A faulty drainage pipe was the most likely source of an outbreak of foot and mouth disease in Britain on 3 August, official investigators concluded today. Show The pipe connected two world class research facilities on the same Pirbright facility in Surrey. One, Merial Animal Health, is a manufacturer of foot and mouth and other animal vaccines. The second, the Institute of Animal Health (IAH), is the world’s foremost reference laboratory for identifying and monitoring outbreaks of foot and mouth. The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) has revealed that the two labs spent years haggling over who should pay for replacement of the ageing pipework, which now looks likely to have allowed the virus to escape. Ironically, the IAH had advertised for a new plumber just days before the outbreak. “The drainage system was crucial to what happened,” says Brian Spratt of Imperial College London, whose report on biosafety was issued at the same time as the HSE report into the incident itself. AdvertisementThe faulty pipe identified by the HSE transmits treated effluent from the Merial factory to a sterilisation tank on the IAH site containing sodium hydroxide. Chain of contaminationHeavy rains in July probably overwhelmed the drainage system, washing live virus into the open through poorly sealed drain covers, concludes the HSE. Lorries owned by contractors working on the Pirbright site probably picked up the mud-borne virus on their wheels and left traces of it on a road adjacent to the farm where the first of the two cases identified was confirmed on 3 August. Tractors from the farm probably picked up traces of contaminated mud from the road, then deposited them on the farmland, exposing the animal to the virus. Early identification of the virus from the infected animal demonstrated that the offending strain – O1BFS – can only have come from Pirbright, where it was being used both by Merial and by the IAH. But the precise source of the virus remains unknown. “We were unable to discriminate between the Merial and IAH sources,” says Geoffrey Podger, chief executive of the HSE. The HSE says that although Merial was producing 12000 litres of the virus at the time of the incident, compared with experiments using just millilitre-scale amounts at the IAH, it isn’t possible to say with certainty that the virus originated from Merial. Biosecurity lapsesThe official reports identifies lapses in biosecurity at the Pirbright site, and demands they be rectified. “There was a poor drainage system, which was poorly maintained, rarely inspected, and not fully contained,” says Spratt. “There was poor communication about risk between the two facilities, and funding difficulties at IAH hindered repairs to the effluent system,” he adds. The HSE report criticises the lack of oversight of contractors visiting the site. “We did find deficiencies in record-keeping, and difficulties accessing records of lorries that had access to the crucial part of the site,” says Podger. Spratt also identifies a possible conflict of interest on the part of the government, which funds research at IAH, and is meant to regulate its activities. Independent reviewsIn response, the government has set up two independent reviews, as demanded by the HSE and Spratt. One will investigate procedures at Pirbright for handling dangerous pathogens like the foot and mouth virus. The other will assess the scope for making a single body responsible for regulating and inspecting labs that handle animal, as well as human, pathogens. At present, the HSE does this job for human pathogens, and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) for animal pathogens. Spratt said HSE would be the ideal body to regulate both. The outbreak itself is now fully under control, says government chief vet, Debby Reynolds. The surveillance zone will be lifted on Saturday, around 35 days after the outbreak began, but the UK will have to wait until November at the earliest to regain its status as a country free of foot and mouth disease, she said. Agriculture minister Hilary Benn, meanwhile, stresses that there should not be a repeat of the Pirbright escape. “There can be no excuse for the foot and mouth virus to escape,” he says. “It must not happen again.”
Foot and Mouth Disease: To Protect U.S. Livestock, USDA Must
Remain Vigilant and Resolve Outstanding Issues (26-JUL-02,
GAO-02-808).
The 2001 outbreak of foot and mouth disease (FMD) in the United
Kingdom decisively illustrated the devastation that this highly
contagious animal disease can cause to a nation's livestock
industry and other sectors of the economy. By the time the
disease was eradicated, the United Kingdom had slaughtered over 4
million animals to control the disease, and sustained losses of
$5 billion in the food and agricultural sectors, as well as
comparable losses to its tourism industry. Before 2001, the
United Kingdom had been FMD-free for almost 34 years; following
the outbreak, the country was, until recently, generally
restricted from participating in the international trade of live
animals, and animal and other products that could transmit the
FMD virus. The United States has adequate processes for obtaining
information on foreign FMD outbreaks and providing U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) agencies and others with this
information, but it does not have adequate processes for sharing
this information with Customs. The United States recieves
information on FMD outbreaks from USDA officials stationed in
foreign countries, international agricultural and animal health
organizations, and foreign governments directly. These officials
collect a wide array of agricultural and animal health
information about the countries and regions in which they are
stationed, which allows the United States to have access to
information on foreign FMD outbreaks in a timely manner. However,
USDA's processes for disseminating information on foreign FMD
outbreaks are uneven. U.S. measures to prevent the introduction
of FMD are comparable to those used by other countries and have
kept the United States free of the the disease for 75 years.
Nevertheless, because of the nature of the disease and the risk
inherent in the ever-increasing volume of international travel
and trade, U.S. livestock remains vulnerable to the disease. USDA
has a two-pronged approach to prevent FMD from reaching U.S.
livestock. USDA tries to keep FMD as far as possible from U.S.
borders by helping other countries control and eradicate the
disease. USDA has developed and implemented specific preventive
measures at ports of entry to ensure that international cargo,
animals, passengers, and mail do not bring the disease into the
United States. In the event of an FMD outbreak, the United States
will face a number of challenges in mounting an effective and
quick response, even though USDA and many states have developed
and tested emergency animal disease response plans.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-02-808
ACCNO: A04062
TITLE: Foot and Mouth Disease: To Protect U.S. Livestock, USDA
Must Remain Vigilant and Resolve Outstanding Issues
DATE: 07/26/2002
SUBJECT: Animal diseases
Infectious diseases
International trade
Livestock products
Emergency preparedness
International relations
United Kingdom
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GAO-02-808
A
Report to the Honorable Tom Daschle, U. S. Senate
July 2002 FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE To Protect U. S. Livestock, USDA Must
Remain Vigilant and Resolve Outstanding Issues
GAO- 02- 808
Letter 1 Executive Summary 2
Purpose 2 Background 3 Results in Brief 3 Principal Findings 6
Recommendations for Executive Action 11 Agency Comments 11
Chapter 1 12
Introduction FMD Is a Highly Contagious Animal Disease 12
Incidence of FMD Worldwide Is Extensive 15 International Community Has
Guidelines to Control and Eradicate
FMD 18 An FMD Outbreak Can Cost Billions of Dollars 19 Social Impacts of
an Outbreak Can Be Significant 21 USDA Is Responsible for Protecting U. S.
Livestock From FMD and
Other Animal Diseases 22 U. S. Customs Service Supports USDA*s Efforts at
Ports of Entry 24 Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 24
Chapter 2 27
USDA Has Adequate USDA Obtains Information on Foreign FMD Outbreaks from
Multiple Sources 27
Processes to Obtain USDA Lacks a Formal Process to Ensure Dissemination of
FMD Information on Foreign
Information to Customs 29 FMD Outbreaks, but
Conclusions 33 Recommendations for Executive Action 34
Dissemination to Customs Can Be Improved
Chapter 3 35
U. S. Measures to USDA*s Efforts to Control and Eradicate FMD in Other
Countries
Help Reduce the Risk to U. S. Livestock 35 Prevent FMD Are
Despite U. S. Preventive Measures at Ports of Entry, Vulnerability to
Generally Comparable FMD Remains 37
to Other Countries, but U. S. Preventive Measures Are Comparable to Those
Used by Other
Countries 46 Complete Protection
Conclusions 51 May Be Infeasible
Recommendation for Executive Action 52 Agency Comments 52
Chapter 4 53
Despite Preparation The Federal Government and Many States Have Developed
and Tested Emergency Response Plans 53
Efforts, the United Serious Challenges to an Effective U. S. Response Are
Yet to Be
States Will Face Resolved 56
Challenges in Conclusions 68 Recommendation for Executive Action 68
Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak
Appendixes
Appendix I: Countries Considered FMD- Free by the United States 69
Appendix II: Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Canada
71
Appendix III: Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Mexico
80
Appendix IV: Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into the
United Kingdom 87
Appendix V: Comments from the U. S. Department of Agriculture 96
Appendix VI: Comments from the U. S. Customs Service 100
Appendix VII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 101 Tables Table 1:
Survival Time of the FMD Virus in Selected Products and
By- Products 14 Table 2: Key USDA Information Dissemination Actions Taken
After the 2001 Outbreak of FMD in the United Kingdom 31
Table 3: Volume/ Numbers of Passengers, Vehicles, and Cargo Entering the
United States, Inspected by APHIS and Resulting in Seized Products, Fiscal
Year 2001 45 Table 4: Agriculture- Related Questions on the Prior and
Revised
U. S. Declaration Forms 51 Figures Figure 1: Worldwide Incidence of FMD,
1992 through 2002 15
Figure 2: Worldwide Incidence of Four Types of FMD, 1990 through 2002 17
Figure 3: U. S. FMD Signs Posted at Ports of Entry 49 Figure 4: Canadian
and Mexican FMD Signs Posted at Ports of Entry 50
Figure 5: Disposal of Animal Carcasses by Burial in the United Kingdom 65
Figure 6: Disposal of Animal Carcasses by Incineration in the
United Kingdom 66
Abbreviations
APHIS Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service BSE bovine spongiform
encephalopathy CCRA Canada Customs and Revenue Agency CFIA Canadian Food
Inspection Agency DEFRA Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
FAS Foreign Agricultural Service FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FMD foot and mouth disease FSIS Food Safety and Inspection Service GAO
General Accounting Office NAHEMS National Animal Health Emergency
Management System OIE Office International des Epizooties pH potential of
hydrogen SAGARPA Secretaria de Agricultura, Ganaderia, Desarrollo Rural,
Pesca y
Alimentaction USDA U. S. Department of Agriculture WTO World Trade
Organization
Executive Summary Purpose The 2001 outbreak of foot and mouth disease
(FMD) in the United Kingdom
decisively illustrated the devastation that this highly contagious animal
disease can cause to a nation*s livestock industry and other sectors of
the economy. By the time the disease was eradicated, about 8 months later,
the United Kingdom had slaughtered over 4 million animals to control the
disease, and sustained losses of over $5 billion in the food and
agricultural sectors, as well as comparable losses to its tourism
industry. Before 2001,
the United Kingdom had been FMD- free for almost 34 years; following the
outbreak, the country was, until recently, generally restricted from
participating in the international trade of live animals, and animal and
other products that could transmit the FMD virus.
The United States is an FMD- free nation and has not had an outbreak of
the disease since 1929. In 2001, the U. S. livestock and poultry sector
was valued at $100 billion. Because of the importance of the livestock
industry to the U. S. agricultural sector and economy, protecting U. S.
livestock from FMD and other animal diseases not present in the United
States (foreign
animal diseases) is an important responsibility for the U. S. Department
of Agriculture (USDA). Senator Tom Daschle asked GAO to determine whether
(1) U. S. processes to obtain and disseminate information on foreign FMD
outbreaks are adequate, (2) U. S. measures for preventing FMD from
entering the United States are effective and comparable with those of
other selected countries, and (3) the United States could respond quickly
and effectively to an outbreak of FMD, if it were to occur.
To respond to this request, GAO, among other things, visited seaports,
airports, and international mail- processing facilities in New Jersey,
Maryland, Texas, and Virginia. GAO also visited federal inspection
stations on the U. S.- Canadian and U. S.- Mexican borders to observe
inspection procedures for livestock imports and met with government
officials in these countries who are responsible for protecting their
nation*s livestock
from FMD. GAO also interviewed state veterinarians in six states that are
major producers of U. S. livestock, and international passengers and U. S.
veterinarians who were in the United Kingdom during the outbreak. In
addition, GAO reviewed and summarized legislation, regulations, and
publicly available documents on the measures used by the European Union
and the United Kingdom to prevent the introduction of FMD. (See chapter 1
for a detailed description of GAO*s scope and methodology.)
Background FMD is a highly contagious viral disease of cloven- hoofed
animals such as cattle, swine, and sheep. Infected animals develop a fever
and blisters on their tongue, lips, and between their hooves. Many animals
recover from an FMD infection, but the disease leaves them debilitated and
causes severe losses in meat and milk production. FMD does not have human
health implications. Animals, people, or any materials that bring the
virus into contact with susceptible animals can spread FMD. FMD is a hardy
virus, and in the right environmental conditions can persist in
contaminated items, such as soil and manure, for weeks or months. Only
about 40 percent of countries worldwide are considered FMD- free, but all
three North American
countries are FMD- free. USDA*s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
(APHIS) is responsible for protecting U. S. livestock from the
introduction of foreign animal diseases such as FMD. In fulfilling its
responsibilities, APHIS conducts activities to exclude animal disease,
detect and eradicate it, and educate
the public about it. APHIS inspectors are present at 144 U. S. ports of
entry, as well as in some foreign countries, to help ensure the safety of
international cargo, passengers, and mail. According to USDA, this
includes all major U. S. ports. In an effort to keep U. S. animals free of
foreign animal diseases, the U. S. Customs Service (Customs) is an
important federal partner, supporting USDA*s activities at each of the 301
ports of entry into the United States. Customs is the first line of
defense at U. S. ports against the entry of prohibited and illegal items,
particularly when the port does not have
APHIS personnel. Results in Brief The United States has adequate processes
for obtaining information on foreign FMD outbreaks and providing USDA
agencies and others with this information, but it does not have adequate
processes for sharing this information with Customs. The United States
receives information on FMD outbreaks from USDA officials stationed in
foreign countries, international agricultural and animal health
organizations, and foreign governments directly. In particular, USDA has
animal health experts stationed in 27 countries and agriculture trade
officials stationed in 129 countries. These officials collect a wide array
of agricultural and animal health information about the countries and
regions in which they are
stationed, which allows the United States to have access to information on
foreign FMD outbreaks in a timely manner. However, USDA*s processes for
disseminating information on foreign FMD outbreaks are uneven. For
example, after receiving official notification from the United Kingdom on
February 21, 2001, about the presence of FMD in that country, USDA
immediately alerted its relevant agencies in Washington, D. C., and their
field locations, and during the month of March provided the public,
industry, state and local governments, and private veterinarians with
information and guidance about FMD prevention. But USDA has no formal
process for providing Customs with information. As a result, Customs
inspectors at U. S. ports of entry did not receive uniform information or
guidance on FMD prevention activities after the U. K. outbreak. Customs
received this information only after formally requesting it from the
Administrator of APHIS* over a month after the United Kingdom*s
notification. During this interval, many Customs inspectors said they felt
ill equipped to adequately process international cargo and passengers at
U. S. ports of entry. While USDA has taken an interim step to improve
notification to Customs about foreign FMD outbreaks, GAO is recommending
further improvements to establish a more permanent solution and ensure
that Customs has clear procedures for handling
passengers and cargo from countries affected by FMD. U. S. measures to
prevent the introduction of FMD are comparable to those used by other
countries and have kept the United States free of the disease for almost
75 years. Nevertheless, because of the nature of the disease and the risk
inherent in the ever- increasing volume of international travel and trade,
U. S. livestock remains vulnerable to the disease. USDA has a twopronged
approach to prevent FMD from reaching U. S. livestock. USDA tries to
keep FMD as far as possible from U. S. borders by helping
other countries control and eradicate the disease. For example, USDA
supports programs in Colombia and Panama to create an FMD- free buffer
zone between North and Central America, which are FMD- free,
and South America, which is not.
USDA has developed and implemented specific preventive measures at ports
of entry to ensure that international cargo, animals, passengers, and mail
do not bring the disease into the United States. For example, in response
to the outbreak in the United Kingdom, USDA immediately prohibited imports
of susceptible animal products from the United Kingdom, including those
shipped 3 weeks prior to the date of official notification of the
outbreak. This prohibition remained in effect until
USDA reassessed the United Kingdom*s animal disease status and determined
the products for which trade could safely resume. Similarly, at airports,
USDA uses signs and inspectors, among other things, to ensure that
international passengers do not inadvertently bring items
into the country that could carry the FMD virus. However, these and other
efforts cannot completely eliminate the vulnerability of U. S. livestock
because (1) some level of risk is inherent in international travel and
trade, (2) FMD is a hardy virus that may remain viable for days or even
weeks on shoes and in hay or certain meat and dairy
products, and (3) the volume of legal and illegal international trade and
passengers entering the United States makes it impossible for U. S.
inspectors to inspect and ensure the safety of every shipment, baggage, or
person entering the country. Furthermore, although the preventive measures
the United States, Canada, and Mexico have implemented are similar, these
other countries* implementation measures suggest opportunities for USDA to
improve its preventive measures. For example, all three countries use
signs at airports to alert passengers about FMD and the need to keep it
out of the country. However, the Canadian and Mexican signs are much more
noticeable because they are larger, bolder, and more colorful. GAO is
recommending that USDA revise its signs to improve their
effectiveness. In the event of an FMD outbreak, the United States will
face a number of challenges in mounting an effective and quick response,
even though USDA and many states have developed and tested emergency
animal disease response plans. For example, a high level of cooperation,
coordination, and communication between state and federal agencies and
between federal agencies is critical to an effective response. While USDA
is making improvements in these areas, there is a wide variance between
the states. Similarly, an effective response will require an adequate
infrastructure, including a massive commitment of manpower and laboratory
resources. USDA has developed agreements with other federal agencies, such
as the Department of Defense and the Federal Emergency Management Agency,
to leverage additional resources. However, gaps remain. For example, it is
unclear how USDA will obtain the 1,200 additional veterinarians trained in
responding to foreign animal diseases that it estimates the nation will
need to respond to an FMD outbreak. Furthermore, several issues relating
to animal identification, disposal, and indemnification have not yet been
addressed. For example, the United States does not have a system to
identify and track animal movements in the event of an outbreak, and it is
unclear how this information would be gathered in a timely manner. USDA
currently has several efforts under way to resolve these issues. However,
the effectiveness and speed of a U. S. response may be compromised if
these issues are not fully addressed and resolved before an FMD outbreak
occurs. GAO is recommending that USDA develop plans with interim and final
milestones to ensure that these issues are addressed in a timely fashion.
Principal Findings USDA Has Adequate
USDA receives information about the incidence of foreign animal diseases,
Processes to Obtain including FMD, from a variety of sources. These
include USDA*s network Information on Foreign
of staff stationed in foreign countries, international animal health and
trade FMD Outbreaks but Can organizations, and the governments of affected
nations. However, the
usefulness of the information on foreign FMD outbreaks depends on a
Improve Dissemination to foreign country*s willingness to provide accurate
information in a timely Customs
fashion. For example, in 2001, Argentine officials did not acknowledge
that some regions of their country had been affected with FMD, although
unconfirmed reports indicated that the disease had been present for
several months, according to USDA officials. USDA was unable to take
official action to prohibit FMD- susceptible products from Argentina until
it received an official notification of the outbreak or obtained
verifiable scientific evidence that FMD was present in Argentina.
APHIS has primary responsibility for sharing information obtained about
foreign FMD outbreaks with other agencies within USDA, Customs, state
governments, affected industries, and the public. These entities all need
current information about potential FMD outbreaks because they all play an
important role in preventing or responding to an outbreak. While APHIS
immediately alerts USDA agencies and others, it has no formal process or
defined procedures to distribute information on foreign FMD outbreaks to
Customs. For example, after the U. K. outbreak, APHIS did not inform
Customs about its decisions to prohibit or restrict certain products or
more vigilantly screen passengers arriving at U. S. ports of entry from
the United Kingdom. Until the Acting Commissioner of Customs formally
requested this information in writing from the Administrator of APHIS,
Customs did not receive any official guidance on general inspection
measures for passengers and products. According to a Customs memorandum
and officials we spoke to, many Customs field inspectors felt ill equipped
to
adequately process international cargo and passengers at ports of entry
during the initial stages of the U. K. outbreak. Moreover, according to
Customs officials, these inspectors are not animal disease specialists,
and therefore need clear, nontechnical procedures to help them process
international passengers and their luggage, especially at those ports
where there is no APHIS presence. According to an APHIS official, although
Customs had not been included on the FMD alert distribution list in the
past, a Customs official has now been added to the list and will receive
future alerts about foreign FMD outbreaks. This is a good interim step,
however, GAO does not believe that it completely addresses the need for
formal and well- defined communication procedures and protocols between
APHIS and Customs. U. S. Preventive Measures The United States seeks to
prevent an FMD outbreak by supporting various
Are Comparable to Those of programs to control and eradicate the disease
overseas and by screening Other Countries, but
livestock, animal and other products, and passengers at the nation*s ports
Providing Complete of entry. By helping other nations eradicate or control
FMD outbreaks, USDA reduces the potential for the disease to reach U. S.
borders. For Protection May Be example, in North America, U. S. efforts to
eradicate and control FMD have Infeasible largely focused on Mexico
because of the shared border and the possible
threat that the FMD virus could move overland from South America, where
the disease is endemic in several countries. USDA helped Mexico eradicate
FMD in 1954 and continues to help ensure that Mexico remains disease free.
Similarly, USDA programs have helped create FMD- free zones in Colombia
and Panama. These zones will help alert countries in both
Central and North America about the potential incursion of FMD from the
south. Also, when other countries have an outbreak, USDA may provide
support by sending U. S. veterinarians to help control and eradicate the
disease. For example, a total of about 327 U. S. animal health
professionals, including over 300 veterinarians, helped eradicate the 2001
outbreak in the United Kingdom.
