What do you call the understanding of a dominant culture before choosing a suitable control system

3 Empirical Research

Part of the strength of the paradigm of media/cultural imperialism was its compelling clarity, which gripped many a critical academic imagination, and which suggested many fertile avenues of empirical research. It precipitated numerous studies that sought to examine the unidirectional flow of mediated product from the West to the South. The ‘one-way street’ of television traffic was mapped by Nordenstreng and Varis (1974); film production and distribution was studied by Guback and Varis (1982); international news flow by the IAMCR/UNESCO study (Sreberny-Mohammadi et al. 1985). Scholars investigated the reach and dominant role of Western news agencies (Boyd-Barrett 1980), supplemented latterly by study of the televisual news agencies (Paterson 1998). Others showed that Third World media organizations were modeled on those of the earlier mother empires (Katz and Wedell 1977). More recent studies detail the on-going transnational processes of conglomeratization and the increasing vertical and horizontal linkages of media corporations (Herman and McChesney 1997).

Cultural imperialism and media imperialism were among the first models to take the global dynamics of media production and diffusion seriously. These paradigms posed important questions about cultural homogenization, about the diffusion of values such as consumerism and individualism, and about the possible impacts of Western media product on indigenous cultures in the South (Hamelink 1983).

1.1 Knowledge and Support of Cultural Traditions

The first goal is to teach each new generation the culture's dominant worldview and history, including the traditional language, social organization, explanations of phenomena (physical and social sciences), and arts. For example, to communicate within their group, Pakistanis learn Urdu, Tunisians learn Arabic, and Peruvians learn Spanish, Qechua, or Aymara. To understand social organization, Tongans learn the traditional chieftain structure of their society, North Koreans learn the country's version of communism, and South Africans study their republic's multiparty system and national assembly. In the realm of literature, India's youths study the epic poems Ramayana and Mahabarata, students in Taiwan read the Analects of Confucius, and those in Spain read Cervantes' Don Quixote.

Acculturation/accumulative stress

Acculturation and accumulative stress, or stress involved in adjusting to a new dominant culture and feeling pressure to adopt the new dominant culture especially regarding the dominant culture’s drinking norms, impacts alcohol use in minority racial/ethnic groups (Park, Anastas, Shibusawa, & Nguyen, 2014). An often-used proxy of acculturation is nativity with those who are born in the U.S. considered to be more acculturated than those born in their country of origin. For both Asian American and Hispanic/Latino adolescents, individuals who are more acculturated are at greater risk for alcohol use, with mediational mechanisms for Hispanic/Latino adolescents being reductions of family closeness and an increased association with substance-using peers (Bacio et al., 2013; Iwamoto et al., 2016). Similarly, Martinez (2006) and Unger, Ritt-Olson, Wagner, Soto, and Baezconde-Garbanati (2009) showed that parent-child acculturation discrepancies, e.g., greater acculturation among adolescents than their parents, are associated with adolescent alcohol use through higher family stress and lower family cohesion. This social context is often coupled with acculturative stress. In a study of different Asian immigrant subgroups, Park et al. (2014) found acculturation and the associated stress to predict alcohol use, though not in adolescents. Alamilla et al. (2019) found acculturative stress and the associated instances of marginalization, alienation, and rejection increased the risk of alcohol use for U.S.-born racial and ethnic minority groups born into immigrant families. In a small study of recently immigrated Hispanic adolescents in late adolescence (14–17 years old), Meca et al. (2019) found bicultural stress, the pressure of adopting a new culture while maintaining your old culture, predicted onset of alcohol use. This suggests acculturation and acculturative stress are racially and ethnically-related risk factors that can increase the risk of alcohol use in minority adolescents.

Does this form of relativism promote or avoid oppression or cultural imperialism?

Defenders of this version of ethical relativism, such as Scheper-Hughes, often argue that their theoretical stance is an important way to avoid cultural imperialism. Kopelman, in contrast, believes it promotes rather than avoids oppression and cultural imperialism. This view, she argues, entails not only the affirmation that female genital cutting is right in cultures where it is approved, but the affirmation that anything with wide social approval is right, including slavery, war, discrimination, oppression, racism, and torture. That is, if saying that an act is right means that it has cultural approval, then it follows that culturally endorsed acts of war, oppression, enslavement, aggression, exploitation, racism, or torture are right. The disapproval of other cultures, on this view, are irrelevant in determining whether acts are right or wrong. Accordingly, the disapproval of people in other cultures, even victims of war, oppression, enslavement, aggression, exploitation, racism, or torture, does not count in deciding what is right or wrong except in their own culture.

