.1111/theo.12045 Douglas Walton, “The Fallacy of Many Questions,” Logique et Analyse 24 no. 95/96 (Septembre-Décembre 1981), 291-313. See also here: The Fallacy of Many Questions. Douglas Walton, Logical Dialogue-Games and Fallacies (Lanham, MD: University Press of America: 1984), 27-33. Douglas N. Walton, “Question-Asking Fallacies,” in Questions and Questioning, ed. Michel Meyer (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 195-221. doi: 10.1515/9783110864205.195 Douglas Walton, “Critical Faults and Fallacies of Questioning,” Journal of Pragmatics 15 no. 4 (April 1991), Berlin: (Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 337-366. doi: 10.1016/0378-2166(91)90035-V Douglas Walton, “Judging How Heavily a Question is Loaded: A Pragmatic Method,” Inquiry 17 no. 2 (Winter, 1997), 53-71. doi: 10.5840/inquiryctnews199717228 Douglas Walton, “The Fallacy of Many Questions: On the Notions of Complexity, Loadedness and Unfair Entrapment in Interrogative Theory,” Argumentation 13 no. 4 (November 1999), 379-383. Also, here. doi: 10.1023/a:1007727929716 Andrzej Wísniewski, “The Logic of Questions as a Theory of Erotetic Arguments,” Synthese 109 no. 1 (October, 1996), 1-25. doi: 10.1007/bf00413820 Rachel Zajac and Harlene Hayne, “I Don't Think That's What Really Happened: The Effect of Cross-examination on the Accuracy of Children's Reports,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied 9 no. 3 (2003), 187-195. doi: 10.1037/1076-898x.9.3.187 Which of the following is an example of the fallacy of using an appeal to novelty?Overestimating things that are perceived or painted as “new”. For example: “if you're trying to lose weight, then you should follow the latest trends in dieting; they always work best”. Underestimating things that are perceived or painted as “old”.
Which of the following is the Latin name for the false cause fallacy?The fallacy of false cause is often known by its Latin name, post hoc, ergo propter hoc.
When committing the fallacy of false cause a speaker assumes?False cause is a fallacy that assumes that one thing causes another, but there is no logical connection between the two. A cause must be direct and strong enough, not just before or somewhat related to cause the problem. In a false cause fallacy, the alleged cause might not be strong or direct enough.
What does it mean to use emotional appeals ethically quizlet?What does it mean to use emotional appeals ethically? To use them only when it is appropriate for your topic. To use them in conjunction with building a case on reason.
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