USDA has also identified key pathways by which the FMD virus could enter
the United States and has implemented measures to prevent potentially
infected animals or products from entering the country. For example, USDA
allows imported livestock only from countries that are free of FMD and
other diseases of concern, when they are accompanied by appropriate import
permits and health certificates and may subject these animals to
quarantine. Furthermore, if a country has an FMD outbreak, USDA prohibits
the importation of all susceptible products shipped 3 weeks prior to the
date of official notification of the outbreak. This prohibition remains
in effect until USDA has reassessed the disease status of the affected
country and determined the level of trade that can resume. Moreover, USDA
restricts imports of animal products from FMD- affected countries to those
that have been processed in such a manner that they inactivate the
virus and do not present a risk to U. S. livestock. In contrast, other
products, such as hay used for feed or bedding, fresh meat, and some dairy
products, are completely prohibited. Similarly, USDA has preventive
measures for international passengers and their luggage, garbage from
international ships and airplanes, and military personnel and equipment
returning from overseas to ensure that they are not carrying the virus
into the country.
USDA officials and some animal health experts believe that the United
States* almost 75- year disease- free status is a measure of the success
of the department*s efforts to keep FMD out of the country. At the same
time,
these officials are also concerned that, because of the level of risk
inherent in international trade and travel, no set of measures can ever
completely eliminate the possibility that FMD will enter the United
States. Moreover, these experts believe that U. S. vulnerability to an
outbreak remains because (1) FMD is a hardy virus that can enter the
country on a variety of animate and inanimate products and (2) the
magnitude and volume of international passengers, mail, and products
entering the United States creates an enormous inspection challenge for
USDA and other federal agencies. According to USDA, it would take only one
contaminated product coming into contact with one susceptible U. S. animal
to start a nationwide outbreak.
Other countries face similar challenges in protecting their livestock from
FMD. Canada, Mexico, and the United Kingdom generally use measures that
are comparable to U. S. measures to ensure that imports of livestock and
animal products, international mail, and garbage from international
carriers do not present an FMD risk. However, the countries have
implemented measures differently for international passengers. For
example, while Canada and Mexico use disinfectant mats at ports of entry,
the United States does not. According to USDA officials, the United States
does not use disinfectant mats because research indicates that their use
may cause the virus to spread. Also, while all three countries use signs
at international airports to alert and inform passengers about the risks
of FMD, the U. S. signs are not as noticeable as the signs used in Canada
and Mexico. While GAO recognizes that there is a cost to developing new
signs, more effective signs may help improve U. S. preventive measures for
international passengers.
Despite Preparation Efforts, If FMD enters the United States despite
USDA*s preventive measures, the
Serious Challenges to an nation*s ability to identify, control, contain,
and eradicate the disease Effective U. S. Response Are
quickly and effectively becomes paramount. Recognizing the importance Yet
to Be Resolved
of an effective response, USDA and many states have developed emergency
response plans that establish a framework for the key elements necessary
for a rapid and successful U. S. response and eradication program. These
plans have been tested, to some extent, by federal and state agencies to
determine their effectiveness. Planning and testing exercises have also
identified the following challenges, which could ultimately impede an
effective and timely U. S. response if they are not resolved before an FMD
outbreak occurs:
Ensuring the rapid identification and reporting of an FMD incident. A
timely response depends on having livestock producers and private
veterinarians quickly identify and report suspicious symptoms to state and
federal officials. If they do not, FMD could become out of control before
the federal and state governments initiate any action. Several federal and
state animal health officials expressed concern about how
quickly disease identification and reporting would actually occur in the
United States. According to USDA officials, the U. K. outbreak helped
raise general awareness among state officials, private veterinarians, and
livestock producers about the risks and potential of an FMD outbreak in
the United States. Consequently, in 2001, USDA and the states increased
their efforts to inform the livestock industry about the risks and
symptoms of FMD. The challenge to USDA will be to maintain this heightened
awareness about FMD, now that the immediate risk from the
United Kingdom has subsided.
Enhancing cooperation, coordination, and communication between federal,
state, and local agencies, private veterinarians, and the industry. Recent
planning efforts and testing exercises have started the process of
establishing greater coordination and improving the level of cooperation
and communication between all levels. However, these
efforts have also identified gaps in these areas, and according to state
officials, the level of cooperation, coordination, and communication
between state officials and their federal counterparts vary across states.
To help address these gaps, USDA is working with other organizations, such
as the National Emergency Management Association, and is providing funds
to help states improve their planning for animal emergencies.
Developing an adequate response infrastructure to outbreaks of animal
disease. An effective response to an FMD outbreak depends on an adequate
infrastructure, which should include a national emergency management
control and command center, technical and other personnel, transportation
and disposal equipment, and laboratory facilities and testing capacity.
While details for some of these components have been developed, others are
not yet fully resolved. For example, USDA, in partnership with the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, has set up a mechanism that will enable it to
leverage resources for many of the general logistical support activities
needed to respond to an outbreak. Similarly, USDA*s memorandum of
understanding with the Department of Defense will help provide needed
military personnel and equipment to support a response effort. However, it
is not yet clear how the United States will fill the shortage of at least
1,200 specially trained veterinarians or the laboratory testing and
diagnostic capacity that USDA estimates is needed to respond to an animal
health emergency.
Establishing methods to identify and dispose of animals, and indemnify
livestock producers. The effectiveness of a U. S. response to an FMD
outbreak will require an animal identification and tracking system that
will allow responders to quickly identify, control, and
slaughter infected and exposed animals, as well as clear animal disposal
and indemnification policies. Recognizing the importance of an animal
identification and tracking system, USDA began planning for it in 1999.
However, until recently, the livestock industry has resisted the concept
because of the costs involved and the potential for the unauthorized
disclosure of proprietary information, according to USDA officials.
Similarly, USDA has determined that burial, incineration, and rendering
are the preferred methods for disposing of animal carcasses. However,
according to federal and state officials, each of these disposal methods
presents significant implementation challenges that have not yet been
fully considered, such as the potential to spread the disease if on- farm
disposal is not feasible, the potential to cause groundwater contamination
or air pollution, high cost, and concerns about public perception.
Finally, delays could occur during an FMD eradication effort, because
producers* fearing that they might not be adequately compensated for the
fair market value of destroyed animals, products, and materials as well as
cleaning and disinfecting costs* may not cooperate with responders. To
address this concern, USDA published a
proposed rule on May 1, 2002, amending its FMD- related regulations
that clarify how indemnity and compensation issues will be handled during
an outbreak.
Recommendations for GAO recommends that USDA collaborate with Customs to
develop (1) a
Executive Action formal process to disseminate updated information on
foreign FMD
outbreaks to Customs inspectors at ports of entry and (2) nontechnical
procedures that these inspectors can use to screen cargo and passengers
from FMD- affected countries. GAO also recommends that USDA consider
better signs for ports of entry to help ensure that international
passengers
do not inadvertently bring FMD into the United States. Finally, GAO
recommends that USDA develop a plan and related milestones to address the
outstanding issues that could compromise an effective and rapid U. S.
response.
Agency Comments We provided Customs and USDA with a draft of this report
for review and comment. Customs had no comments on the report. USDA stated
that the
report was generally accurate and insightful, and provided a number of
meritorious recommendations. USDA also noted that the report provided an
accurate portrayal of the challenges that face the continuum of federal,
state, and industry resources dedicated to safeguarding the health of U.
S. agriculture. USDA agreed with the report*s conclusion that because of
the enormous volume of international travel and trade, there is no way to
ensure zero risk of disease introduction. However, USDA also believes that
the short- and long- term measures that it is taking to enhance
prevention,
surveillance, emergency preparedness, and coordination with other federal,
state, and industry organizations is providing a much- needed boost to the
United States* overall safeguarding infrastructure. At the same time, USDA
agreed that it would continue to look critically at the effectiveness of
its efforts and make whatever changes are warranted. USDA*s and Customs*
written comments are presented in appendix V and
VI, respectively. USDA*s comments include additional information on the
department*s recent and other ongoing efforts to enhance the United
States* ability to prevent and respond to an FMD outbreak in the areas of
(1) resources and infrastructure, (2) prevention and control measures, and
(3) communications and outreach. We have included this information and the
additional technical comments that USDA provided us with throughout the
report as appropriate.
Chapt er 1
Introduction Foot and mouth disease (FMD) is one of the most devastating
viral animal diseases affecting cloven- hoofed animals such as cattle and
swine, and has occurred in most countries of the world at some point
during the last century. Although the disease has no human- health
implications, it can have enormous economic and social consequences, as
recent outbreaks in the United Kingdom and Taiwan have demonstrated. These
consequences occur because the international community values products
from countries that are FMD- free and generally restricts international
trade in FMDsusceptible products from countries affected by an outbreak.
Most FMDaffected countries, therefore, take whatever measures necessary to
regain their FMD- free status as quickly as possible. In the United
States, the U. S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has primary
responsibility for protecting domestic livestock from animal diseases such
as FMD. The U. S. Customs Service supports USDA in these efforts.
FMD Is a Highly FMD* a highly contagious viral disease affecting primarily
cloven- hoofed
Contagious Animal animals, such as cattle, sheep, swine, and goats* has 7
types and over 80 subtypes. Immunity to, or vaccination for, one type of
the virus does not
Disease protect animals against infection from the other types. FMD-
infected
animals usually develop blister- like lesions in the mouth, on the tongue
and lips, on the teats, or between the hooves, which causes them to
salivate excessively or become lame. Other symptoms include fever, reduced
feed consumption, and abortions. Cattle and pigs are very sensitive to the
virus and show symptoms of the disease after a short incubation period of
3 to 5 days. The incubation period in sheep is considerably longer, about
10 to 14
days, and the clinical signs of the disease are usually mild and may be
masked by other conventional conditions, thereby allowing the disease to
go unnoticed. The mortality rate for nonadult animals infected with FMD
varies and depends on the species and strain of the virus; in contrast,
adult animals usually recover once the disease has run its course.
However, because the disease leaves them severely debilitated, meat-
producing animals do not normally regain their lost weight for many
months, and
dairy cows seldom produce milk at their former rate. The disease therefore
can cause severe losses in the production of meat and milk.
The FMD virus is easily transmitted and spreads rapidly. Prior to and
during the appearance of clinical signs, infected animals release the
virus into the environment through respiration, milk, semen, blood,
saliva, and
feces. The virus may become airborne and spread quickly if pigs become
infected because pigs prolifically produce and excrete large amounts of
the virus into the air. Animals, people, or materials that are exposed to
the
virus can also spread FMD by bringing it into contact with susceptible
animals. For example, the virus can spread when susceptible animals come
in contact with contaminated
animals;
animal products, such as meat, milk, hides, skins, and manure;
transport vehicles and equipment;
clothes or shoes worn by people; and
hay, feedstuffs, or veterinary biologics. 1 The FMD virus has a
remarkable capability for remaining viable for long periods of time in a
variety of animate and inanimate objects. For example, the virus can
persist in the human nasal passages for up to 36 hours, manure for 1 to 24
weeks, fodder for 1 month, and on shoes for 9 to 14
weeks. The ability of the virus to persist in the environment and other
products depends on the temperature and potential of hydrogen (pH)
conditions. 2 Generally, the virus can survive freezing but cannot survive
at temperatures above 50 Celsius (122 Farenheit) and at pH levels of less
than 6, or greater than 9. Table 1 shows the various lengths of time that
the
FMD virus can survive in some selected products. 1 A veterinary biologic
is a product used for diagnosing, preventing, and treating an animal
disease. These products include vaccines and kits for diagnosing specific
animal diseases. 2 The pH condition of a product is the measure of its
degree of acidity or alkalinity; a value of 7 is considered neutral while
values greater than 7 are considered alkaline and values below 7 are
considered acidic. A high or low pH of a product may inactivate certain
viruses, such as FMD.
Table 1: Survival Time of the FMD Virus in Selected Products and By-
Products Product or by- product Processing or storage conditions Virus
survival time
Bacon Salted 183 days Bedding (straw and wood shavings) N/ A 4 weeks
Buttermilk N/ A 14 days Ham N/ A 16 weeks Hay Ambient temperature Greater
than 200 days Hides or skins Air dried at 20 C 6 weeks Manure Summer/
winter 1 week/ 24 weeks Shoes Summer/ winter 9 weeks/ 14 weeks Soil
Summer/ winter 3- 7 days/ 21 weeks Water Ambient temperature 14 weeks Wool
Ambient temperature 20 days
Legend: N/ A= not applicable Source: Adapted by GAO from USDA information.
FMD can be confused with several similar but less harmful animal diseases
that also produce blisters and cause animals to salivate, such as
vesicular stomatitis, bovine viral diarrhea, and foot rot. Two foreign
swine diseases are also clinically identical to FMD* swine vesicular
disease and vesicular exanthema of swine. The only way to distinguish
between FMD and these
other diseases is through laboratory analyses of fluid or tissue samples.
FMD is also sometimes confused with mad cow disease or bovine spongiform
encephalopathy (BSE). 3 BSE is a fatal, neuro- degenerative disease found
in cattle in 23 countries around the world. Cattle contract the disease
through animal feed that contains protein derived from the
remains of diseased animals. Scientists generally believe that an equally
fatal disease in humans* known as variant Creutzfeldt- Jacob Disease* is
linked to eating beef from cattle with BSE. However, unlike mad cow
disease, FMD has no known human health implications. 3 In January 2002, we
issued a report on BSE entitled Mad Cow Disease: Improvements in the
Animal Feed Ban and Other Regulatory Areas Would Strengthen U. S.
Prevention Efforts, GAO- 02- 183 (Washington, D. C.: Jan. 25, 2002).
Incidence of FMD FMD is present in about 60 percent of the countries in
the world and
Worldwide Is endemic in many countries in Africa, the Middle East, Asia,
and South America. The relatively few areas that are considered free of
FMD include
Extensive North and Central America, Australia, New Zealand, and the
Caribbean. Figure 1 shows the presence of FMD worldwide for the period
1992
through 2002.
Figure 1: Worldwide Incidence of FMD, 1992 through 2002
Source: GAO*s adaptation of information from the Institute for Animal
Health (Pirbright Laboratory), which is designated the World Reference
Laboratory for Foot and Mouth Disease by the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations, and the Office International des
Epizooties.
In 2000 and 2001, over 40 countries reported outbreaks of FMD, and during
the first 5 months of 2002, five countries reported outbreaks. The spread
of certain strains of the virus also demonstrates how quickly it is
spreading
throughout the world. For example, the FMD virus serotype O, known as the
Pan- Asia strain, was first identified in northern India in 1990 and was
subsequently found in Nepal in 1993. It then spread westward into Saudi
Arabia during 1994 and, subsequently, throughout the Near East and into
Europe (Thrace region of Turkey, Bulgaria, and Greece) in 1996. The
PanAsia
strain was also found in Bangladesh in 1996 and in Bhutan in 1998. In 1999
it was reported in mainland China and then detected in Taiwan. By late
1999 and in 2000, it had reached most of Southeast Asia. Most recently,
the Pan- Asia strain was found in the Republic of Korea, Japan, the
Primorsky Territory of the Russian Federation, and Mongolia (areas free
from FMD since 1934, 1908, 1964, and 1973, respectively). The Pan- Asia
strain is also responsible for the 2001 outbreak of FMD in the United
Kingdom that subsequently spread to France, Ireland, and the Netherlands.
Figure 2 shows the incidence of four types of FMD virus worldwide,
including the type O Pan- Asia strain.
Figure 2: Worldwide Incidence of Four Types of FMD, 1990 through 2002
Source: GAO*s adaptation of information from the Institute for Animal
Health (Pirbright Laboratory), which is designated the World Reference
Laboratory for Foot and Mouth Disease by the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations, and the Office International des
Epizooties.
In North America, the last outbreaks of FMD for the United States, Canada,
and Mexico occurred in 1929, 1952, and 1953, respectively. The United
States has worked closely with both Canada and Mexico to eradicate FMD
from North America.
International The Office International des Epizooties (OIE)* an
intergovernmental Community Has organization created in January 1924 by an
international agreement signed by 28 countries* was established to
guarantee the transparency of Guidelines to Control
information on the animal disease status of member countries. In addition,
and Eradicate FMD
OIE collects and analyzes veterinary scientific information and
disseminates it to member countries, provides expertise and promotes
international solidarity for the control of animal diseases, and
guarantees the sanitary safety of world trade by developing rules for
international trade in animals and animal products. In May 2001, OIE had
158 member countries.
OIE classifies member countries (or certain zones within these countries)
as being FMD- free with or without vaccination if they meet certain
criteria detailed in the OIE International Animal Health Code. For
example, to obtain FMD- free status without vaccination, a member country
should
(1) have a record of prompt animal disease reporting; (2) send a
declaration that it has been FMD- free and has not used vaccination for 1
year; (3) present evidence that it has an effective system of
surveillance;
(4) implement regulatory measures for the prevention and control of FMD;
and (5) provide evidence that no vaccinated animals have been imported
into the country, since such animals can become the source of future
infections. Similarly, to obtain FMD- free- with- vaccination status, a
country
should (1) have a record for prompt animal disease reporting, (2) send a
declaration that there have been no outbreaks of FMD for 2 years, (3)
provide evidence that the country has effective surveillance systems and
has implemented necessary regulatory measures to prevent and
control FMD, (4) provide proof that routine vaccinations are carried out
and that the vaccines comply with OIE standards, and (5) have an intensive
and frequent system to detect any viral activity.
When FMD occurs in an FMD- free country or zone where vaccination is not
practiced, the affected country must reapply after the outbreak to regain
its FMD- free- without- vaccination status from OIE. OIE standards require
a country to wait until 3 months after the last reported case of FMD when
a
*stamping out approach* (immediate slaughter of diseased and exposed
animals with no vaccination) is used to eradicate the disease before the
country can apply for reinstatement of its FMD- free status. As part of
this process, surveillance results of laboratory- screening tests
(serological surveillance results) must be provided to OIE to prove that
the disease has been eradicated. If vaccination was used to control the
outbreak, then the country must wait until 3 months after the last
vaccinated animal is
slaughtered and serological surveillance results prove that the disease
has been eradicated before reapplying for FMD- free status.
The international community generally places a high value on products from
countries that are FMD- free without vaccination. Such countries can
export both live animals and animal products easily to other FMD- free
countries. In contrast, countries that have an FMD- free- with-
vaccination status are restricted to trading animal products that can be
treated to ensure that the virus is inactivated. As a result, most
countries that are
FMD- free without vaccination resort to a stamping out process to
eradicate the disease if an outbreak occurs. The United Kingdom and Taiwan
followed this process in 2001 and 1997, respectively. Similarly, if an
outbreak were to occur in the United States, the current U. S. policy
requires all infected and exposed animals to be immediately slaughtered
and disposed of by incineration, burial, or rendering. 4 In recent years,
the international community has been encouraging the acceptance of
regionalization policies for international trade. Regionalization involves
declaring one or more areas of a country FMDfree
while other areas are responding to an outbreak. Under a regionalization
policy, in the event of an FMD outbreak in the United States, even if one
state or area was infected, the nation as a whole might
not lose its FMD- free status, and trade restrictions might not be
enforced on all of our FMD- susceptible products.
An FMD Outbreak Can An FMD outbreak could cost the U. S. economy billions
of dollars in both
Cost Billions of Dollars direct and indirect costs. Direct costs to the
government would include the
costs of disease control and eradication, such as the maintenance of
animal movement controls, control areas, and intensified border
inspections; the destruction and disposal of infected animals; vaccines;
and compensation to producers for the costs of disease containment.
However, government compensation programs may not cover 100 percent of
producers* costs. As a result, direct costs would also occur for
disinfection and for the value of
any slaughtered animals not subject to government compensation. According
to recent U. K. government estimates, the direct costs for control and
eradication of the 2001 outbreak was about $4 billion. According to
several estimates, the direct costs of controlling and eradicating a U. S.
4 Rendering is a process that subjects animal tissue to heat or chemicals
to separate the fat from the protein and mineral components.
outbreak of FMD could range up to $24 billion in current dollars,
depending, among other things, on the extent of the outbreak and the
control strategy employed. 5 The value of lost export sales in the event
of an FMD outbreak would
represent a significant portion of the total direct costs to the U. S.
economy. According to USDA officials, a single case of FMD in the United
States would cause our trading partners to prohibit U. S. exports of live
animals and animal products. This ban could result in losses of between $6
billion and $10 billion a year while the United States eradicated the
disease and until it regained disease- free status. These losses may be
mitigated to some extent by increased domestic sales of meat from disease-
free portions of the United States that may otherwise have been exported.
However, USDA
officials believe that many people in the United States would refuse to
eat meat during an FMD outbreak, thus the offset probably would be
minimal. Indirect costs of an FMD outbreak would include those costs
affecting consumers, ancillary agricultural industries, and other sectors
of the economy. For example, if large numbers of animals are destroyed as
part of a control and eradication effort, then ancillary industries such
as meatprocessing
facilities and feed suppliers are likely to lose revenue. Furthermore, an
FMD outbreak would result in adverse effects such as unemployment, loss of
income (to the extent that government compensation does not fully
reimburse producers), and decreased economic activity, which could ripple
through other sectors of the
economy as well. For example, the loss of agricultural income could result
in reduced sales of consumer goods. In the United Kingdom, according to
government estimates, the 2001 outbreak resulted in losses to the tourism
industry of over $5 billion that were comparable to the losses sustained
by the food and agriculture sector. In addition, not only may consumers
have to pay higher prices for the remaining supply of animal products
affected by an FMD outbreak, but the price of substitutes is likely to
rise, as well. For example, as the price of FMD- free meat increases, some
consumers are likely to buy poultry or other meat substitutes, thus
causing the prices of these substitute products to rise. However, the
higher prices that consumers pay for substitutes do
5 Over 4 million animals were slaughtered during the U. K. outbreak to
control the disease. According to a USDA preliminary estimate, a
comparable outbreak in the United States could require the destruction of
about 13 million animals.
not result in a net cost to the economy because these higher prices result
in increased revenues for poultry producers and others.