Kopelman argues that on this version of ethical relativism, objections by people in other cultures are merely an expression of their own cultural preferences, having no moral standing whatsoever in the society that is engaging in the acts in question. Kopelman argues this leads to abhorrent conclusions. If this theoretical stance is consistently held, she argues, it leads to the conclusion that we cannot make intercultural judgments with moral force about any socially approved form of oppression including wars, torture, or exploitation of other groups. As long as these activities are approved in the society that does them, they are right. Yet the world community believed that it was making important cross-cultural judgments with moral force when it criticized the Communist Chinese government for crushing a prodemocracy student protest rally, the South Africans for upholding apartheid, the Soviets for using psychiatry to suppress dissent, and the slaughter of ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. In each case, representatives from the criticized society usually said something like, “You don’t understand why this is morally justified in our culture even if it would not be in your society.” If ethical relativism is plausible, these responses should be as well, and they are not. It is troubling, Kopelman writes, for them to suppose that we are so different we cannot converse meaningfully and rationally about morally important topics.

Defenders of ethical relativism may respond that cultures sometimes overlap and hence the victims’ protests within or between cultures ought to count. But this response raises two further difficulties. If it means that the views of people in other cultures have moral standing and oppressors ought to consider the views of victims, such judgments are incompatible with this version of ethical relativism. They are inconsistent with this theory because they are cross-cultural judgments with moral authority. Second, as we noted, unless cultures are distinct, this version of ethical relativism is not a useful theory for establishing what is right or wrong.

Relativists who want to defend sound social cross-cultural and moral judgments about the value of freedom, equality of opportunity, or human rights in other cultures seem to have two choices. On the one hand, if they agree that some cross-cultural norms have moral authority, they should also agree that some intercultural judgments about female circumcision/genital mutilation also may have moral authority. Sherwin is a relativist taking this route, thereby abandoning the version of ethical relativism being criticized herein. On the other hand, if they defend this version of ethical relativism yet make cross-cultural moral judgments about the importance of values like tolerance, group benefits, and the survival of cultures, they will have to admit to an inconsistency in their arguments. For example, Scheper-Hughes advocates tolerance of other cultural value systems. She fails to see that claim as being inconsistent. She is saying tolerance between cultures is right, yet this is a cross-cultural moral judgment using a moral norm (tolerance). Similarly, relativists who say it is wrong to eliminate rituals that give meaning to other cultures are also inconsistent in making a judgment that presumes to have genuine cross-cultural moral authority. Even the sayings sometimes used by defenders of ethical relativism – such as “When in Rome do as the Romans” – mean it is morally permissible to adopt all the cultural norms whatever culture one finds oneself. Thus, it is not consistent for defenders of this version of ethical relativism to make intercultural moral judgments about tolerance, group benefit, intersocietal respect, or cultural diversity.

Kopelman argues that given these difficulties, the burden of proof is upon defenders of this version of ethical relativism. They must show why we cannot do something we think we sometimes ought to do and can do very well, namely, engage in intercultural moral discussion, cooperation, or criticism and give support to people whose welfare or rights are in jeopardy in other cultures. Defenders of ethical relativism need to account for what seems to be the genuine moral authority of international professional societies that take moral stands, for example, about fighting pandemics, stopping wars, halting oppression, promoting health education, or eliminating poverty. Responses that our professional groups are themselves cultures of a sort, seem plausible but incompatible with this version of ethical relativism, as already discussed. Some defenders of ethical relativism object that eliminating important rituals from a culture risks destroying the society. Scheper-Hughes insists that these cultures cannot survive if they change such a central practice as female circumcision. This counterargument, however, is not decisive. Slavery, oppression, and exploitation are also necessary to some ways of life, yet few would defend these actions in order to preserve a society. El Dareer responds to this objection, moreover, by questioning the assumption that these cultures can survive only by continuing clitoridectomy or infibulation. These cultures, she argues, are more likely to be transformed by war, famine, disease, urbanization, and industrialization than by the cessation of this ancient ritual surgery. A further argument is that if slavery, oppression, and exploitation are wrong whether or not there are group benefits, then a decision to eliminate female genital mutilation should not depend on a process of weighing its benefits to the group.

It is also inconsistent for such relativists to hold that group benefit is so important that other cultures should not interfere with local practices. This elevates group benefit as an overriding cross-cultural value, something that these ethical relativists claim cannot be justified. If there are no cross-cultural values about what is wrong or right, a defender of ethical relativism cannot consistently say such things as “One culture ought not interfere with others,” “We ought to be tolerant of other social views,” “Every culture is equally valuable,” or “It is wrong to interfere with another culture.” Each of these claims are intercultural moral judgments presupposing authority based on something other than a particular culture’s approval.

The Differentiation Perspective

A consistent organizational culture expresses the core values shared by most members of the organization. When we speak of an organizational culture, we are thus referring to the dominant culture. It is by using a macro-perspective that we can perceive an organization's special personality.