Social Impacts of an An FMD outbreak can have significant social impacts,
such as enormous Outbreak Can Be psychological damage, especially on
families and localities directly
affected by the outbreak, as the U. K. experience in 2001 illustrates. For
Significant
example, in May 2001, the Welsh Institute of Rural Health found that
individuals affected by the FMD outbreak experienced a range of symptoms,
including tearfulness, lack of sleep, loss of appetite, increased anger,
irritability, and general depression. An increase in marital discord was
also noted. One general practioner reported that 50 percent of his
patients affected by the FMD outbreak required antidepressant drugs. Some
farming families even sent their children away from home during the
outbreak rather than have them witness the slaughter and disposal of the
family*s livestock.
Consumer confidence in the safety of the U. K. food supply was also
adversely affected by the outbreak. A survey by the United Kingdom*s
Institute of Grocery Distribution determined that because of the FMD and
mad cow disease outbreaks, many consumers in the United Kingdom now
consider meat and dairy products to be unsafe. As a result, these
consumers have changed their grocery- buying habits.
An outbreak also significantly disrupts daily life. Normally busy
livestock producers suddenly had almost nothing to do because their
animals had been destroyed and their properties were quarantined.
According to one
study of the effects of FMD on farm life in the Cumbria area of the United
Kingdom, most farming households had to curb their usual daily activities,
and only the most essential movements on and off the farms were permitted.
Lost income caused stress to families because they had to cut back on
their household expenditures and some had to renegotiate loans.
The study notes that the enforced isolation caused by the quarantines
added to the tensions and stresses already being experienced by both
adults and children.
USDA Is Responsible Within USDA, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service (APHIS) has for Protecting U. S. the lead responsibility for
protecting the nation*s livestock from foreign
animal diseases, which are diseases not native to the United States as
well Livestock From FMD as those thought to have been eradicated.
Assisting APHIS in this endeavor and Other Animal are USDA*s Foreign
Agricultural Service, the Food Safety and Inspection Diseases
Service, and the Homeland Security Council. Within APHIS, several groups
share responsibility for protecting U. S. livestock from the incursion of
foreign animal diseases such as FMD: International Services. Working
with its counterpart organizations in foreign countries, this group seeks
to reduce the international spread of animal and poultry diseases. Its
goal is to protect U. S. livestock and
poultry by reducing risk abroad through disease- management strategies
provided to exporting countries before they send their animals and
products to the United States.
Veterinary Services. To protect and improve the health, quality, and
marketability of our nation's animals, animal products, and veterinary
biologics, this group seeks to prevent, control, and/ or eliminate animal
diseases, and monitor and promote animal health and productivity. This
group administers laws and regulations on importing animals and animal
products, including embryos and semen, to ensure that imports are free
from certain disease agents. In addition, Veterinary Services
provides training for state and private veterinarians on foreign animal
diseases of concern and provides animal disease diagnostic and
surveillance testing. Veterinary Services has primary responsibility for
inspecting and ensuring the safety of live animal and animal product
imports to the United States. Within Veterinary Services, the Emergency
Programs unit coordinates efforts to prepare for and respond to animal
disease outbreaks, including FMD, and in the fall of 2001, published a
draft plan for responding to an FMD outbreak. It employs veterinarians
trained to detect and respond to an FMD outbreak. Emergency Programs also
provides federal and state veterinarians and others with training on
foreign animal diseases.
Plant Protection and Quarantine. Inspectors in this group are USDA*s
primary presence at 144 of the 301 ports of entry in the United States, as
well as 8 foreign ports. According to USDA, inspectors are present at all
major ports of entry, and staffing is based on risk assessments and
supplemented with tools such as detector dogs, X- rays, and hand- held
remote- sensing equipment. USDA inspectors screen and physically inspect
animal products and other cargo arriving by air, sea, or land, as well as
international passengers and their luggage arriving via air, sea, or land
border crossings. Most notably, the beagles in Plant Protection and
Quarantine*s Beagle Brigade sniff travelers' luggage for prohibited
fruits, plants, and meat that could harbor harmful plant and animal pests
and diseases. According to USDA, by the end of this year, it will have
increased the number of dog teams to 123, which is double the level
available 2 years ago. In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA
stated that by the end of this year, APHIS will also have increased the
number of its safeguarding personnel to approximately 3,870* an increase
of 50 percent over its fiscal year 2000 staffing levels. Moreover, USDA
told us that it has hired 18 additional veterinarians who are conducting
port- of- entry reviews, working
with state counterparts, and providing technical guidance and training on
working with and handling animal products and byproducts and international
garbage that could pose a threat of foreign animal diseases. In addition,
USDA*s Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) operates programs designed to
build new markets and improve the competitive position of U. S.
agriculture in the global marketplace. FAS is responsible for USDA*s
overseas activities, such as market development, international trade
agreements and negotiations, and the collection and analysis of statistics
and market information. FAS supports U. S. agricultural interests through
its network of agricultural counselors, attaches, and trade officers
stationed in many foreign countries. FAS officials primarily deal with
agricultural trade issues and meet with host government and industry
officials to discuss and facilitate agricultural trade.
USDA*s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) has primary
responsibility for ensuring the safety of imported and domestic meat and
meat products meant for human consumption. FSIS stations inspectors at
ports of entry to conduct sampling and inspection functions on imported
meat products. FSIS also has responsibility for approving countries that
are eligible to export meat products to the United States. In fulfilling
this responsibility, FSIS conducts periodic reviews of eligible countries.
According to USDA, FSIS*s inspection of livestock before slaughter is an
important surveillance tool for detecting the presence of FMD in the
United States.
Finally, USDA*s Homeland Security Council is responsible for leading and
coordinating USDA*s activities to plan for and manage agriculture- related
crises as well as emergency programs. This council serves as USDA*s
primary contact with the Federal Emergency Management Agency and
facilitates coordination with other federal agencies, state and local
governments, and private- sector organizations. U. S. Customs Service
The U. S. Customs Service (Customs) is the nation*s primary enforcement
Supports USDA*s agency for preventing the entry of a number of potentially
harmful products into the United States, including FMD- contaminated
products. In Efforts at Ports of
addition to their Customs responsibilities to ensure that proper duties or
Entry
tariffs are paid on imported products, Customs inspectors work to enforce
the regulations of about 40 federal agencies, such as those of USDA.
Customs inspectors review paperwork, such as manifests and bills of
lading, and physically inspect cargo and international passengers and
their luggage. Customs has inspectors stationed at all 301 ports of entry
throughout the United States, including international airports and
seaports and land border crossings along the Canadian and Mexican borders.
Customs also has inspectors at some foreign locations, such as the
international airport in Toronto, Canada, where they perform preclearance
inspections of passengers and their luggage prior to entry into the United
States. Customs inspectors also examine international mail and packages
arriving in the United States at the 14 facilities handling mail of
foreign
origin. Objectives, Scope, and
Senator Tom Daschle asked us to determine whether (1) U. S. processes to
Methodology obtain and disseminate information on foreign FMD outbreaks
are adequate and timely, (2) U. S. measures for preventing FMD from
entering
the country are effective and comparable with those of other selected
countries, and (3) the United States could respond quickly and effectively
to an outbreak of FMD if it were to occur. To address the first question,
we obtained and reviewed relevant documents, and we interviewed USDA and
Customs officials. In particular,
we reviewed the adequacy and timeliness of the information obtained and
disseminated by USDA after the 2001 FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom.
For the second question, we reviewed relevant legislation, regulations,
and other USDA documents. We also interviewed USDA, Customs, and state
officials. To observe the preventive measures for international cargo, we
visited three large seaports in Elizabeth, New Jersey; Baltimore,
Maryland; and Houston, Texas. To observe the preventive measures for
international mail, we visited international mail- processing facilities
in New Jersey and Virginia and one international express package carrier
in Kentucky. To observe the preventive measures for live animals imported
through
U. S.- Canadian and U. S.- Mexican land ports of entry, we visited the
Sarnia, Ontario, and Nuevo Laredo, Mexico, border crossings. To observe
the preventive measures for international passengers, we visited Dulles
International Airport, and obtained information on the preclearance
procedures used to process international passengers entering the United
States via Canada at the international airport in Toronto, Canada. We also
gathered information on how garbage from international carriers is handled
at airports and seaports. In addition, we visited two nearby county
and two state fairs in Maryland and Virginia to observe how USDA*s
guidance for biosecurity measures to prevent the spread of disease at U.
S. livestock and agricultural shows was implemented.
As a result of the heightened level of security at airports after
September 11, 2001, and because our review was largely conducted after the
U. K. outbreak had ended, we were unable to implement a portion of the
review as originally planned. In particular, we were unable to survey
passengers who were returning to the United States from the United
Kingdom, during the outbreak, at the airport after they left the
passenger- processing area. Instead, we surveyed by telephone 60
passengers who visited the United Kingdom during the time of the outbreak
(Mar. through Sept. 2001). We asked them to recall various aspects of
their return trip and the processing they underwent at U. S. airports.
These results cannot be generalized and
represent only the experiences of the people whom we surveyed. In
addition, because we asked people to recall events after the passage of 4
to 6 months, their recollections of certain events and processes might not
have been as clear as they would have been immediately upon arrival.
Furthermore, to respond to our second question, we compared the preventive
measures used by Canada, Mexico, and the United Kingdom with those used by
the United States. We selected Canada and Mexico for our review because
the ability of the United States to protect its livestock from FMD also
depends on the ability of our neighbors to prevent the disease; according
to USDA officials, if any of the three countries has an FMD outbreak, the
other two are also likely to have an outbreak. We
included the United Kingdom in our analysis because it is a major U. S.
trading partner and because of its recent experience with FMD. To obtain
information on the preventive measures used by Canada and Mexico, we
visited these two countries, met with federal officials, and obtained and
reviewed relevant documents. While in Canada and Mexico, we visited
airports, seaports, international mail- processing facilities, and border
crossings to observe the preventive measures used by these countries. To
obtain information on the United Kingdom*s preventive measures, we
reviewed and summarized legislation and regulations for the European Union
and the United Kingdom, as well as other publicly available documents. To
ensure the accuracy and completeness of our information, we shared the
summaries that we prepared on the preventive measures used by the three
countries with officials in these countries and asked for their review and
comments. The information on these foreign countries* preventive measures
does not reflect our independent legal analysis.
Finally, for our third question, we reviewed federal and state emergency
response plans as well as other key documents and federal legislation and
regulations. We interviewed USDA officials, industry representatives, and
state officials. We also interviewed a group of selected veterinarians and
animal health technicians who were part of the U. S. contingent that
supported the United Kingdom*s response efforts in 2001 to obtain their
perspectives on U. S. preparedness and observations on lessons learned
from the U. K. outbreak. We interviewed the state veterinarian in six
states that are major U. S. livestock producers to obtain their
perspective on their state*s preparedness efforts as well as the overall
U. S. ability to respond to
an outbreak if it were to occur. We also attended a USDA training session
and a conference organized by the Western States Livestock Health
Association that included information on U. S. preparedness and response
to an FMD outbreak. We provided USDA and Customs with a draft of this
report for review and comment. The written comments we received from USDA
are presented in appendix V, and those we received from Customs, in
appendix VI. In addition, we received technical comments from USDA that we
have incorporated throughout the report as appropriate. We conducted our
work from August 2001 through May 2002 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
USDA Has Adequate Processes to Obtain Information on Foreign FMD
Outbreaks, but
Chapt er 2
Dissemination to Customs Can Be Improved USDA relies on a wide variety of
sources to obtain information on outbreaks of FMD overseas. Its sources
include APHIS and FAS staff stationed abroad, official notifications from
international trade or animal health organizations, and notifications from
affected countries. But USDA*s dissemination of this information is more
problematic because it has no formal process* detailed procedures and
protocols* for sharing information on foreign FMD outbreaks with Customs,
which provides the first line of defense against potentially contaminated
products entering U. S.
ports. USDA does, however, share the information it develops with agencies
within the department, states, public and private veterinarians, industry
groups, and the public through various methods, including Emails, postings
to USDA*s Internet site, telephone calls, and media alerts.
USDA Obtains USDA receives information about the incidence of foreign
animal diseases, Information on Foreign
including FMD, from a variety of sources. These include USDA staff
stationed in foreign countries; international organizations, such as OIE
and FMD Outbreaks from
the World Trade Organization (WTO); and the governments of affected
Multiple Sources
nations. USDA officials stationed in countries around the world provide a
range of information on agricultural issues, including the disease status
of foreign countries. For example, APHIS*s International Services group
employs over 300 foreign service officers and host country nationals in 27
countries around the world. According to APHIS officials, these foreign
service staff collect agricultural information for the countries they are
stationed in as well as other countries in the region. Their primary
sources of information
include (1) official notifications from foreign governments about changes
in their country*s animal or crop disease status; (2) meetings with host
government, local industry, and private- sector officials; (3) local radio
and television reports, as well as newspapers and magazines, which may
provide early information about potential animal or crop disease problems;
and (4) informal discussions at receptions or other social events hosted
by the foreign government or private citizens, from which they may gather
references of potential animal or crop disease problems. According to
APHIS officials, any information gathered from unofficial or informal
sources needs to be confirmed through other official sources before the
United States can initiate any formal action, such as restricting imports.
Similarly, FAS maintains an international field structure: 63 agricultural
counselor, attache, and affiliate foreign national offices; 17
agricultural trade offices; and a number of agricultural advisers covering
129 countries
around the world. According to the FAS officials we spoke with, staff
stationed overseas have no functional responsibility for tracking foreign
animal diseases, such as FMD. However, during their routine activities,
they may become aware of a possible outbreak, in which case they would
likely relay this information to FAS headquarters, in Washington, D. C.
FAS staff obtain agricultural information from several of the same sources
accessed by APHIS staff, such as the local media, trade and industry
reports, meetings with host government officials, and official government
notifications and documents.
In addition, FSIS provides APHIS with information on the disease
conditions present in foreign countries that it obtains as part of its
evaluation of a country*s eligibility to export meat and meat products to
the United States. FSIS*s technical staff review the documents provided by
the foreign country as well as conduct in- country visits before deeming a
country eligible to export meat and meat products to the United States for
human consumption. FSIS also conducts audits in each eligible exporting
country, at least annually, and shares any information obtained on
diseases of concern with APHIS, according to USDA.
USDA also receives information from international organizations, such as
OIE and WTO, which have reporting guidelines for member nations to follow
during outbreaks of certain animal diseases. For example, both OIE
and WTO require member countries affected with FMD to make an official
notification as soon as the disease has been confirmed. These
organizations then provide other member nations with official notification
of the outbreak.
In addition to reporting to international organizations, countries
affected by FMD may report the outbreak directly to their major trading
partners. For example, major U. S. trading partners often notify USDA
officials directly when an FMD outbreak occurs, as the United Kingdom did
in early 2001. According to APHIS officials, the United Kingdom notified
USDA on the same day that it confirmed the presence of FMD* February 21,
2001. In
North America, Canada, Mexico, and the United States have an informal
understanding that in the event of an FMD outbreak, the affected country
will immediately report to the other two countries. The usefulness of
information on foreign FMD outbreaks depends on a foreign country*s
willingness to provide accurate information in a timely fashion. There are
instances, however, when a country may fail to notify OIE, WTO, or its
major trading partners of a disease outbreak in a timely
manner. 6 For example, Argentine officials did not acknowledge that some
regions of their country had been affected with FMD, although unconfirmed
reports indicated that the disease had been present for several months,
according to USDA officials. Argentina officially notified OIE on March
13, 2001, and USDA then took action to prohibit imports of affected
Argentine products. In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA stated
that if it had verifiable scientific evidence that FMD existed in
Argentina, it could have prohibited imports before the country notified
OIE. USDA Lacks a Formal
APHIS has primary responsibility for sharing information obtained about
Process to Ensure
foreign FMD outbreaks with other agencies within USDA, Customs, state
governments, affected industries, and the public. These entities all need
Dissemination of FMD information about potential FMD outbreaks because
they all play an Information to
important role in preventing or responding to an outbreak. While APHIS
Customs
immediately alerts USDA agencies and others, it has no formal process,
including defined procedures and protocols, to distribute information on
foreign FMD outbreaks to Customs. Consequently, there is no assurance that
Customs inspectors at U. S. ports of entry, and in particular at the ports
where APHIS does not have a presence, are adequately informed of the
need to implement controls for potentially contaminated cargo, and
international passengers and their luggage entering the United States.
APHIS Uses Multiple APHIS uses various methods to inform its own field
staff located in the
Mechanisms to Inform United States and abroad, other USDA agencies, state
governments,
USDA Agencies and Others industry groups, the public, and the media about
foreign FMD outbreaks. in the United States About These methods include
Foreign FMD Outbreaks
E- mails and electronic alerts,
memos and letters,
telephone calls,
meetings, 6 While OIE cannot sanction countries that do not comply with
its reporting requirements, WTO can.
press releases,
printed media (brochures, pamphlets, and posters),
public education and outreach,
toll free information hotline, and
postings to the Internet (USDA*s Web page). After the 2001 outbreak of
FMD in the United Kingdom, we observed that APHIS used each of these
methods to distribute information about (1) the disease, (2) the outbreak
in the United Kingdom, and (3) preventing the introduction and spread of
the disease in the United States. For example, APHIS field locations began
receiving electronic alerts and E- mails from
APHIS headquarters, on February 21, 2001, which was the same day that the
United Kingdom notified APHIS about the outbreak. Similarly, by the second
week of March 2001, USDA had issued several press releases, placed
information on its Web site about FMD precautions, initiated an
international travelers* education campaign, and established a toll- free
number for public inquiries about the disease. Also, shortly after the U.
K. outbreak began, APHIS distributed several types of printed media to its
field offices nationwide. According to the Veterinary Services staff in
the
field offices we contacted, they distributed these materials to state
governments, industry associations, and private veterinarians, and placed
posters in public transportation terminals, such as train stations. Table
2 shows selected key actions APHIS took upon learning of the FMD outbreak
in the United Kingdom.
Table 2: Key USDA Information Dissemination Actions Taken After the 2001
Outbreak of FMD in the United Kingdom Date Action taken/ information
disseminated
Feb. 21, 2001 APHIS Alert to all its Plant Protection and Quarantine Port
Offices prohibiting the importation of all meat products from the United
Kingdom (including England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, and the
Isle of Man).
Feb. 26, 2001 APHIS Electronic Alert reminding Plant Protection and
Quarantine inspectors to closely monitor international passengers, in
particular those arriving from the United Kingdom, and screen for those
who had been on a farm overseas and to check footwear and decontaminate if
necessary.
Mar. 1, 2001 APHIS Electronic Alert to Plant Protection and Quarantine
inspectors providing guidance on inspecting farm equipment and tractors as
well as other vehicles imported from the United Kingdom or the Republic of
Ireland. Mar. 6, 2001 First team of U. S. veterinarians deployed to the
United Kingdom to help respond to the outbreak. Mar. 12, 2001 Beginning
the week of March 12, 2001, a high- ranking APHIS official began a tour of
major eastern U. S. ports, meeting with U. S. Customs and other federal
inspection agencies to emphasize the need for
aggressive exclusion activities. Mar. 13, 2001 APHIS Electronic Alerts and
USDA news release announcing the prohibition of imported live swine and
ruminants, any fresh swine or ruminant meat (chilled or frozen), and other
products of swine and ruminant from all European Union nations (does not
include cooked pork products).
Mar. 13, 2001 USDA Media Advisory announcing kick off of traveler*s
education campaign starting March 14, 2001. Mar. 14, 2001 USDA memo to its
field veterinarians and Animal Import Centers regarding guidelines for
importing pets from areas affected with FMD. Mar. 16, 2001 USDA news
release announcing the establishment of toll- free FMD call lines*
domestic and international. Mar. 20, 2001 APHIS begins regularly scheduled
conference calls with the National Association of State Departments of
Agriculture to discuss APHIS*s FMD exclusion efforts. Mar. 22, 2001
Specific guidance provided to the U. S. Customs Service on FMD- related
inspection procedures for cargo and passengers at U. S. ports of entry.
Mar. 23, 2001 Industry Alert to livestock owners and private- practice
veterinarians posted to the APHIS Web site, reminding them to report
unusual animal health symptoms.
Mar. 2001 Other information issued during the month of March includes
meetings about FMD with industry, state, and local governments;
FMD- prevention information developed for airlines;
warning signs posted at airports;
public service announcements on radio and television; and
FMD information for USDA extension agents. Apr. 9, 2001 Secretary of
Agriculture authorizes an additional $32 million to increase inspection
personnel. Apr. 26, 2001 Secretary of Agriculture assures the Congress
that compensation would be available to producers in the event of an FMD
outbreak in the United States. USDA begins hiring 400 new inspectors and
doubling the size of the canine inspection teams, and reassigns 200
current inspectors to critical ports of entry. May 11, 2001 USDA and the
Department of Defense coordinate restrictions on military exercises to
ensure that FMD is kept out of the United States.
May 2001 USDA issues FMD- prevention guidelines for livestock shows
agricultural fairs, and other agricultural events.
However, the effectiveness of USDA*s efforts is uncertain. For example, in
March 2001, APHIS issued an industry alert to airlines, suggesting that
they
could assist USDA*s preventive activities by making in- flight
announcements on international flights to raise passengers* awareness
about the dangers of FMD. APHIS also provided a brief text for the
airlines to use when making these announcements. However, the passengers
returning from the United Kingdom during the outbreak whom we contacted
told us that not all the airlines made such announcements. Similarly in
May 2001, APHIS issued disease prevention guidelines for
livestock shows and agricultural fairs, such as state and county fairs.