However, most large organizations are characterized by the fact that different subcultures evolved. These reflect common problems, situations or experiences that members have taken part in. Subcultures often occur as a result of an organization's division into sections. They can also be the result of geographical separation. An individual department can have a subculture that is unique for its members. Usually, such subcultures include the core values of the dominant culture and additional values that are unique to that particular department. Organizations can therefore be seen as collections of various subcultures that operate with different systems of meaning. This means that there is no monolithic culture. Different departments or professional groups have their own subcultures, and these are sometimes at odds with each other. These subcultures sometimes compete for power, control, and resources. The conflicts are normally resolved through adaptation and negotiation.

According to Deborah Dougherty, the reason for this division is that innovation often requires insights based on collective interpretation developed by various specialist groups. Within these groups people think differently and give priority to different types of information. Dougherty suggests four basic types of subcultures that characterize functional departments: (1) the engineering culture; (2) the market culture; (3) the production culture; and (4) the planning culture.

In recent years, the concept of creative knowledge environments has been launched by Sven Hemlin, Carl Martin Allwood, and Ben Martin. This refers to environments in which knowledge is produced by people in a work-life context. Creative knowledge environments may be small. They occur both at the individual level and the team level. In these environments, factors such as personal interaction and physical work conditions are important. Knowledge environments can also be large. They can consist of a research institution or a knowledge-intensive company where employees work. However, the basic idea with the concept of creative knowledge environments is that some form of differentiation of the dominant culture takes place.

The general principles of how a creative knowledge environment works apply at all levels of an organization, whether we are talking about a leadership or a production environment. Creative knowledge environments may be divided according to team and management responsibility. In many knowledge environments the common responsibility is to carry out the assigned work. This common responsibility is something that is special for a knowledge environment. We are talking about a creative knowledge environment that normally has a leader.

If the knowledge environment also leads, we obtain what is commonly called a self-governed knowledge environment. Where the knowledge environment in addition creates itself by selecting the members to be included, we obtain a self-designed knowledge environment. Such a knowledge environment is often made up of members with diverse skills and experience. They solve tasks for which knowledge and skills are required from different parts of their organization, and no single department can cover all areas of the field. It may for example be a case of product-, market-, quality-, or customer-focused knowledge environments.

3.1 Marxist Industry Analysis

Marxist critics have long seen this influential cultural industry as a classic example of monopoly capitalism, focusing on how these long lived corporations colluded to devise ways to maintain their power and cultural imperialism. While Wall Street celebrated Twentieth Century Fox and Paramount's co-financing of Titanic, Marxist critics would see this as yet another example of studios working together—not competing—to maximize profit. Since there were at most eight players, they did not have to worry about going out of business, but simply seeking how much their exploit and keep in profits.

The long-term propensity toward concentration of ownership, endemic to monopoly capitalism, was simply exemplified by the Hollywood motion picture industry. That is what history should teach us, and that is how Hollywood has behaved even in the face of new technologies. Marxists focus on the expansion of giant corporations and the spread of their influence to television, music, toys, theme parks, and other entertainments. Market concentration and anticompetitive behavior describe the operation and ownership of the Hollywood movie industry.

Marxist industry analysis usually focuses on international distribution, seeing the trend toward globalization as evidence of cultural and economic imperialism. While Hollywood publicity focuses on the production of films—its stars, stories, and special effects—international distribution has always been a key to corporate longevity. No other national film industry has been ever been so far-reaching, endangering indigenous, nonprofit seeking culture. They correctly emphasize that Hollywood taught the mass culture businesses to focus on and exploit the advantages of globalizing as seen in the work of Wasko (1994) and Guback (1969).

Assimilation

The concept of assimilation refers to the process through which members of a culture give up many of their traditions, rituals, and language patterns in order to become more fully integrated into the dominant culture. Park and Burgess (1924) offered an initial definition of assimilation in the context of immigration: “a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons and groups, and by sharing their experience and history are incorporated with them in a common cultural life.” Whereas first-generation immigrants may make numerous accommodations in order to adapt to their new cultural setting, it is typically only the young and second or subsequent generations that become fully assimilated. Rumbaut (2013) argued that this process takes place most readily through “intimate and intense” social contacts, requiring communication through a shared language, and full and frequent participation in the activities of daily life. The individual or group of individuals may not be fully aware of how their sense of cultural identity has transformed from thinking of oneself as a refugee, immigrant, or asylum seeker from the sending culture to experiencing a sense of belonging in the receiving culture.