According to APHIS officials, these guidelines are *suggestions* for fair
organizers and directors, and their actual use and implementation are left
to the discretion of state and local authorities. We observed that the
implementation of APHIS*s guidelines varied dramatically at the two county
fairs and two state fairs that we visited. For example, USDA*s guidelines
indicate that food should not be allowed in areas where show animals are
housed; however, at all four fairs, we observed that no restrictions of
this kind were in effect. Moreover, some of the livestock
owners and show officials that we interviewed at the fairs generally did
not know about the risks associated with FMD or the need to take
precautionary measures to prevent its introduction or spread. For example,
one livestock producer told us that FMD was a *European
problem* and that the United States did not have to worry about it. APHIS
Does Not Have a While APHIS uses a number of mechanisms for informing
interested parties Formal Process to Provide
about foreign FMD outbreaks, it has no formal process to inform Customs
with Information Customs* the first deterrent to the importation of
potentially FMDaffected
on Foreign FMD Outbreaks products* about these outbreaks. As Table 2
shows, after the U. K.
outbreak, APHIS did not immediately inform Customs about its decisions to
prohibit or restrict certain products or more vigilantly screen passengers
arriving at U. S. ports of entry from the United Kingdom. Customs did not
receive any consistent national guidance from APHIS until the Acting
Commissioner of Customs formally requested this information in writing
from the Administrator of APHIS, on March 16, 2001. As a result, Customs*
field staff did not receive uniform official guidance on general
inspection
measures for passengers and products until March 27, 2001, and specific
information on at- risk products to be detained at the ports until April
4, 2001* 37 and 45 days, respectively, after APHIS received the United
Kingdom*s official notification of the outbreak. According to a Customs
memorandum and officials we spoke to, field inspectors felt ill equipped
to adequately process international cargo and passengers at ports of entry
during the initial stages of the U. K. outbreak. For example, one Customs
supervisor told us that there was no APHIS inspector present at her port
of entry and that she had no information on how to clean passengers* shoes
and what kind of disinfectant to use. According to this Customs
supervisor, the lack of official guidance forced her staff to rely on
informal and inadequate guidance obtained from APHIS officials located at
another port of entry. She added that because Customs inspectors are not
animal disease specialists, they need nontechnical, clear procedures to
help them
process international cargo, passengers and their luggage, especially at
those ports where there is no APHIS presence. The Customs* Assistant
Director for Field Operations agreed that such uniform and clear guidance
is needed for all Customs field inspectors. APHIS officials acknowledged
that they did not notify Customs of the U. K. outbreak. According to these
officials, because Customs had not sought specific guidance from APHIS
about prior FMD outbreaks in other
countries, they believed that Customs knew how to handle cargo,
passengers, and luggage arriving from the United Kingdom during the
outbreak without specific notification and further guidance from them. As
a result of the concerns raised by Customs during the U. K. outbreak, the
APHIS Assistant Director for Technical Trade Services told us that in May
2002, she added an official from the Customs Office of Field Operations to
the list of people to whom she sends E- mail notifications of foreign FMD
outbreaks. The Customs Assistant Director for Field Operations told us
that this action will help his office better inform Customs* field
inspectors about future foreign FMD outbreaks.
Conclusions Although APHIS is primarily responsible for protecting U. S.
livestock from FMD, it needs Customs to help it fulfill this
responsibility. Customs is especially critical to keeping FMD-
contaminated products out of the United States at those ports of entry
where APHIS is not present. However,
Customs inspectors can help provide a concerted, coordinated, and
comprehensive defense against FMD at the nation*s border only if they
receive current information on the countries that are affected by FMD and
have clear nontechnical guidelines on how to process at- risk products and
passengers. APHIS has taken the first interim step to notify Customs of
future foreign FMD outbreaks, by including a Customs official on one of
its
electronic mailing lists. However, we believe that this does not provide a
permanent solution to the lack of clear communication protocols and
procedures between APHIS and Customs.
Recommendations for To help ensure that Customs inspectors at all U. S.
ports of entry are fully
Executive Action informed about current foreign FMD outbreaks, we
recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture direct the Administrator of
APHIS to develop (1) a formal written agreement with the Commissioner of
the Customs Service
that will clearly delineate the process by which future information on
foreign FMD outbreaks will be communicated with Customs and (2) uniform,
nontechnical procedures that Customs inspectors can use to process
international passengers and cargo arriving from FMD- affected countries.
U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other Countries,
but Complete
Chapt er 3
Protection May Be Infeasible U. S. measures to prevent an FMD outbreak*
control and eradication overseas and the port of entry screening of
livestock, animal products, and passengers* have been successful since
1929. Nevertheless, the United States remains vulnerable to an FMD
outbreak because of the nature of the virus, the many pathways by which it
can come into the country, and the growing magnitude and volume of both
legal and illegal passengers and
cargo entering the country. Other countries face similar challenges in
protecting their livestock from FMD and use preventive measures that are
comparable to those the United States uses. However, the United States
could also build on the experiences of other countries to improve its
preventive measures.
USDA*s Efforts to As a first line of defense to safeguarding U. S. animal
resources against the
Control and Eradicate introduction of pests and diseases, USDA helps
prevent, control, and
eradicate agricultural health threats where they originate outside the FMD
in Other
United States. By helping other nations eradicate or control these
Countries Help Reduce outbreaks, USDA reduces the risk of agricultural
pests and diseases the Risk to U. S.
reaching U. S. borders. Livestock
In North America, U. S. efforts to eradicate and control FMD have largely
focused on Mexico, because of our shared border and the possible threat of
the FMD virus*s moving overland from South America, where the disease is
endemic in some countries. USDA has staff located in Mexico working with
the Mexico- United States Commission for the Prevention of Foot and Mouth
Disease and Other Exotic Animal Diseases. The commission, formed in 1947
as a combined U. S.- Mexican effort to eradicate FMD from Mexico, 7 built
Mexico*s animal health infrastructure and successfully eradicated FMD from
Mexico in 1954. Today, USDA and Mexican
veterinarians work together, through the activities of the commission, to
provide disease surveillance, diagnostic testing, and training for Mexico
to ensure that the country remains FMD- free. According to USDA officials
in Mexico, the United States initially covered about 80 percent of the
costs for the joint program; however, as the Mexican government assumed
greater responsibility for the program, the U. S. share has decreased to
about 20 percent. In fiscal year 2001, USDA provided about $160,000 in
funding
for the commission*s activities. According to USDA officials, this funding
7 The commission was originally called the Mexican American Commission for
the Eradication of Foot and Mouth Disease.
supports the commission*s high- security laboratory in Mexico City by
providing training, supplies, and equipment. In addition, for over 30
years, the United States has held regular meetings on animal health issues
with the governments of Canada and Mexico to harmonize North America*s
import requirements and, more recently, to coordinate preventive actions
and emergency response activities in the event of an FMD outbreak. For
example, in 2000, the three countries held joint exercises* known as the
Tripartite Exercise 2000* to test their FMD communication and response
plans, and to assess their response systems.
As a result of this exercise, the three governments signed a memorandum of
understanding to formally establish the North American Animal Health
Committee. This committee represents animal health issues for the North
American Free Trade Agreement and seeks to harmonize live animal and
animal product import requirements for North America. The committee will
also plan emergency response activities and perform joint test exercises
to ensure that all three countries remain prepared to respond to an FMD
outbreak.
The United States also supports efforts to establish FMD- control zones in
Central and South America. For example, to help alert countries in Central
and North America about the potential incursion of FMD from South America,
USDA has established cooperative programs with Panama and Colombia. In
Panama, USDA supports the U. S.- Panama Cooperative Program for the
Prevention of Foot and Mouth Disease, which maintains the Darien Gap area
of Panama free from FMD and other foreign animal diseases. This program
conducts field surveillance at high- risk border
points and annual training, analyzes technical data, and improves the
infrastructure. The program also provides support for the Investigative
Laboratory for Vesicular Disease, which provides bio- containment,
diagnostic, and detection capabilities for vesicular and other foreign
animal diseases in Central America.
Through the Colombian program, USDA helps maintain an FMD- free barrier
along the Colombia- Panama border. 8 This barrier serves as the "first
line of defense" for preventing the spread of FMD northward into Central
America, Mexico, and the United States, which are all FMD- free. Until FMD
is eradicated from South America, USDA believes that 8 This barrier is one
of two in the world; the other, in Turkey, is maintained by the European
Union to protect Western Europe from FMD.
maintaining this barrier will prevent the disease*s northward spread. USDA
provides technical assistance and half of the funding for the program. As
part of its disease exclusion activities for the region, USDA also has
cooperative agreements with all the other Central American countries to
support joint monitoring and surveillance activities, including field
investigations and the collection of laboratory samples for FMD and other
foreign animal diseases. Through these agreements, USDA helps transfer
surveillance and detection technologies to these countries.
When FMD strikes other nations* as it did recently, for example, in
Argentina and the United Kingdom* the United States may assist in
controlling and eradicating the disease. For example, a total of 327 U. S.
animal health professionals, including over 300 veterinarians, helped
eradicate the 2001 outbreak in the United Kingdom. The Americans came from
USDA, other federal agencies, and state governments. Beginning in March
2001, they traveled to the United Kingdom, generally in groups that
averaged about 10 per week, and assisted with the response for about a
month. At the peak of the outbreak during March and April, about 100 U. S.
animal health professionals were assisting in the U. K. response. The U.
S. responders with whom we spoke participated in surveillance activities,
such as collecting blood samples, and epidemiology tasks, such as tracking
and predicting the path of new disease outbreaks. They also issued permits
and licenses to move animals and products such as silage. By providing
such assistance, the United States not only helps ensure that the disease
is eradicated quickly, but also helps reduce the potential for FMD-
infected products to arrive at U. S. ports of entry. 9
Despite U. S. Preventive Preventive measures at U. S. borders provide the
second line of defense Measures at Ports of against the incursion of FMD
into the United States. USDA has identified several key pathways by which
the FMD- virus could enter the United Entry, Vulnerability to States. To
respond to the risk posed by these pathways, USDA FMD Remains
implemented measures designed to ensure that animals, products,
passengers, and equipment arriving at U. S. borders are free of the virus
and do not pose a risk to U. S. livestock. However, some level of risk is
inherent 9 According to USDA officials who helped respond to the U. K.
outbreak in 2001, another benefit of sending U. S. personnel to assist
with foreign disease outbreaks is the valuable
training they receive by handling diseased animals and responding to
various aspects of a *real life* response.
in international trade and travel, and no set of measures can ever
completely eliminate the possibility that FMD will enter the country.
Moreover, because FMD is a hardy virus and the level of inspection
resources cannot keep pace with the increasing volume and magnitude of
cargo and passengers, both legal and illegal, that continue to enter the
country, the United States remains vulnerable to an outbreak.
The United States Has The FMD virus could enter the United States through
a number of key
Implemented Preventive pathways: live animal imports, imports of animal
and other products, Measures for Key Pathways
international passengers and their luggage, garbage from international
carriers, international mail, and military personnel and equipment
returning from overseas. For each of these pathways, USDA has developed
and implemented specific preventive measures described below.
Live animal imports. The United States allows imported livestock, such as
swine, cattle, and sheep, only from preapproved countries that USDA judges
to be free of FMD and other diseases of concern. 10 For example, in April
2002, USDA recognized 49 countries or geographical regions as free of FMD.
(See app. I.) Generally, live animals can be imported only through
designated ports of entry, the majority of which are located along U. S.
borders shared with Canada and Mexico, and three others located on the
east and west coasts. 11 Most live cattle imports into the United States
originate from Canada and Mexico; live hog imports, from Canada; and live
lamb imports, from Australia and New Zealand. Livestock exported to the
United States must be accompanied by a U. S. import permit and a health
certificate from an official government veterinarian in the country of
origin. The health certificate states that the animals have been in the
exporting country for at least 60 days prior to shipment and are free of
other diseases
of concern. 12 Generally, animals arriving from countries other than
Canada and Mexico may be quarantined. 13 Zoological ruminants and swine
from
10 USDA performs a risk assessment to determine a country*s FMD- free
status using the OIE criteria described in chapter 1, and independently
validates the country*s disease status reports sent to the OIE. In
addition, USDA reviews additional information provided by the country and
conducts verification visits to the country. 11 Twenty- six other U. S.
ports of entry accept live animals on a limited basis. 12 Because the
incubation period for FMD is significantly less than 60 days, the 60- day
requirement helps ensure that if animals have been exposed to the FMD
virus or other serious animal health diseases, they would become
symptomatic within this period of time.
FMD- affected countries are permitted into the United States but must be
processed through USDA*s New York Animal Import Center.
Animal and other product imports. Thousands of animal and other products
that could be contaminated with the FMD virus could potentially enter the
United States during the course of normal international trade. These
products include animal products meant for human consumption,
such as meat and dairy products; nonfood animal products, such as hides,
skins, casings, and animal extracts; as well as nonanimal products, such
as farm equipment, hay, and straw. USDA regulates the importation of this
diverse range of products to help minimize the risk of introducing FMD
into the United States.
USDA implements different import rules for FMD- free and FMD- affected
countries. Generally, for countries free of FMD and other diseases of
concern, 14 USDA imposes few restrictions on animal product imports. For
FMD- affected countries, USDA prohibits the importation of all susceptible
products shipped 3 weeks prior to the date of official notification of the
outbreak. This prohibition remains in effect until USDA reassesses the
disease status of the affected country and determines the level of trade
that can resume. USDA allows imports of animal and other products from
FMD- affected countries only if they meet certain requirements. These
requirements vary for different kinds of products, as follows: Animal
products meant for human consumption. Generally fresh, chilled, or frozen
meat from cattle, sheep, and pigs, and fresh milk are prohibited from FMD-
affected countries. However, processed meat and dairy products are allowed
from FMD- affected countries if they meet certain requirements. For
example, meat products can be imported
from FMD- affected countries only if (1) the country and meat processing
plants have been deemed eligible to export meat products to the United
States by FSIS and (2) the processing plants also meet APHIS*s meat-
processing standards. The APHIS standards ensure that meat products from
these countries are not contaminated with the FMD
virus, and require that the products be processed in a manner that will 13
The length of the quarantine depends on the type of animals imported and
the kinds of diseases present in the country of origin. 14 Unrestricted
trade is generally dependent on a country*s being free of other diseases
of concern, such as cattle plague (rinderpest), and others. FMD is only
one of the diseases of concern.
inactivate the virus. For example, they must be fully cooked, dry cured,
or canned and shelf- stable, with all bones removed. Moreover, a U. S.
import permit and an official veterinary health certificate from the
country of origin must accompany certain meat shipments. Similarly, most
dairy products from FMD- affected countries must meet APHIS*s requirements
to ensure that they do not pose a risk of FMD*s introduction. For example,
milk products that are in a concentrated liquid form and are shelf- stable
without refrigeration are allowed from FMD- affected countries. Some dairy
products, such as condensed milk require a U. S. import permit, while
others, such as yogurt and butter are unrestricted and do not require a
permit. 15 Nonfood animal products. A variety of nonfood animal products
are
allowed from FMD- affected countries if they have been properly treated to
inactivate the virus; however, a U. S. import permit may be required. For
example, tanned hides, leather, and fully finished mounted animal trophies
can be imported into the United States from FMD- affected
countries.
Other products. USDA does not allow imports of grass, hay, or straw used
for feeding, bedding, or other purposes from FMD- affected countries.
However, used farm equipment is allowed with a certificate from the
exporting country stating that the equipment has been steam cleaned. APHIS
officials inspect farm equipment at U. S. ports of entry
to ensure that it is free from dirt and soil. If dirt and soil are found,
then inspectors will determine whether they can be adequately washed with
detergent and disinfected at an appropriate location before granting
approval for entry into the United States. All animal and other products
arriving at U. S. ports of entry, whether from FMD- free or FMD- affected
countries, are subject to inspection by U. S. federal inspectors. Customs
officials, who review the documents accompanying the shipments, either
electronically or on paper, provide the first level of inspection for
these shipments. On the basis of this review, Customs is authorized to
either release the shipments into commerce or hold them for USDA
inspection. USDA provides Customs with a list of products to be flagged
for inspection by APHIS. APHIS inspectors ensure that all the necessary
documents accompanying the shipment, such as
15 The import permit allows USDA to evaluate the processing conditions for
the product and determine whether the stated process will inactivate the
FMD virus.
import permits and official health certificates, are complete and ensure
that the shipments match their manifest. In some instances, APHIS
inspectors will inspect the shipping containers to check their contents.
After APHIS completes its inspection, the shipment may proceed to FSIS
and/ or the Food and Drug Administration for further inspection, depending
on which agency regulates the safety of these products for human health
issues, or may proceed to Customs for release into commerce. 16 According
to USDA, FSIS inspectors at ports of entry visually examine all shipments
of products under FSIS*s jurisdiction and randomly select some for more
in- depth examination.
In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA noted that it has primary
inspection responsibility for agricultural cargo and manifests at those
ports staffed with USDA inspectors. To ensure that these shipments
continue to be referred to USDA for inspection, the department said that
it is working
with Customs and other federal agencies to develop an automated targeting
system, which will serve as an electronic interface among federal agencies
to identify and automatically segregate high- risk plant cargo and track
imported animals and animal products. International passengers.
International passengers who may have been in contact with the FMD virus,
either through contact with infected animals or materials such as soil and
manure, or who bring potentially
contaminated products into the country may also transmit the virus to the
United States. USDA provides the following FMD- prevention information and
types of scrutiny for international passengers in an effort to reduce the
risk associated with this pathway:
USDA requests airlines to make in- flight announcements on international
flights; at ports of entry, it places warning signs and it plays
prerecorded announcements about how international passengers can assist in
keeping FMD out of the United States.
International passengers must fill out a U. S. Customs declaration form
that asks if they are bringing any animal or plant products into the
country and if, while traveling abroad, they visited a farm or were in
contact with animals. Passengers responding affirmatively to these
16 Certain imported animal products, such as meat, are regulated by FSIS,
while others, such as milk and cheese, are regulated by the Food and Drug
Administration to ensure that they are safe for human consumption before
they are released into U. S. commerce.
questions are sent by Customs officials to a USDA inspection area at the
port of entry for further processing. USDA officials may x- ray and
inspect the contents of the passengers* baggage; ask them additional
questions; confiscate any prohibited items, such as meat and dairy
products; and clean and disinfect their shoes.
USDA*s Beagle Brigade and inspectors generally rove the baggage claim
areas at major ports of entry to help identify passengers and their
luggage that may be carrying prohibited food items. USDA inspectors look
not only for suspicious packages, such as bulky, misshapen, and
leaking containers, but also question passengers about their travels to
determine whether they present a greater risk of disease transmission. If
the dogs or the inspectors identify such passengers, these passengers are
referred to the USDA inspection area for further processing.
After the 2001 FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom, according to the
international passengers we surveyed, some of these measures were not
consistently implemented. For example, some passengers told us that the
airlines they traveled on did not make any in- flight announcements about
FMD. Other passengers told us that even though their Customs declaration
form indicated that they had been in contact with animals or visited a
farm while in the United Kingdom, they were not referred by officials to
the USDA inspection area at the airport for further processing or they had
to request USDA personnel at the airports to examine and disinfect the
shoes that they wore while they were in FMD- affected areas in the United
Kingdom.
Garbage from international carriers. Garbage from international carriers,
such as airplanes and ships, can also transmit the FMD virus into the
United States if the garbage contains food items contaminated with the
virus. Therefore, USDA has developed guidelines to ensure that garbage
from international carriers is properly handled and disposed of so that it
does not present a risk to U. S. livestock. For example, USDA inspectors
supervise the removal of all international garbage from airplanes and
ships. This garbage must be transported in leak- proof containers and must
be disposed of properly, such as by incineration or sterilization, and
subsequent burial at a landfill. USDA has compliance agreements with
catering firms and cleaners that outline the proper handling and approved
disposal methods for international garbage. Before a compliance agreement
is signed, APHIS officials will, among other things, review the
application; visit the handling, processing, or disposal facilities;
observe the operation of any equipment to determine its adequacy for
handling
garbage; and certify and approve the garbage cookers and sterilizers to be
used to process international garbage. USDA also monitors firms operating
under these compliance agreements to ensure that they abide by the
conditions stated in the agreement.
International mail. Prohibited animal products that could transmit the FMD
virus may also be sent through international mail and courier services to
U. S. residents. As a result, international mail packages entering the
United States are subject to inspection by Customs and USDA officials.
Customs generally reviews the declaration form on the packages and either
visually inspects or x- rays them as part of its responsibility to screen
international mail for illegal and prohibited items, such as contraband
and drugs. At USDA*s request, Customs can also screen international
packages for prohibited animal products, such as meat and dairy products
from
FMD- affected countries. Customs sets aside packages that appear to
contain such items for USDA*s inspection. USDA officials will review the
declaration forms and may x- ray or open these packages for physical
inspection. If the item in the package is a permissible product, the
officials
will reseal the package and release it for delivery; otherwise it will be
confiscated and destroyed. 17 In commenting on a draft of this report,
USDA noted that mail from high- risk countries is more thoroughly
scrutinized on the basis of pathway analysis.
Military personnel and equipment. Because U. S. military forces are
deployed throughout the world, troops and military equipment returning to
the United States could introduce FMD and other diseases into the country.
As a result, USDA provides support for the military and helps oversee the
reentry of military cargo, personnel, equipment, and personal property to
reduce the risk of introducing diseases into the United States. For
example, military personnel must declare all agricultural items they are
bringing back to the United States and identify whether they have been on
farms or in contact with animals while abroad. Their clothing and gear
should also be cleaned and washed before reentering the country.
Similarly, all military rolling stock, such as humvees, trucks, weapons
systems, and tanks, as well as other used military gear, such as canvas
tents, must be thoroughly cleaned before reentry. Pallets, wooden crates,
and other military equipment must be free of soil, manure, and debris.
Military equipment used to eradicate animal diseases overseas, such as
FMD, is not allowed reentry. For small- scale operations, the military
must 17 Senders of packages that are confiscated and destroyed are
routinely notified.
notify USDA at least 7 days in advance of arrival at a U. S. port of
entry. USDA will determine if appropriate cleaning facilities are
available at the first port of entry, and all items will be held at this
port for inspection. If approved cleaning facilities are not available or
if the equipment is contaminated to an extent that prevents cleaning, USDA
will refuse to allow reentry. Large- scale operations require a 30- day
notification.
United States Remains The United States has not had an outbreak of FMD
since 1929, and some Vulnerable to FMD
USDA officials and animal health experts believe that this healthy
condition of U. S. livestock is directly related to the effectiveness of
U. S. measures to prevent the incursion of the disease. However, these and
other
experts agree that the nation remains vulnerable to an FMD outbreak for
the following reasons: FMD is a highly contagious and hardy virus that
remains viable for long periods of time.
FMD can be carried and transmitted by a variety of animate and inanimate
items. Although the key pathways described earlier pose varying levels of
risk to U. S. livestock, according to USDA, it could take only one
contaminated product to come into contact with one
susceptible U. S. animal to start a nationwide outbreak.
The magnitude and volume of international passengers, mail, and products
entering the United States creates an enormous challenge for USDA and
other federal inspection agencies. As a result, most inspections at ports
of entry are restricted to paper reviews of manifests supported by a
limited number of judgmentally selected samples for physical inspection.
For example, in fiscal year 2001, over 470 million international
passengers and pedestrians arrived at U. S. ports of entry; of these, USDA
inspected about 102 million. According to APHIS officials, about 30
percent of the items seized from passengers at airports were prohibited
animal products or by- products. Table 3
provides information on the volume/ numbers of passengers, vehicles, and
cargo entering the United States and the level of APHIS*s inspections for
fiscal year 2001. Similarly, the volume of international mail entering the
United States makes it difficult for APHIS and
Customs to adequately screen incoming parcels for FMD- susceptible
products. For example, APHIS inspectors at the international mail facility
in Elizabeth, New Jersey, told us that about 30, 000 international parcels
pass through their check point every day. This volume of mail
provides the inspectors approximately 3 seconds per parcel to judge
whether the package might contain FMD- susceptible products. Moreover,
mail is processed at the facility during the day and night to keep up with
the volume of international mail arriving daily. However, APHIS inspectors
are present only during the day shifts and detector dogs are available for
only 1 to 2 days per week. Although Customs* inspectors screen packages
for FMD- susceptible products during the time when APHIS inspectors are
not available, both APHIS and Customs inspectors told us that the process
is less effective than having an APHIS
inspector on site. Nonetheless, according to APHIS*s Assistant Director
for Port Operations, even doubling or tripling the agency*s inspection
resources would not significantly reduce the FMD risk from overseas
entries because the percentage of passengers, vehicles, and cargo
receiving a physical inspection is likely to continue to be relatively
low. Table 3: Volume/ Numbers of Passengers, Vehicles, and Cargo Entering
the United States, Inspected by APHIS and Resulting in Seized Products,
Fiscal Year 2001
Percentage Commodity/ mode Volume/ number a Inspected by APHIS b inspected
Passengers 472,000,000 101,513,792 21. 5 (all modes of transport) Ships
215,328 52,016 24. 2
Aircraft 1,064,923 541,109 49. 0 Cargo
14, 538, 271 c 2,181,904 d N/ A e
Rail 1,534,566
Tr uck s 7,878,000
Ship 5,125,705
Mail packages N/ A f 434,216 N/ A Legend: N/ A= not applicable a Source:
U. S. Customs Service.
b Source: USDA. c The number of full containers. d The number of bills of
lading inspected. A single bill of lading may include multiple containers.
e The percentage cannot be calculated because APHIS and Customs report
their data in differing units of measure.
f The total amount of international mail that entered the United States
during fiscal year 2001was not available; however, APHIS officials at the
Port Elizabeth, New Jersey, facility told us that approximately 30,000
parcels go past their check point every day. Moreover, most U. S.
preventive measures are not designed to intercept illegal entries of
products or passengers that may harbor the FMD virus.
According to USDA, the volume of illegal agricultural products entering
the United States is growing, and contraband meat products entering the
country is the single most important risk for the introduction of FMD. In
addition, illegal shipments of products from countries other than the
stated point of origin and illegal immigrants also pose significant risks.
USDA and Customs annually confiscate thousands of contraband and
prohibited products at U. S. ports of entry. For example, in fiscal year
2001, USDA seized 313,231 shipments of prohibited meat/ poultry and animal
by- products. According to USDA officials, these seizures are only a small
portion of the contraband entering the United States. To respond to the
growing threat from illegal entries, USDA recently
created the Smuggling Interdiction and Trade Compliance program. Program
officials collaborate with several federal, state, and private
organizations to ensure compliance with U. S. agriculture import laws at
ports of entry. U. S. Preventive U. S. preventive measures for FMD are
comparable to the measures used by
Measures Are Canada, Mexico, and the United Kingdom for four key pathways
included in this review: livestock imports, animal product imports,
international
Comparable to Those mail, and garbage from international carriers. The
pathway that presented
Used by Other the most significant area of difference concerned the
measures used to Countries
process international passengers entering these countries. (Detailed
information on the preventive measures used by Canada, Mexico, and the
United Kingdom are provided in appendixes II through IV of this report.)
Generally, U. S. preventive measures were similar to those used by the
other three countries for the following four pathways:
Imported livestock. The three countries allow imports of livestock only
from approved countries that are FMD- free. Generally, these live animals
must be imported through predetermined inspection ports that
have adequate facilities available to quarantine the animals, if
necessary. In addition, the countries require import permits and health
certificates to accompany the livestock shipments unless the animals are
imported directly for slaughter. Of the three countries, Mexico requires
an official government veterinarian to (1) preinspect animals imported
from
countries other than the United States in their country of origin before
they are loaded for transport to Mexico and (2) accompany the shipment and
monitor the health status of the animals while they are in transit.
Imported animal products. The countries generally allow animal product
imports only from countries that they consider FMD- free and that meet
their specific animal health and food safety standards. The countries also
allow certain animal product imports from FMD- affected countries if they
originate from a preapproved establishment and are
processed in a manner that would inactivate the virus. For example, meat
products that are fully cooked and canned and are shelf- stable can be
imported from FMD- affected countries, but unprocessed products, such as
fresh, chilled, or frozen meat, and untreated milk, are not allowed. In
addition, all imported animal product shipments are subject to review and
may be selected for physical inspection when they arrive at the port of
entry in each of the countries. 18 International mail. The countries
handle international mail in a similar
manner, which includes a review of the documentation detailing the sender,
country of origin, and contents of the package. Only packages considered
suspect, for example, because they do not include required information,
are from high- risk countries, or have been sent by repeat offenders, are
selected and opened for further inspection. Canada uses x- ray technology
to help identify packages containing prohibited items, and Mexican
officials told us that all international packages arriving
from FMD- affected countries are opened and inspected for prohibited
items.
Garbage from international carriers. The countries* federal agencies
responsible for protecting animal health supervise the containment,
transportation, and processing of garbage from international carriers.
They generally dispose of international garbage by incineration or under
certain conditions by burial at federally approved sites. For example, in
Canada, international garbage can be buried at approved sites located at
least half a kilometer from any premise with livestock and/ or poultry
and must be immediately covered by 1.8 meters (approx. 5. 5 feet) of local
refuse and/ or other standard covering material. At the time of our
review, none of the countries allowed domestic animals to be fed
international garbage from airlines or ships. 18 All imported animal
product shipments receive a documentary review, which usually involves a
review of the accompanying paperwork, such as import permits and health
certifications. A percentage of animal product shipments is judgmentally
selected for physical inspection to ensure that the products do not
present any animal or public health risk. Samples may be taken for
laboratory analyses as part of this inspection.
In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA noted that the United
Kingdom faces greater risk than the United States because it is a member
of the European Union, which includes, and provides for trade among,
countries that are FMD- free as well as some that are not.
The United States differed from Canada and Mexico in the measures used to
prevent FMD from entering the country via international passengers.
Specifically, we noted the following three areas of difference:
Use of signs at ports of entry. While Canada, Mexico, and the United
States all posted special signs at ports of entry to alert international
passengers to the dangers of FMD, the U. S. signs were smaller and less
visible in comparison with the signs used by the other two countries.
For example, the Canadian signs were over 6 feet tall and warned
passengers in large, bold letters in both English and French about FMD.
Similarly, in Mexico the signs were also over 6 feet tall, included
pictures, and colored text in English or Spanish. In contrast, the first
U. S. signs were 1- by- 1 foot and included relatively small- sized text
on a white background that was difficult to read and did not easily convey
the importance of the message. According to USDA officials, these signs
were subsequently replaced with larger signs (3- by- 3 feet) that included
a colored graphic and larger- sized text. While larger, we observed at one
U. S. international airport that the new signs were placed at a
considerable distance from arriving passengers. These signs
were placed on easels on top of the baggage carousels and therefore were
several feet above eye level. In contrast, we observed that the signs in
Canada and Mexico were placed in more easily visible locations that were
in greater proximity to the passengers. According to agriculture officials
in all three countries, they are limited in their ability to place signs
at ports of entry because they have to negotiate the size
and placement with the port authorities. As a result, they are not always
able to use the most effective signs or locations. Figures 3 and 4 show
the signs that were used in the United States and Canada and Mexico.
Figure 3: U. S. FMD Signs Posted at Ports of Entry
Figure 4: Canadian and Mexican FMD Signs Posted at Ports of Entry
Modified declaration forms. In 2001, both Canada and Mexico made changes
to the declaration forms they use to process international passengers upon
arrival. For example, after the U. K. outbreak in 2001, Canada reworded
its declaration form to provide examples of food products of concern, such
as dairy products. Similarly, Mexico
developed a separate form that passengers coming from FMD- affected
countries must complete, and it asks clear, detailed agriculture- related
questions. In contrast, the United States did not make any changes to its
declaration form in 2001, and some of the international passengers we
contacted considered the agriculture- related question on the form
ineffective and unclear. A senior APHIS official told us that USDA was
aware that the question on the form was confusing and ambiguous to
travelers. This official said that most of the confusion arises because
the question on the form consolidates three questions into one.
In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA stated that it has recently
worked with Customs to revise the agricultural question on the Customs
declaration form. The form now includes two agriculturerelated questions
that USDA believes will be more easily understood by travelers and will
yield better information to the department to help focus its inspection
efforts. The new form is currently being distributed
throughout the country. Because USDA*s actions address our concerns, we
have deleted our recommendation on this issue from this report. (See table
4 for a comparison of the agriculture- related questions on the
prior and revised U. S. declaration forms.) Table 4: Agriculture- Related
Questions on the Prior and Revised U. S. Declaration Forms Language on
prior Customs declaration form a Language on revised Customs declaration
form a
Q. 11 I am (We are) bringing fruits, plants, Q. 11 I am (We are) bringing
meats, food, soil, birds, snails, other live (a) fruits, plants, food,
insects: animals, wildlife products, farm products; or, (b) meats,
animals, animal/ wildlife products: have been on a farm or ranch outside
the
(c) disease agents, cell cultures, snails: U. S.
(d) soil or have been on a farm/ ranch/ pasture: Q. 12 I have (We have)
been in close proximity of (such as touching or handling) livestock:
Note: a Both forms require the questions to be answered with either a
*yes* or *no* response.
Use of disinfectant mats. As a precaution, both Canada and Mexico
developed guidelines requiring all international passengers arriving at
airports and seaports to walk over disinfectant mats when entering the
country. However, according to USDA officials, the United States chose not
to use disinfectant mats because USDA research found that the disinfectant
in the mat would become ineffective after a certain number of uses and may
begin to harbor the virus, thus contaminating shoes that
were otherwise clean. Conclusions The United States has had significant
success in keeping the nation*s livestock FMD- free since 1929. To some
extent, the success of this effort is directly related to the
effectiveness of U. S. preventive measures both abroad and at the nation*s
borders. However, because of the extensive
presence of FMD worldwide and because the magnitude and volume of
international cargo and travel continue to expand, the nation*s
vulnerability to an introduction of FMD remains high. The steps that other
nations have taken to reduce the risk of FMD* such as signs to alert
international passengers* could help improve USDA*s efforts to protect U.
S. livestock.
While we recognize that there is an additional cost to preparing new,
larger, and more noticeable signs, we believe that, given the significant
economic costs of an FMD outbreak to the nation, these costs are justified
if they can help improve our preventive measures.
Recommendation for To help improve the effectiveness of U. S. measures to
prevent the
Executive Action introduction of FMD by international passengers, we
recommend that the
Secretary of Agriculture direct the Administrator, APHIS, to develop more
effective signage about FMD for ports of entry. Agency Comments In its
comments on a draft of this report, USDA stated that it is in the process
of developing new signage for ports of entry that will be larger and more
mobile than the ones that we observed during the course of our work.
Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face Challenges in
Responding Quickly
Chapt er 4
and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak If FMD enters the United States despite
USDA*s preventive measures, the nation*s ability to identify, control,
contain, and eradicate the disease quickly and effectively becomes
paramount. Recognizing the importance of an effective response and the
necessity to prepare before an outbreak occurs, USDA and most states have
developed emergency response plans that establish a framework for the key
elements necessary for a rapid and successful U. S. response and
eradication program. Many of these plans have, to some extent, been tested
by federal and state agencies to determine their effectiveness. However,
planning and testing exercises have also identified several challenges
that could ultimately impede an effective and timely U. S. response if
they are not resolved before an FMD
outbreak occurs. The Federal Planning for a coordinated response to
emergencies, including outbreaks Government and Many
of animal disease, is occurring at both the federal and state levels.
Furthermore, both the federal government and many states have tested and
States Have Developed
revised their plans in response to the results of these tests. and Tested
Emergency Response Plans
Federal and State At the federal level, 26 federal agencies and the
American Red Cross signed
Governments Have the federal response plan in April 1999, which is
intended to guide the Developed Emergency federal response to national
emergencies and augment state response Response Plans efforts. Under this
plan, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is designated as the
coordinating agency and is responsible for providing expertise in
emergency communications, command and control, and public affairs. In the
event of an FMD outbreak, FEMA would designate USDA as the lead agency and
work closely with the department to coordinate the support of other
federal agencies to respond to the outbreak. For example, under the plan,
Customs would *lock down* ports of entry; the Department of Defense would
provide personnel, equipment,
and transport; the Environmental Protection Agency would provide technical
support on the disposal of animal carcasses; the National Park Service
would guide the response if wildlife become infected; and other agencies
would provide additional support. To supplement the federal response plan
and provide specific guidelines for an animal disease emergency, such as
implementing quarantines of
infected premises and disposing of animal carcasses, APHIS, USDA*s
Homeland Security Council, and FEMA are taking the lead in developing a
federal plan specifically for responding to an FMD or other highly
contagious outbreak of an animal disease. The draft plan calls for the
involvement of more than 20 agencies and describes the authorities,
policies, situations, planning assumptions, concept of operations, and
federal agency resources that will provide the framework for an integrated
local, state, and federal response. At the state level, many states have
developed an animal disease
component for their state*s emergency management plans. According to the
National Animal Health Emergency Management System (NAHEMS), 19 in January
2000, only about half the states and U. S. territories had developed
animal health emergency response plans. At that time, NAHEMS recommended
that each state develop a plan for responding to animal health emergencies
that links to their state*s emergency management plan and includes
information on the following key elements:
Animal health surveillance and detection systems.
Control and eradication procedures.
Communication between key partners.
Involvement of emergency management officials.
Collaboration between state and federal emergency responders.
Involvement of state and federal animal health officials in responding
to natural disasters.
According to NAHEMS, in its 2001 annual report dated March 2002, the
number of states and U. S. territories with animal disease emergency plans
had increased to 46, of which 45 had included the plan as part of their
state*s emergency management plan, and 30 indicated that their plan
included all of the elements listed above. 19 NAHEMS is a joint federal-
state- industry group whose objectives include improving the U. S. ability
to respond to animal health emergencies.
Federal and State Agencies To ensure the efficacy and completeness of
their plans, the federal Have Tested Their
government and many of the states have conducted *tabletop* and Emergency
Response Plans
functional exercises. Tabletop exercises bring together key decision
makers in a relatively stress- free setting to
discuss the contingencies and logistics of a hypothetical disease
outbreak;
evaluate plans, policies, and procedures; and
resolve questions of coordination and responsibility. The setting is
relatively stress- free because there is no time limit to resolve the
hypothetical outbreak. In contrast, functional exercises simulate an
emergency in the most realistic way possible, without moving people or
equipment. It is a stressful, real- time exercise in which people apply
emergency response functions to a hypothetical scenario. According to one
APHIS official, functional exercises are best described as *dress
rehearsals* for actual emergencies.
The federal government has held both tabletop and functional exercises, as
described below:
To ensure that the federal FMD emergency response plan is comprehensive
and well coordinated, USDA conducted a tabletop exercise in 2001. In this
exercise, USDA developed a scenario involving a modest, limited FMD
outbreak in the United States and obtained the views of 21 federal
agencies and the American Red Cross on how they could support the federal
response to an FMD outbreak. USDA used this information to revise its
draft national FMD response plan.
The federal government held a functional exercise in 2000* the
Tripartite Exercise 2000* to test the plans, policies, and procedures that
would guide the emergency response to a multifocal FMD outbreak in North
America. The test focused on communication between the various entities
involved in an outbreak and the use of vaccines by Canada, Mexico, and the
United States. The test resulted in many recommendations to improve the
three countries* abilities to (1) communicate effectively, (2) provide
program support, and (3) use vaccines. According to the final report, the
recommendations, if implemented, will improve North America*s overall
response capacity.
The three countries have established working groups tasked with responding
to these recommendations.
Similarly, as of 2001, about 26 states had periodically conducted various
kinds of exercises to test state responses to an FMD or other animal
disease outbreak, according to NAHEMS. For example, in June 2001, the
Texas Animal Health Commission, in conjunction with the Texas Division of
Emergency Management within the Texas Department of Public Safety,
conducted a 4- day modified functional exercise of the state*s draft FMD
response plan and engaged 23 federal, state, academic, and private
entities in the exercise. The exercise was designed to test participants*
abilities to control the simulated outbreak, find and deliver indemnity
funds, and
streamline the decision- making processes. Overall, the exercise
determined that better communication and coordination could improve the
speed and effectiveness of the state*s response. It also identified areas
of ambiguity in the plan that left participants without clear directions
at crucial times during the exercise. According to state officials, the
plan was revised as a result of the exercise, and according to the
Executive Director of the Texas Animal Health Commission, more exercises
are necessary to continuously improve the plan. However, the state
veterinarian also said that he does not believe that adequate resources
are available either at the federal or state level for such activities.
Serious Challenges to As the U. K. experience has demonstrated, responding
to an FMD outbreak
an Effective U. S. can tax a nation*s fiscal, scientific, and human
resources. If a similar outbreak were to occur in the United States, the
nation would face a wide Response Are Yet to Be
spectrum of challenges that can hamper an effective and rapid response:
Resolved
(1) the need for rapid disease identification and reporting; (2) effective
communication, coordination, and cooperation between federal, state, and
local responders; (3) an adequate response infrastructure, including
equipment, personnel, and laboratory capacity; and (4) clear animal
identification, indemnification, and disposal policies. While USDA has
made some progress in addressing some of these issues, significant work
remains. Rapid Disease Identification
The rapid identification and reporting of an FMD incident is key to and
Reporting mounting a timely response. However, a timely response depends
on livestock producers* and private veterinarians* quickly identifying and
reporting suspicious symptoms to state and federal officials. If they do
not
do so, FMD could become out of control before the federal and state
governments could initiate any action. For example, within the first few
days of the outbreak in the United Kingdom, before the first reports of
FMD reached British officials, infected animals were criss- crossing the
country in hundreds of separate movements, putting other livestock at
risk. The main geographical spread of the disease occurred before any
suspicion that the disease was present in the country. In contrast, in
France, county officials quickly identified diseased animals from the
United Kingdom, and were able to slaughter them quickly and avoid a large-
scale outbreak. As a result, France sustained minimal animal losses and
was declared FMD- free within months, while it took the United Kingdom
almost a year to eradicate
the disease and regain its FMD- free status. Several federal and state
animal health officials with whom we spoke were concerned about how
quickly disease identification and reporting would actually occur in the
United States. They told us that livestock producers or veterinarians may
not readily identify FMD because (1) the disease presents symptoms that
are similar to other less- serious diseases, (2) FMD
and other foreign animal diseases are not usually included in veterinary
school curricula, and (3) many veterinarians may never have seen
FMDinfected animals. Furthermore, livestock producers and veterinarians
may not report the disease because they are not aware of the reporting
process or may not realize the criticality of prompt reporting. According
to USDA officials, the U. K. outbreak helped raise general awareness among
state officials, private veterinarians, and livestock
producers about the risks and potential of an FMD outbreak in the United
States. An indication of this increased awareness is the doubling of
foreign animal disease investigations from about 400 in 2000 to more than
800 in 2001. In addition, federal and state officials told us that the U.