Assimilation may occur subtly as neighboring cultural groups interact and share information, technologies, or daily practices. Experiences of attending public schools, achieving upward economic mobility through occupational attainment, and intermarriage may all contribute to a waning of the salience of the sending culture and a more comfortable incorporation of the dominant or receiving culture. It may occur voluntarily in the process of increased global travel, migration, participation in communication systems, and opportunities to study or work in other cultures. As part of a pattern of increasing globalization, individuals may think of themselves as having mixed cultural identities (Kağıtçıbaşı’, 2007/2009). However, even when a group shares a common language and endorses dominant cultural values, assimilation may be restricted or limited through structural considerations such as barriers to full citizenship, racial or religious discrimination, residential segregation, or conditions of oppression as the dominant culture restricts the expression of certain cultural practices. Upon entry into the receiving culture, members of an immigrant group may experience economic, political, social, or cultural competition or conflict that can heighten their own ethnic or cultural awareness and create boundaries between groups, fostering intergroup differences as opposed to assimilation.

EUROPEAN-AMERICAN VALUES AND THE DOMINANT CULTURE

The dominant culture is identified as European-American because the majority of its peoples originally emigrated from countries in western, central, northern or southern Europe. Although each part of Europe contributed variations to the cultural milieu, some central themes have developed that characterize the dominant culture. It is those themes we present here. Although there are other values that may be important to take into account in specific instances, these values are the ones most likely to be problematic when the human service worker assesses the life style of a minority client. The values presented here are adapted from the work of Katz (1985).

Ethnic and multiethnic identity

Part of forming a clear sense of personal identity requires an understanding of one’s ancestry, especially one’s cultural and ethnic heritage and the values, beliefs, and traditions that may have shaped one’s childrearing environment as well as one’s vision of the future. Ethnic group identity typically involves the incorporation of certain ideals, values, and beliefs that are specific to that ethnic group; a sense of how this ethnic group is regarded by outsiders; and the way in which one orients oneself with respect to this group, that is, whether one seeks out other members of the group, feels proud of one’s membership, and has positive attitudes about it (Cross, 1991).

Young people make the transition from early to later adolescence having done different amounts of work in exploring their ethnic group identity. One theory of ethnic minority identity development offers a five-stage model (Atkinson, Morten, & Sue, 1983):

Conformity. Identification with the values, beliefs, and practices of the dominant culture.

Dissonance. Recognition and confusion about areas of conflict between the values, beliefs, and practices of the dominant culture and those of one’s own ethnic group.

Resistance and immersion. Rejection of many elements of the dominant culture; education about and involvement in one’s own ethnic group and its beliefs, values, and practices.

Introspection. Critical examination of the values, beliefs, and practices of both the dominant culture and one’s own ethnic group’s views.

Articulation and awareness. Identification of those values, beliefs, and practices from the dominant culture and from one’s own ethnic group that are combined into a unique synthesis that forms a personal, cultural identity.

This model highlights the interaction between ethnic identity and personal identity (Cross & Fhagen-Smith, 2001; Rotheram-Borus & Wyche, 1994). Not all young people experience all of these stages. The complex interweaving of ethnic identity exploration, personal identity exploration, and the pursuit of academic goals results in a variety of individual trajectories (Crocetti, Rubini, & Meeus, 2008; Syed, 2010). Over the period of later adolescence, many young people gradually progress from an unexplored or unexamined ethnic identity to a more fully articulated understanding of how race and ethnicity contribute to their sense of self, and a stronger sense of ethnic group membership (Fuligni, Hughes, & Way, 2009; Syed & Azmitia, 2009). Others come to reject the traditional categories of race and ethnicity in favor of a more nuanced view of race as a socially constructed category system and their own ethnicity as derived from diverse backgrounds and ancestries (Ojalvo, 2011).

2.2 The Dominant Culture

The culture which is predominant in society is another pertinent factor. The ‘void of community,’ it is often contended, created by modernity induces individuals—mobile and nonmobile alike—to value the retention of community. Instrumental thinking which pervades all areas of life brings ethnics to aspire to self-expression and to assert their particular identities (Taylor 1994). More specifically, it is also contended that the ‘dominant culture’ is a contingency that may display diverse perspectives toward ethnicity and influence it in different manners. By this notion, one means the beliefs, values, and symbols that identify the society, according to those—the elite or larger social segments—which constitute its leading political forces. These forces give expression to the dominant culture by defining the legal frame of the social insertion of ethnics and weighing on the public opinion through media and policies. Hence, in Germany, the notion of Volk has for a long time stated the supremacy of the nation over the individual, and its anchorage in a given history and culture (Brubacker 1992). As a consequence, naturalization laws obstructed the acquisition of German nationality for non-Germans who reside in the country, even for decades. In the USA where an assimilationist notion of ‘melting-pot’ has been gradually substituted by a pluralistic concept of ‘salad-bowl,’ groups are entitled to retain their particularism while becoming Americans and adjusting to its culture. In France, the ‘republican nation’ is understood as a homogeneous whole—a ‘community of citizens’—which expects new groups to integrate society on these terms (see also Nation: Sociological Aspects). Hence, these dominant cultures display distinct perspectives vis-a-vis ethnics' social evolution, i.e., assimilation, pluralism, or segregation.