K. outbreak
led to greater awareness of the need to have trained diagnosticians for
foreign animal diseases in the field. In recent years, more field
veterinarians have attended foreign animal disease training at USDA*s Plum
Island facility. 20 Nevertheless, as described in chapter 2, USDA
intensified its efforts to
increase public and industry awareness about FMD after the U. K. outbreak
20 Plum Island is USDA*s high- security laboratory (with a biosafety
level- III status) located on an island off of Long Island, New York, and
is the only U. S. laboratory authorized to conduct diagnostic testing of
FMD- suspected samples using live FMD virus.
in 2001. As part of these efforts, USDA also addressed industry and animal
health associations, and sponsored workshops, conferences, and
informational telecasts for federal, state, and local officials, and
others. In addition, the state governments also supported and supplemented
USDA*s informational efforts. Despite USDA and state efforts to flood the
livestock industry with information about the risks of FMD during 2001,
the challenge to USDA will be to maintain this heightened awareness about
FMD, now that the immediate risk from the U. K. outbreak has subsided.
Cooperation, Coordination, Cooperation, coordination, and communication
between federal, state, and
and Communication local agencies, private veterinarians, and livestock
producers are essential
for an effective FMD response. Recent planning efforts and test exercises
have helped start the process of establishing greater coordination and
improving the level of cooperation and communication between all levels.
According to a USDA official, for example, USDA*s recent planning efforts
to develop a national FMD response plan brought together officials from a
variety of federal agencies to consider the implications of an FMD
outbreak to their areas of responsibility and helped them develop ways in
which they could support a federal response.
Moreover, efforts to improve communication, cooperation, and coordination
are beginning to transcend state boundaries. In 2001, 26 U. S. states/
territories reported to NAHEMS that they were part of a group of states
that had agreed to support each other in preparing for and
responding to animal health emergencies. For example, according to
Midwestern state officials, they are now beginning to address regional
coordination and cooperation issues. In May 2002, seven Midwestern states
met in Iowa for a planning conference to discuss a coordinated response
plan for the region.
While these planning and testing efforts have improved the level of
communication, coordination, and cooperation, they have also identified
areas that need considerable attention. For example, although the
Tripartite Exercise of 2000 identified generally good communication and
cooperation between government and industry participants, it also
identified the need for the following actions:
Improve the technology used to ensure an uninterrupted flow of
information.
Develop written agreements between national animal health and industry
officials to ensure a continued high level of communication even when
players change.
Have federal and state counterparts work together to develop
collaborative relationships that will improve communications during an
actual outbreak.
We also found that cooperation and communication between federal and state
officials varied by state. For example, while some state officials
indicated that they had excellent working relationships with their federal
counterpart located in the state, others told us that cooperation and
communication were limited. According to one APHIS field veterinarian, the
level of cooperation and communication depends to a large extent on the
personalities of the people involved and therefore such variance is to be
expected. While the development of written agreements as suggested by the
Tripartite exercise report and NAHEMS could help alleviate this problem,
as of 2001, only about 32 U. S. states/ territories had such
agreements or other documents that detailed the respective roles of
federal and state officials. To help improve cooperation, coordination,
and communication, USDA officials told us that they are working with
organizations such as the National Emergency Management Association to
help states with their animal- emergency- planning efforts. In addition,
USDA awarded 38 grants totaling $1. 8 million in 2001 to state agencies,
tribal nations, and emergency management organizations. According to USDA,
this funding was to be
used for training, equipment, and emergency- preparedness exercises. In
commenting on a draft of this report, USDA stated that in late May 2002,
it announced that it would be making more than $43 million available as
grants to the states for strengthening homeland security preparedness. Of
this $43 million, $14 million is to help states meet the national
standards of emergency preparedness established by NAHEMS. Moreover, USDA
stated that it is working with FEMA to develop a framework for a
comprehensive communications plan to address a foreign animal disease
outbreak. The plan will help better ensure the timely dissemination of
information to critical audiences, including federal agencies, states, and
industries.
Adequate Response An effective response to an FMD outbreak requires an
effective
Infrastructure infrastructure, including a national emergency management
control and
command center, technical and other personnel, transportation and disposal
equipment, and laboratory facilities and testing capacity. To ensure that
a U. S. response to an FMD outbreak is properly coordinated
and adequately controlled, USDA has established an Emergency Management
Operations Center at its Riverdale, Maryland, location. In the event of an
outbreak, USDA will activate this center to coordinate day- today
activities during an FMD response and notify U. S. trading partners of the
status of the outbreak. According to USDA*s draft FMD response plan,
APHIS will set up the Joint Information Center* collocated with the
Emergency Management Operations Center* to serve as the primary source of
public information about the response and will coordinate with other
federal and state information centers.
In addition, as the U. K. outbreak illustrated, responding to an FMD
outbreak requires extensive personnel resources. These include persons who
can provide (1) specialized animal disease support for testing and
diagnosis, epidemiology, vaccination, slaughter, and carcass disposal; (2)
biohazard response support for controlling animals* movement and
decontaminating infected and exposed premises, equipment, and personnel;
and (3) general logistics support for sheltering and feeding responders;
the transportation, movement, and positioning of equipment and supplies;
and general law enforcement. During the 2001 outbreak, the U. K.
government had to request specialized animal disease support from several
countries, including the United States, Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand; hire thousands of private contractors to provide slaughter and
decontamination support; and use military personnel to provide general
logistical support. According to a U. K. government working paper issued
in March 2002, during the peak of the outbreak, more than 7,000 civil
servants, 2,000 veterinarians, and 2,000 armed forces personnel were
involved in the response* making it a bigger and more complex logistical
exercise than the United Kingdom*s involvement in the Gulf War. A recent
test exercise in Iowa indicates that the personnel requirements to respond
to an FMD outbreak in the United States would also be
enormous* approaching 50, 000 people to support a response. More
specifically, according to APHIS estimates, the United States would be at
least 1,200 veterinarians short of the required 2,000 to 3,000 specially
trained veterinarians needed to respond to an animal health emergency.
APHIS officials told us that while state and private veterinarians could
help
make up some of this difference, without appropriate training, their help
would be of limited use.
To address the personnel challenges posed by an FMD outbreak, USDA has
undertaken several efforts. By partnering with FEMA and other emergency
management organizations, USDA will be able to leverage these agencies*
resources to help provide many of the general logistical support
activities. Similarly, USDA has established a memorandum of understanding
with the Department of Defense to provide military personnel and equipment
to support a response effort. In addition, APHIS has implemented an
Emergency Veterinarian Officer Program to increase the number of
veterinarians available to assist in an animal health emergency. The
program trains federal, state, and private veterinarians to handle
emergency situations. As of December 2001, APHIS had trained 276 emergency
veterinarian officers, 145 of whom participated in responding to the U. K.
outbreak. Moreover, USDA has trained 520 veterinarians across the country
as foreign animal disease diagnosticians, and they may be called upon to
provide specialized animal health support in the event of an outbreak.
Finally, according to APHIS officials, USDA has informal arrangements with
the United Kingdom and other countries to provide the
United States with veterinary support. More formally, Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, the United States, and the United Kingdom are currently
drafting a memorandum of understanding that would allow the five countries
to share veterinary resources in the event of an animal health emergency.
In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA also indicated that it has
created a National Animal Health Reserve Corps, composed of private
veterinarians from around the country who would be willing to assist APHIS
veterinarians in field and laboratory operations during a foreign
animal disease situation. According to USDA, to date, more than 275
private veterinarians have signed on to this corps and the department is
continuing its efforts to recruit more members. This corps will supplement
the personnel drawn from states, and other federal agencies and
organizations. A response infrastructure also requires a diagnostic
laboratory system that is capable of handling the volume of testing and
analysis necessary in the event of an outbreak. For example, from February
through December 2001, the United Kingdom*s Pirbright Laboratory, that
country*s primary reference laboratory, tested 15,000 samples for the
presence of the FMD
virus and performed 1 million monitoring tests to ensure that the disease
had been eradicated. Nationwide, a total of 2.75 million samples were
tested as part of the response to the outbreak. Despite this level of
testing, according to U. S. veterinarians returning from the United
Kingdom, the United Kingdom had unmet needs for laboratory assistance.
In the United States, USDA*s Plum Island facility* the primary laboratory
in the United States that is authorized to test suspected FMD samples*
would be quickly overwhelmed in the event of an FMD outbreak, according to
many federal and state officials with whom we spoke. Recognizing this
potential problem, the National Association of State Departments of
Agriculture recently recommended that the United States develop a national
strategy for animal health diagnostic laboratory services that would
include USDA*s Plum Island facility and its National Veterinary Services
Laboratories at Ames, Iowa, as well as state and university laboratories.
Currently, state diagnostic laboratories have no formal role in a foreign
animal disease response. In addition, the Director of the Plum
Island facility stated that the nation needs to look beyond Plum Island
for laboratory support in the event of a large- scale FMD outbreak. He
suggested that off- site noncentralized testing, using noninfectious
material (tests that do not use the live virus), should be considered with
backup testing support provided by Plum Island. APHIS officials told us
that while the idea of a regional laboratory structure has merit, several
issues would
have to be addressed before such a structure could be implemented. For
example, laboratory personnel would have to undergo continuous training
and certification, and facilities would have to be renovated and
maintained to provide state of the art capabilities. This would require a
significant commitment of resources.
In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA stated that as part of its
efforts to strengthen homeland security preparedness, it is providing
state and university cooperators with $20.6 million to establish a network
of diagnostic laboratories dispersed strategically throughout the country.
This network will permit the rapid and accurate diagnosis of animal
disease threats. Moreover, USDA stated that earlier this year it allocated
$177 million to make improvements at key locations, including its
diagnostic and research facilities in Ames, Iowa, and Plum Island, and
that $15.3 million
was allocated to USDA*s Agricultural Research Service to improve rapid
detection technology for FMD as well as other animal diseases.
Animal Identification, The effectiveness of a U. S. response to an FMD
outbreak will require an
Disposal, and animal identification and tracking system to allow
responders to identify,
Indemnification Policies control, and slaughter infected and exposed
animals as well as clear animal disposal and indemnification policies. The
2002 farm bill, 21 addresses
animal disposal and indemnification issues by providing the Secretary of
Agriculture with broad authority to hold, seize, treat, or destroy any
animal, as well as to limit interstate livestock movement as part of
USDA*s efforts to prevent the spread of any livestock disease or pest. The
Secretary may also take measures to detect, control, or eradicate any pest
or disease of livestock, as needed. In addition, the farm bill requires
the Secretary to compensate owners on the basis of the fair market value
of destroyed
animals and related materials. USDA is currently trying to develop
specific guidance on how these authorities will be implemented.
Many epidemiologists believe that in the event of an FMD outbreak,
successfully tracing affected animal movements within 24 hours is
essential if the response is to be effective. However, the United States
generally does not require animal identification, nor does it have a
system for tracking animal movements. As a result, according to a USDA
official, in the event of an FMD outbreak, USDA would likely have to rely
on sales records to track animal movements, which could take days, or
weeks, depending on the accuracy of record- keeping and producer/ seller
cooperation. The longer it takes to identify animals and track their
movements from premise to premise, the more difficult it becomes to
contain the outbreak. USDA officials told us that, depending on where the
outbreak is first identified, it may be relatively easy or extremely
difficult to trace. For example, if only one farm were infected and
animals had not recently been moved on or off the premises, no tracing of
live animals would be necessary. However, if the outbreak first appeared
in a major market or feedlot where hundreds of animals move in and out on
almost a daily basis, tracing would be very difficult and time- consuming.
Recognizing the importance of an animal identification and tracking
system, USDA began planning such a system 3 years ago, according to the
Director of the National Animal Identification initiative. However, the 21
The President signed the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002
(the 2002 farm bill) on May 13, 2002.
industry resisted the concept because of the costs involved and the
potential for the unauthorized disclosure of proprietary information. The
Director noted that the events of September 11, 2001, as well as
technological advances appear to be reducing the level of industry
opposition to a national animal identification system. For example, this
official told us that the National Cattlemen*s Beef Association recently
indicated some support for such a system. However, the following issues
will need to be resolved before a national system can be developed and
implemented:
The responsibility for funding the system.
The type of technology that should be employed* strictly visual,
electronic, or some combination.
The amount of information that should be included on each animal*s
identification tag or electronic- tracking device.
The persons able to access this information.
The information that should be shared with other federal departments and
agencies.
At what point on the farm- to- table continuum should identification
end? In addition, during an FMD outbreak in the United States, the
disposal of carcasses could become a significant challenge because of the
potential number of animals that may have to be slaughtered. For example,
during
the U. K. outbreak, over 4 million animals, primarily sheep, were
slaughtered for controlling the disease. According to USDA estimates, if
the United States had an outbreak of comparable magnitude (affecting
about 8 percent of the livestock population), over 13 million animals
would be affected, and most of them would be cattle and hogs. Generally,
disposal can occur by burial, incineration, or rendering. In the United
States, according to USDA*s draft FMD response plan, burial would be the
preferred method of disposal when conditions make it practical. The plan
states that burial is the fastest, easiest, and most economical method of
disposal. When burial is not feasible, the plan recommends incineration as
the alternative means of disposal even though USDA recognizes that
incineration is both difficult and expensive. According to a USDA
veterinarian who helped during the U. K. outbreak, a 200- meter funeral
pyre was used to incinerate 400 cows or 1, 200 sheep or 1,600 pigs. Such a
pyre
required 1,000 railway ties, 8 tons of kindling, 400 wooden pallets, 4
tons of straw, 200 tons of coal, and 1,000 liters of diesel fuel. In
addition, heavy equipment, such as bulldozers and a team of about 18 to 20
people, was needed to construct the pyre. Figures 5 and 6 show burial pits
and incineration pyres used in the United Kingdom to dispose of
slaughtered animals.
Figure 5: Disposal of Animal Carcasses by Burial in the United Kingdom
Source: USDA.
Figure 6: Disposal of Animal Carcasses by Incineration in the United
Kingdom
Source: USDA.
According to the federal and state officials we spoke with, each of these
disposal methods presents significant implementation challenges that have
not yet been fully considered. For example, burial poses such challenges
as the potential to contaminate groundwater, the need to identify burial
sites and obtain appropriate federal and state permits and clearances in
advance, and the potential to spread the disease if animals have to be
transported to an off- farm burial site. For incineration, the
incineration site has to be accessible to large equipment, and yet has to
be sufficiently away from public view to minimize negative public reaction
to the sight of
large burning pyres. In addition, incineration could not only affect air
quality but also may be ineffective because if not constructed properly,
the pyres may not generate sufficient temperatures to completely
incinerate the carcasses. According to a USDA veterinarian, in the United
Kingdom
the pyres generally burned for about 9 to 10 days before all of the
carcasses were incinerated. Similarly, rendering poses challenges because
transporting carcasses to rendering plants increases the risk of spreading
the disease, and additional cleaning and disinfecting procedures would be
needed at the rendering facility. Some U. S. veterinarians returning from
the United Kingdom told us that during the outbreak, the United Kingdom
faced many of these disposal challenges and they were concerned that the
United States might not have devoted enough attention to deciding how it
would address these or similar disposal issues. According to APHIS
officials, USDA is currently creating digital maps of the whole country to
help identify appropriate burial and incineration locations. In addition,
USDA is trying to determine alternative uses of carcasses, such as safely
converting the meat into food, and using vaccinations to limit the number
of animals slaughtered and thus requiring disposal.
Finally, clear indemnification and compensation criteria are needed to
ensure producer cooperation to slaughter and dispose of infected and
exposed livestock during an outbreak. During the U. K. outbreak, the
government agency responsible for responding to the outbreak experienced
delays in slaughtering animals because of farmers* resistance and legal
challenges. According to state and livestock association officials,
indemnification would be a significant issue* one that could hamper a
rapid response in the United States. USDA published a proposed rule on May
1, 2002, amending the indemnity provisions for its FMD- related
regulations. This proposed rule clarifies how USDA will determine the
value of animals and materials affected by an FMD outbreak and how
indemnity payments will be made to claimants. USDA developed this proposed
rule because it was concerned that potential delays to an FMD eradication
program in the United States might occur because of producers* perceptions
that they might not be adequately
compensated for the fair market value of destroyed animals, products, and
materials as well as cleaning and disinfecting costs. Under the proposed
rule, the federal government would pay 100 percent of the costs for the
purchase, destruction, and disposition of animals if they become infected
with FMD, as well as for materials contaminated with FMD and the cleaning
and disinfection of affected premises, according to USDA.
In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA agreed that animal
identification, carcass disposal, and indemnity are all absolutely vital
areas that have to be addressed before any major outbreak of disease. In
this regard, USDA stated that it is working closely with the agricultural
industries to provide forums for a national dialogue on the issue of a
national identification plan for American livestock. The ultimate
objective is to establish a national identification plan that provides the
essential
elements to improve emergency response and meet future needs. USDA further
stated that it is investing in other options for disposing of carcasses on
a large scale. Finally, USDA stated that it has extended the comment
period from July 1 to July 31, 2002, for its proposed regulations that
address how decisions regarding indemnity payments will be made in the
event of an FMD outbreak.
Conclusions If an outbreak of FMD in the United States rages out of
control, it could ultimately cost tens of billions of dollars and the
destruction of millions of
animals. To avoid such catastrophic consequences, the disease must be
stamped out quickly. Although the federal government and state governments
have made significant progress in developing and testing emergency
response plans for an animal disease outbreak, such as FMD, significant
issues remain unresolved. These unresolved issues could present major
impediments to an effective and timely response if not addressed before an
outbreak occurs. While USDA currently has several ongoing efforts to
resolve many of these issues, the department has not established specific
time frames for the completion of these efforts. We believe it is critical
that adequate management attention and resources be made available to
ensure that these issues are resolved expeditiously.
Recommendation for To ensure that the United States is well positioned to
respond effectively to Executive Action
an animal disease outbreak such as FMD, we recommend that the Secretary of
Agriculture direct the Administrator of APHIS to develop a plan, which
should include interim milestones and completion dates, for addressing the
various unresolved issues that could challenge an effective
U. S. response.
Appendi xes Countries Considered FMD- Free by the
Appendi x I
United States As of April 29, 2002, USDA considered the following
countries/ areas free of foot and mouth disease (FMD) and rinderpest
(cattle plague): Australia Austria 22 Bahama Islands 22 Barbados Belgium
22 Belize (British Honduras) Bermuda Canada Channel Islands 22 Chile 22
Costa Rica Czech Republic 22 Denmark 22 Dominican Republic El Salvador
Fiji Finland 22 France 22 Germany 22 Greenland Guatemala Haiti Honduras
Hungary 22 Iceland Italy 22 Jamaica Japan 22 Luxemborg 22 Mexico
Netherlands 22 New Caledonia 22 New Zealand Nicaragua Northern Ireland 22
Norway 22 Panama Panama Canal Zone Papua New Guinea 22
Poland 22 Portugal 22 Republic of Ireland 22 Spain 22 Sweden 22
Switzerland 22 Territory of St. Pierre and Miquelon Tobago Trinidad Trust
Territories of the Pacific Islands
22 These countries are included in special categories for FMD and
rinderpest because even though they have been determined to be free of
these diseases, one or more of the following conditions exist: (1) they
supplement their national meat supply through the importation of fresh,
chilled, or frozen meat of ruminants or swine from countries/ areas that
are not designated as free of rinderpest or FMD; (2) they have a common
land border with countries/ areas that are not designated as free of
rinderpest or FMD; or (3) they import ruminants or swine from countries/
areas that are not designated as free of rinderpest or FMD under
conditions less restrictive than would be acceptable for importation into
the
United States.
Measures for Preventing the Introduction of
Appendi x II
FMD into Canada This appendix provides summary information on Canada*s
preventive measures to ensure that FMD does not enter the country via five
key pathways included in our review: (1) the importation of live animals;
(2) the importation of animal products; (3) the handling and disposal of
garbage from international carriers, such as airplanes and ships; (4)
international passengers; and (5) packages sent through international
mail.
Background The creation of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), in
April 1997, consolidated the delivery of all federal food, animal, and
plant health inspection programs, which were previously provided by four
federal agencies, into a single food safety agency for Canada. CFIA
delivers food,
plant, and animal inspection programs in 18 regions across Canada. CFIA
has 180 field offices, including border ports of entry, and 408 offices in
nongovernment establishments, such as processing facilities. CFIA also
has 13 biosecurity level- III laboratories, including 1 that handles FMD
and large animals. 23 These laboratories provide scientific advice,
develop new technologies, provide testing services, and conduct research.
The Health of Animals Act authorizes CFIA to prevent the introduction of
diseases that may harm animals or humans. CFIA controls the importation of
animals and animal products from foreign countries to reduce the risk of
introducing serious animal diseases, such as FMD. The last outbreak of FMD
in Canada was in 1952. CFIA has 14 inspection programs for animals,
food, and plants produced in Canada and commodities and live animals
imported into Canada. One of these programs is the Animal Health and
Production program, which is applied at Canadian ports of entry. This
program covers the issuing of import permits, quarantining of live animal
imports, negotiating export health requirements with other nations*
government, and establishing and ensuring compliance with Canadian
import health standards. In addition, the program is responsible for
implementing domestic disease control programs, foreign animal disease
preparedness, and emergency response.
23 Canada*s biosecurity level- IV laboratory conducts tests on animals
infected with dangerous zoonotic agents.
Controls for Live Canada allows live animal imports only from countries
that are FMD- free
Animal Imports and have been preapproved by CFIA. Generally, live animals
imported into
Canada must be admitted through approved inspection ports of entry. For
example, live animals imported into Canada by air from countries other
than the United States are required to enter at airports, such as
Vancouver, Halifax, Montreal, Toronto, and Calgary. CFIA generally
requires that an import permit application be filed in advance of the
importation of live animals from countries other than the United States.
The import permit contains information on the (1) importer, who must be a
Canadian resident;
(2) exporter; (3) destination of the animal( s); (4) producer; (5) port of
entry; (6) preapproved quarantine site, if the animal is to be
quarantined; and (7) description of animals to be imported including the
number, species, breed, age, color, name, individual identification, and
registration
numbers or numbers from the official seal on the transporting vehicle. If
quarantine periods are required for the animals, CFIA preapproves the
quarantine premises. The inspection of shipments of live animals at
Canadian ports of entry includes a document review and verification by
Canadian Customs and CFIA, and in some cases, CFIA inspectors may off-
load the animals for inspection, depending on their proposed use. As part
of the physical inspection, inspectors may verify the animal
identification numbers. CFIA usually requires the importer to have a
license to move the imported animals to their final destination.
Additionally, once animals have entered Canada, CFIA can impose post-
import requirements, which may include the possible quarantine and testing
or additional treatment of the animals.
All live animals, regardless of their country of origin, must meet these
general import requirements. However, once these requirements are met,
Canada has separate procedures for live animal imports from the United
States and those from other countries.
Live Animals Imported from Generally, live animals entering Canada from
the United States must the United States
conform to entry requirements that are less stringent than those for
animals from other countries. Depending on an animal*s state of origin and
the intended use of the animal, tests for some foreign animal diseases
that Canada does not have or has already eradicated, such as brucellosis,
tuberculosis, anaplasmosis, and blue tongue, may be required. Some states
have been preapproved by CFIA to export certain kinds of animals on the
basis of the state*s disease status. For example, as of April 2002, the
following seven U. S. states were qualified to export restricted feeder
cattle to Canada: Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, New York, North Dakota, South
Dakota, and Washington.
CFIA generally does not require an import permit for most animals imported
from the United States. For example, an import permit is not required for
U. S. imports of breeding cattle and bob calves for fattening. These
animals are required only to have an Official Zoosanitary Export
Certificate signed by an official USDA veterinarian. The certificate
contains information on the (1) name and address of the consignor; (2)
consignee; (3) individual identification of the animals to be exported;
(4) animal*s origin; (5) results of the veterinary examination of the
animals; and (6) animal*s residency in the United States, which must be
for a minimum of 60 days. Additionally, while some animals, such as bob
calves and restricted feeder cattle, are not required to be tested for
diseases that Canada does not have such as, tuberculosis, brucellosis,
blue tongue, and
anaplasmosis, others, such as breeding cattle, must be tested. Similarly,
a CFIA import permit and individual identification are not required for
animals imported from the United States for direct slaughter. U. S.
livestock to be exported to Canada for direct slaughter are placed in
sealed trucks or containers and transported directly to the Canadian
slaughter facility. CFIA requires all live animals imported for direct
slaughter from the United States to be slaughtered within 4 days of
importation.
CFIA encourages U. S. exporters to fax inspection certificates ahead of
time to ease the border review process. 24 Once a truckload of U. S.
livestock arrives at the border, Canadian Customs performs a preclearance
document review for CFIA and then sends the vehicle to the CFIA inspection
area, where inspectors review the documentation to ensure that the
information provided is correct. When required, CFIA unloads cattle
for individual inspection. CFIA can perform inspections on the trailers if
the load is small and it is safe to do so. U. S. livestock imported for
direct slaughter requires only a visual inspection; however, imported
breeding cattle are checked for health status, and their ear tags and
tattoos are verified against the documentation provided. Every transporter
is required
24 Live animals in transit by air are off- loaded only to change planes
and, if destined for the United States, are placed in sealed trucks before
leaving Canada. CFIA does not allow animals to transit Canada that would
normally not be allowed into the country.
to clean and disinfect the trucks, railway cars, aircraft, or shipping
vessels that have been used to transport livestock immediately after they
have been unloaded. A U. S. origin health certificate issued by a USDA-
authorized veterinarian
must accompany swine imports from the United States. The certificate
contains the name and address of both the consignor and consignee and
complete identification of the animals to be exported, including
certification that the (1) United States is free of hog cholera; (2) herd
of origin has been free of brucellosis and pseudo rabies for the past 12
months, and that the animals exported have been tested for these two
diseases; (3) animals have been isolated from other animals for at least
30 days prior to export; (4) animals have been transported in cleaned and
disinfected vehicles; and (5) animals have not been fed any garbage at any
time. Additionally, all swine imported from the United States must be
quarantined in Canada for at least 30 days in a CFIA- approved quarantine
station. Swine shipments imported directly for slaughter are required to
have an import permit.
CFIA requires shipments of bovine embryos or semen from the United States
to be accompanied by a U. S. origin health certificate and an import
permit. The certificate contains information such as the (1) registered
name and identification number of the parents, (2) species and breed,
(3) name and address of the consignor, (4) address of the collection
premises, (5) numbers from the official seal on the transporting vehicle,
and (6) name and address of the consignee.
Live Animals Imported from To prevent the introduction of disease and
control the importation of
Other Countries animals into Canada, the Minister of Agriculture
designates countries or parts of countries free from specific diseases.
Canada designates countries
to be FMD- free after reviewing the (1) prevalence of disease in the
country or part of a country, (2) time since the last outbreak of the
disease, (3) surveillance programs in effect, (4) measures taken to
prevent the
introduction and spread of the disease, (5) natural barriers to the spread
of the disease, and (6) the zoo- sanitary infrastructure. Importing
countries must also be free of other Office of International des
Epizooties (OIE) List A diseases in addition to FMD, such as rinderpest
and classical swine fever. Importing countries that have OIE List B
diseases, such as bovine spongiform encephalopathy, also known as mad cow
disease; tuberculosis; and brucellosis must provide additional
documentation proving that the herds being exported to Canada are free of
these diseases. At the time of
our review, in addition to the United States, CFIA accepted live cattle
imports only from Australia and New Zealand, and goats were permitted only
from the United States. If CFIA recognizes a country as free of FMD and
other diseases of concern,
the importer must apply for an import permit for live animals. CFIA
generally requires that all live animals imported into the country have a
unique individual identification. However, there are exceptions for
animals imported for direct slaughter. Additionally, all cattle must be
tested for tuberculosis, brucellosis, blue tongue, and anaplasmosis,
unless the
exporting country is considered free of these diseases and certifies that
it is free of other diseases of concern. CFIA has established additional
requirements for importing horses into Canada from FMD- affected
countries. Under CFIA supervision, horses from FMD- affected countries
must be quarantined and washed with a disinfectant. In addition, their
hooves and all equipment, such as saddles and tack, and all transportation
vehicles must be cleaned and disinfected. Bedding and manure must be
placed in bags and incinerated.
Controls for Imported Canada allows only imports of FMD- susceptible
animal products, such as Animal Products
fresh meat, from countries that have been preapproved by CFIA. Some animal
products may be imported from FMD- affected countries if they meet certain
requirements. CFIA and the Canada Customs and Revenue
Agency (CCRA) combine investigation services at ports of entry to ensure
that all Canadian import requirements are met prior to releasing the
products into commerce. Animal product imports from the United States are
generally required only to present proof of the country of origin at the
port of entry. Countries or parts of countries officially considered FMD-
free by CFIA can
generally export many types of animal products to Canada. As with live
animal imports, to designate a country as FMD- free, CFIA reviews
information about the (1) prevalence of the disease in a country; (2) time
since the last FMD outbreak; (3) surveillance programs in effect;
(4) measures taken to prevent the introduction and spread of the disease;
(5) natural barriers to the spread of the disease; and (6) zoo- sanitary
infrastructure. For all countries, Canada also has a country- by- country
meat inspection
and approval system, which includes a review of the following (1) the
country's overall system of meat inspection, (2) the establishments
operating within that system, and (3) the approval of individual meat
products prepared in these establishments. Moreover, CFIA reviews relevant
legislation and related technical information, including the country*s
residue- monitoring program. If the requesting country has legislation
equivalent to Canada*s, a visit is made to the country to study the
actual implementation of the legislation in establishments. On the basis
of satisfactory findings during the visit, establishments wishing to
export meat products to Canada are approved. CFIA maintains a list of the
countries and establishments that have been approved to export certain
types of meat products into Canada. For those countries where the meat
inspection system as a whole has not been approved, importation may be
limited to specific meat products. Importations from countries that are
not considered free from FMD are normally limited, to include the
following: (1) commercially sterile canned cooked meat products; (2)
pasteurized, canned, cured, and boneless meat products; and (3) cooked,
frozen, tubed and boneless beef from specified
establishments in certain countries. Milk products are allowed entry if
they have been treated properly and are certified accordingly.
Establishments approved for meat and meat product exports to Canada are
periodically reviewed.
All commercial shipments of imported meat products are subject to
monitoring and inspection at the Canadian port of entry. Once a shipment
is identified as containing meat products, it must be held until the CFIA
inspector reviews the information, such as the Official Meat Inspection
Certificate signed by the official veterinarian of the exporting country.
The Official Meat Inspection Certificate contains information on the (1)
name and address of the exporter and importer; (2) certificate number,
country code, and exporting establishment number; (3) establishment number
and
name, and country where the animals were slaughtered; (4) name of the
carrier; (5) port of loading and landing; (6) departure date; (7) number
and description of the meat products; and (8) numbers from the official
seal on the container and the container numbers. Depending on the
exporting country, additional certifications may be required. Some animal
product shipments are exempt from CFIA review because they are in transit
through Canada to another country. CFIA does not review these shipments,
provided they remain under a Customs bond and originate in a country and
are of a type that would otherwise be eligible for entry into Canada.
Animal product imports from the United States are generally required only
to present proof of country of origin. However, some U. S.
products, such as meat and bone meal are also required to have an import
permit.
CFIA*s sampling and inspection procedures for all meat packed in boxes
require the shipment to be totally unloaded and staged so that all
containers are visible. Inspectors visually scan the shipment to identify
any evidence of damaged or stained cartons and to verify outer labels. For
shipments that include suspected or unsatisfactory containers, a full
inspection of affected containers is conducted. For canned meat products,
random inspections are carried out by the inspector on a minimum of 40
cases, which are to be representative of the inspection lot and not
include more than 5 containers from each of the cases. When there are
fewer than 40 cases in an inspection lot, inspectors select the
appropriate number of containers out of each case to make up the required
sample. For
inspection lots having fewer than 200 containers, the entire inspection
lot must be examined, and the total number of containers must be recorded
on the report form. When a shipment is refused entry into Canada, the
inspector must immediately hold the animal products and notify the area
office by
telephone. The inspector or an officer from the area office must
officially notify the importer that the imported shipment is totally or
partially refused and that the importer has 90 days to destroy it or
remove it from Canada or it will be destroyed under direct supervision of
a CFIA inspector.
Controls for Garbage from international airlines and ships must be
disposed of and
International Garbage treated under the supervision of a CFIA inspector.
Garbage from carriers
of U. S. origin, however, is disposed of in landfills, similar to those
for Canadian garbage. CFIA requires international garbage to be disposed
of by incineration, heat treatment at 100 Celsius for 30 minutes, or
burial at a CFIA- approved site. In addition, the transportation routes
for international garbage are approved in advance along with alternative
routes in case of an emergency. Transporters are responsible for
maintaining their trucks in good condition and checking to ensure that
there are no possible leaks.
Regarding foreign ships, CFIA monitors and inspects them to ensure that
garbage on board the vehicle is stored and contained properly. Garbage can
be removed only from ships at approved ports that have adequate
incineration or burial sites. The ships* destinations are also recorded at
the first Canadian port of entry, and CFIA inspectors may seal galleys to
ensure that foreign foodstuffs do not find their way onto Canadian land.
At
subsequent Canadian ports, CFIA inspectors check the galley seals. Seals
may be broken under CFIA presence but must be resealed prior to departure
if the ship is going to additional Canadian ports. All foodstuffs and pet
animals are to remain on the ship and are allowed off only with the
written permission of CFIA. If ships do not comply with these
requirements, CFIA can fine and bar the vessel from entering Canadian
waters. Controls for
CFIA inspectors work with CCRA officers and with specially trained
International detector dogs in all major airports to prevent the entry of
prohibited plants and animal products. International passengers are
required to declare all Passengers
animals and animal products; the failure to declare certain animal
products can result in fines. International passengers, except those
arriving from the United States, are not allowed to bring meat and meat
products into Canada but may bring up to 20 kilograms of cheese.
Passengers not
declaring prohibited items are subject to monetary penalties of up to Can.
$400. At the main Canadian international airports, CFIA has approximately
nine dogs trained to sniff baggage accompanying international passengers
before they proceed through the federal inspection areas. The detector dog
program is part of CFIA*s front line of defense against pests and
diseases. The dogs are trained to detect items such as prohibited fruits,
plants, and meat. When the dogs are not available, CFIA inspectors walk
through the baggage claim area looking for anything that might be
considered suspicious. CFIA made a number of changes to the international
passenger controls as
a result of the FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom and other parts of
Europe. CFIA expanded its efforts to (1) use detector dogs at the
airports, (2) x- ray passengers* baggage, and (3) mount a public awareness
campaign.
As a part of the public awareness campaign, large signs were placed around
the airport terminals informing the public about FMD and precautions that
should be taken to prevent its introduction into Canada. Brochures were
also printed conveying similar information and handed to international
passengers arriving from FMD- infected countries. In addition, CCRA
officials asked specific questions about whether the passengers had been
around farm animals or visited farms or if they planned to visit a farm in
Canada* even if the relevant question was not marked on the declaration
card. This additional questioning ceased after the United Kingdom was
declared FMD- free. Moreover, all international passengers entering Canada
were required to step on a disinfectant mat. Passengers who indicated that
they might present an FMD risk were asked additional
questions about their activities and* as deemed necessary* their shoes
were sent out for cleaning. For example, when soccer teams came to Canada
from countries that had FMD, their shoes were sent for cleaning at
the teams* expense. CFIA officials told us that even though the European
outbreak is over, FMD still exists in many parts of the world, and they
are planning to revamp their public awareness campaign and broaden the
messages to cover all foreign pests and diseases.
Controls for CCRA officers inspect all international packages arriving
into Canada by International Mail
mail. Although CCRA officers are the only officials authorized to open
mail, when inspectors find packages that need further inspection by
agencies, such as CFIA or drug enforcement, they open it and affix a seal
with a code indicating which agency should perform a further inspection.
Generally, each package is then x- rayed. Problem importers/ exporters are
identified through a computer system, and these packages are given
additional scrutiny. Recently, Canada passed new legislation making the
recipient responsible for items sent through the mail, rather than the
sender. As a result, recipients in Canada may be held responsible if they
receive inappropriate items through the mail. For example, if personal
shipments of prohibited
agricultural products are sent through the mail, the recipient can be
subject to monetary penalties of up to Can. $400. For commercial
shipments, however, penalties for prohibited agricultural products can
currently be as much as Can. $6,000. In addition, criminal penalties can
also be imposed, depending on the nature of the offense.
Measures for Preventing the Introduction of
Appendi x II I FMD into Mexico This appendix provides summary information
on the preventive measures that Mexico uses to ensure that FMD does not
enter the country via five key pathways included in our review: (1) the
importation of live animals; (2) the importation of animal products; (3)
the handling and disposal of garbage from international carriers, such as
airplanes and ships;
(4) international passengers; and (5) packages sent through international
mail. Background The Mexican American Commission for the Eradication of
Foot and Mouth
Disease, formed in 1947, combined U. S. and Mexican efforts to eradicate
FMD from Mexico. 25 The commission built Mexico*s animal health
infrastructure and successfully eradicated FMD from Mexico in 1954.
Currently, the commission is responsible for performing a number of
activities, including (1) foreign animal disease surveillance, (2)
responding to reports of suspicious cases, (3) developing training on
emergency plans and programs, (4) promoting public information programs,
and (5) preparing and updating Mexico*s emergency foreign animal disease
response plans.
Mexico*s Secretaria de Agricultura, Ganaderia, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y
Alimentacion (SAGARPA) covers agriculture, rural development, fish, and
food issues. SAGARPA is responsible for implementing, among other things,
(1) the animal health laws and regulations, (2) the zoo- sanitary rules
used by inspectors at border inspections at the port of entry, and (3) the
animal health measures used in response to a foreign animal disease
emergency. SAGARPA has 509 inspection offices, 105 of which are at
international ports of entry, such as border crossings, airports, and
seaports. For 2001, SAGARPA*s budget for borders, ports, and airports was
about Mex. $11 million (approximately U. S. $1. 1 million). All imports of
live animals and agricultural products must be processed through one of
SAGARPA*s offices. In addition, SAGARPA officials enforce compliance with
Mexico*s official zoo- sanitary rules (1) at Customs offices, (2) at
quarantine stations, (3) at inspection points, and (4) in other countries
where treaties and accords have been approved. SAGARPA divides Mexico into
eight regions and assigns a veterinarian coordinator to each region for
animal disease surveillance and for 25 The commission is currently called
the Mexico- United States Commission for the Prevention of Foot- and-
Mouth and other Exotic Animal Diseases.
activating emergency operations in the event of a foreign animal disease
outbreak. Additionally, to support the coordinators, Mexico established 29
animal health emergency state groups. Active throughout Mexico, these
groups include over 900 government and private veterinarians trained in
identifying and responding to foreign animal diseases, including FMD.
Mexico also has a diagnostic biosecurity level- III laboratory capable of
testing for foreign animal diseases. 26 In 2001, Mexico reported
performing 220 investigations into suspicious cases that might have been
FMD. All investigations resulted in negative results for the FMD virus.
Controls for Live
SAGARPA allows live animal imports only from preapproved countries. Animal
Imports Live animal imports into Mexico are prohibited from countries that
have the FMD virus. SAGARPA*s general requirements for all live animal
imports include advance notification to SAGARPA*s official veterinarians
at the ports of entry. The amount of time required for official advance
notification depends on the animals* country of origin. Before live
animals can be sent to Mexico, SAGARPA sends official veterinarians to the
exporting country to ensure that the live animals to be exported are free
of disease. Once a live animal shipment arrives at the Mexican port of
entry, official veterinarians review all the documents and physically
inspect the animals. Importers are required to supply (1) a Mexican
sanitary import permit; (2) a
country of origin health certificate; (3) a dip certificate, if
applicable; (4) a registration certificate, if applicable; and (5) a
commercial license. The sanitary import permit certifies that the
exporting country has met Mexican importation requirements. The health
certificate contains information on the
name and address of the importer,
place of origin and destination of the animals,
animal health production standards of the exporting country, 26 A
biosecurity level- III laboratory is one that maintains a high security
level and employs extreme control measures in the handling of samples.
Such laboratories install special control measures to reduce the risk of
pathogens escaping into the surrounding environment by using air filters
and requiring all personnel to take disinfectant showers prior to leaving
the facility.
place where the certificate was issued, and
time period for which the certificate is effective. All animals imported
into Mexico must have individual identification marks or numbers unless
they are imported for immediate slaughter. If animals are imported for
direct slaughter, the only information that needs to be recorded is the
number of animals and their origin. Additionally, all live
animals must walk over a disinfectant mat, and depending on how tame the
animals are, the hooves are scraped of dirt, and the entire animal is
hosed down with disinfectant. Additionally, the trucks and containers that
transported the animals are disinfected, and any bedding or waste from the
animals is incinerated at the port of entry. Generally, all live animals,
regardless of their country of origin, must meet these import
requirements. However once these requirements are met, Mexico has separate
procedures for live animals imported from the United States and those
imported from other countries. Live Animal Imports from
Generally, all live animals entering Mexico from the United States are the
United States
allowed to conform to less- stringent entry requirements than animals
imported from other countries. For example, animals from the United States
frequently pass through Mexican land border ports on the basis of a U. S.
veterinary inspection. U. S. animals that arrive in Mexico via air or sea
are also allowed to enter with just a sanitary import permit when
facilities for inspection are available at the port of entry within
Mexico.
Before crossing the border, U. S. animals must remain on the U. S. side of
the border at an authorized facility for a minimum of 24 hours. When
Mexican veterinarians perform entry inspections in lieu of their U. S.
counterparts, they may (1) require additional quarantine for the animals,
(2) perform clinical observations and inspect the animals, (3) require
animals to be disinfected and/ or immunized, or (4) apply other animal
health safety measures.
Live Animal Imports from In addition to the general requirements listed
above, all live animals
Other Countries entering Mexico from preapproved countries must meet other
import requirements. Importers of live animals from countries other than
the
United States are required to notify SAGARPA in advance of a shipment. As
a part of the live animal importation process, SAGARPA sends two
official veterinarians to the exporting country to inspect the animals
before they are sent to Mexico. These Mexican veterinarians are
responsible for developing an animal health report for the animals being
exported, which will document information on the health of the animals
from the time the veterinarians arrive in the exporting country until the
shipment of animals
arrives in Mexico. As a result, before the animals are loaded onto the
ship for transport to Mexico, the Mexican veterinarians will examine the
paperwork and inspect each animal. One of the veterinarians will then
accompany the shipment and monitor the animals for clinical signs of
disease while in transit to Mexico. According to Mexican officials,
because the majority of live animal imports into Mexico come from
Australia, Guatemala, New Zealand, Nicaragua, and Panama, the time in
transit is usually considered an adequate quarantine period for the
animals. For
example, the voyage from New Zealand or Australia typically lasts 28 days
and serves as an adequate quarantine period for live animals. Because live
animal imports from countries such as Panama or Guatemala are also
transported to Mexico via ship and enter the country at maritime ports,
they too are subject to the same procedures. If the veterinarian on board
the ship notices any suspicious animal disease signs during the trip to
Mexico, the veterinarian will notify officials in Mexico, and the shipment
can be rejected en route and returned to the exporting country. Controls
for Imported
SAGARPA and the Mexican Customs Service combine inspection services Animal
Products at Mexican ports of entry to ensure that all imported products
comply with all Mexican import requirements before they are released into
commerce.
Animal products can be imported into Mexico only from countries that
SAGAPRA has preapproved, using OIE criteria for determining which
countries are FMD- free. SAGARPA may add additional requirements or
restrictions to the OIE criteria if it deems them necessary. Mexico does
allow some animal product imports from countries that have FMD, as long
as SAGARPA has approved the animal- product- processing plants and the
products are shipped with the required health and sanitary certificates.
Some products, such as milk and dairy products, are allowed into Mexico
only if they have been properly heat- treated or subjected to maturation
processes that destroy the FMD virus. Other products, such as machinery,
vehicles, and bullfighting equipment, must undergo disinfection
procedures, determined by SAGARPA, before being allowed into the country.
Products denied entry into Mexico must be immediately reexported or
destroyed.
All agricultural cargo must be processed through one of SAGARPA*s
inspection offices located at various borders, airports, and seaports.
Some imported animal products are allowed entry only at certain ports of
entry that have the proper facilities to warehouse them. SAGARPA officials
review the manifest of all international carriers arriving in Mexico to
ensure that no food items inadvertently enter the country without
inspection. The broker initiates the importation and inspection process
for animal products at the port of entry by presenting the required
paperwork, including the sanitary import permit, and requesting inspection
services from SAGARPA officials. The SAGARPA port veterinarian will review
the paperwork as well as the health certificate accompanying the shipment.
The health certificate contains information on the (1) name and address of
the importer or proprietor, (2) place of origin and the specific
destination
of the animal products, (3) animal health production standards used by the
exporting country, (4) place where the certificate was issued, and (5)
time period for which the certificate is effective. If the import
documents are in order and the products are from permissible countries,
the container is unloaded from the vessel and transported to the official
warehouse for further inspection.
SAGARPA officials inspect all containers used to ship animal products or
farm machinery and equipment. Containers from countries that Mexico has
deemed as high- risk for FMD must be sprayed with disinfectant on the
outside. In addition to the containers they arrive in, farm machinery and
other equipment from high- risk countries must be completely disinfected.
Fresh, chilled, and frozen meat products are physically inspected by
SAGARPA inspectors while they are stored in the refrigerated section of
the Customs warehouse. The inspection consists of (1) a paperwork review,
including a review of the Mexican sanitary import permit and
health certificate signed by an official veterinarian of the exporting
country, and (2) a visual inspection of the meat packages for the meat-
processing plant*s seal, lot number, and factory number to ensure that the
product came from an approved plant in the country of origin. In addition,
SAGARPA officials may collect product samples for laboratory analysis. 27
27 Mexico has a meat- product- sampling scheme, which is detailed in the
country*s meat
inspection regulations. Normally, 15 samples are taken from a shipment of
25 tons of meat. The system is based on a judgmental sampling process;
however, importers who have had problems in the past are sampled more
often.
Once all the reviews and inspections are completed, SAGARPA inspectors
complete the inspection report and make a final recommendation on whether
the shipment should be released. Cargo cannot leave the warehouse at the
port of entry without forms from SAGARPA stating that the cargo has been
inspected and deemed safe to enter the country. After
the main SAGARPA office issues the final certificate of importation and
releases the shipment, the broker can proceed to the Mexican Customs*
inspection. Mexican Customs helps SAGARPA ensure that prohibited or
restricted products are not entering the country. Controls for
SAGARPA officials supervise the off- loading and disposal of organic waste
International Garbage and garbage from airplanes and ships arriving from
FMD- affected countries. Generally, this garbage must be incinerated.
Incinerators in two locations accept international garbage* one in Mexico
City and one in Cancun. Consequently, cruise ships arriving in Mexico are
allowed to dispose of garbage only in Cancun. Ships arriving at other
Mexican ports must take their garbage with them.
Controls for In addition to the regular immigration and customs forms that
all International international passengers have to complete upon entry
into Mexico, all
passengers from FMD- affected countries must fill out a special, detailed
Passengers
questionnaire. This questionnaire asks passengers to help prevent the
introduction of FMD by (1) declaring any animal products that they may be
carrying and (2) providing information about their contact with animals in
the country from which they are arriving. In addition, the form asks
passengers to avoid visiting places in Mexico where they could come into
contact with live animals. At airports and marine ports of entry,
international passengers from highrisk countries must walk over special
mats soaked with disinfectant to disinfect their shoes. According to
Mexican officials, the disinfectant mats are changed every month, and
before the arrival of a high- risk flight at the airport, SAGARPA
officials apply fresh disinfectant to the mat. In addition,
until January 2002, the outside surface of baggage arriving from high-
risk countries was sprayed with disinfectant as it was loaded onto the
conveyor belt and before it entered the baggage claim area of the airport.
Baggage
from high- risk flights is also x- rayed and inspected for illegal
products by official inspectors at the airports. All confiscated products
are incinerated.
Announcements are made on the public information system at the airport in
English, Spanish, and French requesting passengers to help prevent the
introduction of FMD into Mexico by complying with the Mexican requirements
described above. Signs in English and Spanish warning travelers about the
dangers of FMD are posted throughout the airports.
Mexico also has inspection requirements for international cargo ships
arriving at Mexican seaports that specifically relate to the disposal and
use of food in the ship*s galley that is intended for the crew. As part of
this inspection process, Mexican officials (1) review the list of all the
seaports that the ship has stopped at before arriving in Mexico to
determine whether it docked in ports that pose a risk for FMD, (2) review
the list of all food
products on board the ship, (3) visually inspect the food in the galley,
(4) seal the food containers in the galleys of those ships that are from
highrisk countries, and (5) disinfect the stairs and main entrances of the
ship. Crewmembers of ships docked at a Mexican port for more than 3 or 4
days are allowed to consume some of the products in the galley while they
are docked. Crewmembers leaving the ship to go ashore must go through the
same procedures as other international passengers arriving at any port of
entry* complete immigration and customs forms, declare any products of
animal or plant origin that they may be carrying, and walk over
disinfectant mats.
Controls for SAGARPA officials receive advance notification of all
international mail International Mail
deliveries to Mexican post offices that handle such mail. According to
Mexican officials, SAGARPA inspectors open and inspect 100 percent of all
the international packages arriving from FMD- affected countries but only
randomly sample packages arriving from the United States and Canada.
According to these officials, the post office facility in Mexico City
receives about 500 packages per international mail delivery. Inspectors do
not leave the postal facility until all of the packages that arrived on a
particular day have been inspected, according to officials. Any prohibited
products sent through international mail that are confiscated are
incinerated.
Measures for Preventing the Introduction of
Appendi x I V
FMD into the United Kingdom This appendix provides summary information on
the preventive measures used by the United Kingdom to ensure that FMD does
not enter the country via five key pathways included in our review: (1)
the importation of live animals; (2) the importation of animal products;
(3) the handling and
disposal of garbage from international carriers, such as airplanes and
ships; (4) international passengers; and (5) packages sent through
international mail. Because the United Kingdom is subject to the
directives of the
European Union Economic Community, for each pathway, this appendix
summarizes (1) the preventive measures established by the European Union
for trade between member states and nonmember countries and
(2) any additional measures established by the United Kingdom. Background
The United Kingdom is a member state of the European Union Economic
Community 28 and is subject to the European Union*s directives. One E. U.
goal was to develop a common market without borders among the member
states. The European Union established directives that approximated
member states* laws and developed rules applicable to all member states.
These directives harmonized the European Union*s laws so that member
states could consistently follow and apply the same rules uniformly in a
common market. For example, each member state must follow guidelines
governing the import of live animals and animal products to prevent the
introduction of foreign animal diseases, such as FMD, into the European
Union. In addition, each member state is allowed to have national
provisions as needed. As a result, the United Kingdom has its own
legislation governing the imports of live animals and animal products that
implements the European Union*s directives and covers areas that are not
harmonized by these directives. When the European Union becomes aware of
an outbreak of disease in another member state or in a nonmember country
that may constitute a
serious threat to animal or public health, it has the power to issue a
declaration making it an offense for any member state to import specific
animals or animal products from the affected country or region. In the
event of such an outbreak, the European Union can take emergency safeguard
measures, including prohibiting the (1) export of particular species of
animals or animal products from affected member states to 28 Member states
include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Republic of Ireland, Spain,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
other member states and (2) import of live animals or animal products from
affected nonmember countries by member states. In certain circumstances,
member states may invoke additional safeguarding
procedures and take "interim safeguard and protective measures." Member
states invoking such measures and procedures must inform all members of
the European Union of the actions taken and the reasons for them. The
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) is the federal
agency responsible for environmental, rural, food, and related issues.
DEFRA is responsible for ensuring the health of livestock in the United
Kingdom. E. U. and U. K. Controls The European Union has established
separate preventive measures for for Live Animal
imports of live animals from member states and those from nonmember
states. In addition, the United Kingdom has additional controls to ensure
Imports
that live animal imports are disease free. E. U. Measures for Imports
Live animal trade between member states requires an official veterinarian
of Live Animals from from the state of origin to inspect the animals prior
to their movement and Member States
certify them as disease- free. This certification ensures that the (1)
animals have originated from an FMD- free country or have been tested for
diseases of concern, (2) animals have been isolated for a specified period
of time,
(3) country has an official disease surveillance program, and (4) animal
production standards have been met. Member states must also ensure that
the animals to be exported (1) come from approved holdings that undergo
routine veterinary checks, (2) have official tags and identification as
required by E. U. rules, and (3) are registered in such a way that the
original transit holding can be traced. Although the inspections of live
animals traded between member states are generally performed in the
country of
origin, nondiscriminatory, random spot checks in the destination member
state are permitted. Official veterinarians in the destination member
state are responsible for performing these checks. E. U. Measures for
Imports
Member states can import live animals only from nonmember countries (or of
Live Animals from areas of nonmember countries) if the European Union has
approved the Nonmember Countries
country as being FMD- free. This approval is granted on a country-
bycountry basis after the following factors have been considered for the
nonmember country:
The general health of the livestock, wildlife, and other domestic
animals, with particular attention to any exotic animal diseases and
environmental health situations that may exist.
The regularity and rapidity with which information on outbreaks of
infectious or contagious animal diseases is supplied to trading partners.
The rules for and implementation of measures to prevent and control
infectious or contagious animal diseases, including those that apply to
imports.
The structure and authority of veterinary services, including laboratory
services.
Legislation covering the use of animal production substances, such as
hormones.
In addition, live animals are prohibited entry into the European Union
when (1) importation rules were not followed, (2) the animals appear or
are found to be diseased, and (3) the animals are unfit to continue to
travel. Animals denied importation must be quarantined and reexported out
of the country or slaughtered. Live animal shipments from nonmember
countries must enter the
European Union through approved member states* border inspection posts. A
health certificate signed by an official veterinarian from the exporting
country must accompany all shipments. E. U. directives have harmonized the
inspections conducted at the border inspection posts to ensure the quality
and equality at all member states* ports of entry. At border inspection
posts, animal shipments undergo full documentary, identity, and physical
checks by an official veterinarian before the shipment is allowed to enter
into free circulation within the European Union. The
border inspection post must ensure that only cattle and swine that show no
clinical signs of specific diseases and no signs of FMD and brucellosis
are allowed into the European Union. Border inspection posts are required
to inform other member states* border inspection posts of any live animal
shipments denied entry and the reasons for the denial.
U. K. Measures for Imports Animals can be imported from member states to
go directly to slaughter of Live Animals from facilities, move through
approved holding centers to slaughter facilities, or Member States
go directly to farms in the United Kingdom. An export health certificate
and a license for animal movement must accompany animals arriving from
member states. Veterinary inspectors have the authority to inspect animals
imported into the United Kingdom from member states at their point of
destination to ensure that E. U. requirements have been met. Inspectors
can stop a shipment of animals while in transit if the transporter does
not
have the appropriate documentation. Animals imported for slaughter are
required to be slaughtered immediately after they arrive at an approved
facility. Breeding animals must have remained in the exporting member
state for 6 months prior to transport to the United Kingdom, and slaughter
animals, 3 months. DEFRA maintains a list of registered haulers allowed to
transport live animals within the United Kingdom. Haulers must maintain
the following
information for shipments of cattle and swine: the (1) place and date of
pick- ups, including the name of the producer or business and the address
of the animal- holding center; (2) species, origin, and number of animals
transported; (3) the date and place of disinfection; and (4) individual
animal identification numbers. Because of the recent FMD outbreak, as a
temporary measure, transportation vehicles are required to have, at all
times while in the United Kingdom, proof of disinfection.
In addition, operators or owners of holding centers must record and
maintain information on the owner*s name, the registration number of the
transporter, and the license number for all imported animals. For cattle,
they must also record the country of origin, date of entry into the United
Kingdom, identification numbers, and the date of exit and proposed
destination if the cattle are at a holding center. For swine, operators
are required to record only the registration number of the holding center
or the herd of origin and the proposed destination. Owners and operators
of slaughter facilities are generally not required to maintain this
information.
U. K. Measures for Imports The United Kingdom has adopted the European
Union*s directives for of Live Animals from importing live animals and has
spelled out the details for implementing Nonmember Countries
these rules in legislation. Animals that have already passed through
another member state*s border inspection post are required to have both a
border certificate of examination and the original health certificate when
they arrive at the U. K. destination. The United Kingdom also has
procedures for post- import checks, which allow DEFRA veterinary
inspectors to recheck any imported animals that were processed at a member
state*s border inspection post. These post- import checks can occur at the
imported animals* destination or while they are in transit. As a result of
these checks, if disease is suspected, animals may be quarantined,
slaughtered, or reexported. The imports of live animals from nonmember
countries are required to enter the United Kingdom through certain ports
of entry such as, Heathrow, Luton, Stansted, and Prestwick. E. U. and U.
K. Controls The European Union has established separate preventive
measures for for Imported Animal
imports of animal products from member and nonmember states. The United
Kingdom has additional controls to ensure that animal product Products
imports are disease free. E. U. Measures for Imported Animal products
imported by a member state from other member states Animal Products from
must be shipped from approved and licensed facilities that meet the Member
States
European Union*s animal health requirements and are under the control of
an official veterinarian. Each member state is responsible for ensuring
that its animal products are safe and disease free. Intracommunity
shipments of animal products must be accompanied by an official health
certificate or commercial document that contains information on the origin
and destination of the products. As a result of the European Union*s
common market rules, there are no routine public health checks at member
states* ports of entry for shipments originating in another member state.
However,
E. U. rules permit random spot checks of shipments at the place of
destination.
E. U. Measures for Imported Member states can import animal products only
from nonmember
Animal Products from countries or parts of a nonmember country approved by
the European Nonmember Countries
Union. As with live animal imports, approval is considered on a countryby-
country basis after the following factors have been considered:
The general health of the livestock, wildlife, and other domestic
animals, with particular attention to any exotic animal diseases and
environmental health situations that may exist.
The regularity and rapidity with which information on infectious or
contagious animal disease outbreaks is supplied to trading partners.
The rules for and implementation of measures to prevent and control
infectious or contagious animal diseases, including those that apply to
imports.
The structure and authority of veterinary services, including laboratory
services.
Legislation covering the use of animal production substances, such as
hormones.
Imported animal products from nonmember countries must enter member states
through approved border inspection posts and be accompanied by a health
certificate signed by an official veterinarian of the exporting country.
Official veterinarians at the member states* border inspection post are
responsible for ensuring that the following three types of checks on
shipments from nonmember countries are performed and that the information
provided is verified:
A documentary check to review the veterinary documentation accompanying
the shipment, the importer*s advance written notice specifying the number
and nature of the shipment, and the estimated time of arrival at the port
of entry. An identity check to verify that the contents of the shipment
are the
same as described in the documentation. For shipments that do not arrive
in containers, identity checks involve ensuring that the stamps, official
marks, and health marks identifying the country and establishment of
origin are present. In contrast, shipments arriving in officially sealed
containers are not opened unless there is doubt about the authenticity of
the seals or suspicions about tampering. In such cases, the containers
will be opened and inspected to ensure that the stamps, health marks, and
other marks identifying the country and establishment of origin are
present on the shipment and conform to those on the certificate or
document accompanying the shipment. A physical check of the shipment
involves inspecting the contents to
ensure that they do not present an animal or public health risk. During a
physical check, the inspectors may take samples for laboratory analysis.
Physical checks are conducted on a predetermined percentage of imported
shipments of animal products from nonmember countries. The percentage
varies according to the product and the country of origin. For example,
veterinarians inspect 20 percent of fresh meat, fish
products, eggs, animal fats, and animal casings shipments and 50 percent
of wild meat products, milk, egg products, and processed animal protein
shipments.
In those cases where the checks indicate that the shipment does not meet
requirements for entry into the European Union, the shipment is reexported
if it does not pose any risk to public or animal health. For shipments
where reexportation is not possible, the product is destroyed. E. U. rules
allow for the importation of some types of animal products, such as canned
meat and some milk products, from nonmember countries that have FMD, as
long as specific food- processing procedures are followed to inactivate
the virus. For example, milk products imported from FMD
countries must be properly heat- treated. Imports of semen and embryos
from nonmember countries are accepted by the European Union if the
shipment (1) comes from an FMD- free country; (2) is accompanied by a
signed health certificate attesting to the diseasefree
status of the animals from which the semen, ova, or embryos are derived;
and (3) comes through an approved collection center. The information in
the accompanying documents is checked at the member states* border
inspection post to determine if the shipment meets the
European Union*s requirements before it is released. The European Union
has additional requirements for imported germplasm; however, these are
currently being updated.
U. K. Measures for Imported Animal products from other member states must
be accompanied by all the
Animal Products from documents required by E. U. rules and are deliverable
only to the address in Member States
the United Kingdom that is identified on these documents. Official U. K.
veterinarians perform nondiscriminatory veterinary checks for products
imported from other member states, which may include the sampling of the
product at the U. K. destination.
U. K. Measures for Imports In order to ensure that animal diseases are not
imported into the United
of Animal Products from Kingdom via animal products from nonmember
countries, DEFRA enforces Nonmember Countries
a system of controls that relies primarily on the health certification
accompanying the shipment and post- import official veterinary inspections
of the shipment. Imports from nonmember countries are permitted only
through about 26 approved border inspection posts in the United Kingdom.
E. U. and U. K. Controls E. U. rules require that garbage from
international carriers, such as for International airplanes and ships, be
removed under official control for destruction. In
the United Kingdom, international garbage is known as *catering waste*
Garbage and, according to U. K. regulations, represents the most likely
route by which a major foreign animal disease such as FMD could enter the
country. As a result, DEFRA regulates the handling and disposal of all
catering waste from international carriers that arrive in the United
Kingdom. To ensure proper handling and disposal, DEFRA issues licenses,
which
delineate how the catering waste is to be transported, including the
transportation route for the waste from the port of entry to the disposal
site and how it is to be disposed of, which could either be at an approved
landfill or incinerator. Livestock in the United Kingdom cannot be fed any
imported catering waste. E. U. and U. K. Controls E. U. rules set limits
on what products international passengers can bring
for International from nonmember countries into member states. For
example, personal imports of raw meat from any nonmember country are
illegal. However, Passengers
passengers are allowed to bring some animal products from nonmember
countries if (1) the products are meant for human consumption, (2) the
products come from an E. U.- approved country, and (3) the quantity
imported does not exceed 1 kilogram (2. 2 pounds) per person. Passengers
traveling within the European Union are allowed to import meat, animal,
and milk products up to 10 kilograms per person as long as the product
originates from another member state. The United Kingdom follows the E. U.
rules for personal imports of animal products by international passengers.
The United Kingdom can impose
penalties of up to 2 years of imprisonment and fines for passengers found
smuggling prohibited goods, such as milk and raw meat. Additional
restrictions on personal imports of international travelers may be imposed
as needed, owing to outbreaks of animal disease in various parts of the
world. As part of a new publicity campaign to help stop illegal products,
such as meat, from entering the United Kingdom, posters were placed at
various ports of entry and airports to inform travelers about prohibited
items and
warn them about potential penalties for illegal imports.
U. K. Controls for We are not aware of any specific E. U. requirements for
international mail.
International Mail However, U. K. Customs* inspectors examine all
international mail packages for prohibited and restricted items. For
example, packages
containing meat products may be subject to inspection and may be opened
and closed by a post office official. Packages from approved nonmember
countries will be allowed as long as the quantity of the product does not
exceed 1 kilogram (2. 2 pounds), the product is fully cooked in
hermetically sealed containers, and it is intended for personal
consumption only. Packages found in contravention of these regulations are
liable to be seized without compensation. Meat or meat products sent to
the United Kingdom via international mail from other member states are
allowed if they are for personal consumption and do not exceed 10
kilograms. Additional evidence may be required to support claims that
imports in excess of 10 kilograms are for personal use. Further
restrictions on imported items sent through international mail may be
imposed as needed, owing to outbreaks of animal disease in other
countries.
Comments from the U. S. Department of
Appendi x V Agriculture
Appendi x VI Comments from the U. S. Customs Service
Appendi x VII
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contacts Lawrence Dyckman (202)
512- 3841 Anu Mittal (202) 512- 9846 Acknowledgments In addition to the
persons named above, Erin Barlow, Clifford Diehl, and
Eugene Wisnoski made key contributions to this report. Important
contributions were also made by William Chatlos, Oliver Easterwood, Judy
Pagano, and Carol Hernstadt Shulman.
(360116)
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a
GAO United States General Accounting Office
Page i GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Contents
Contents
Page ii GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Contents
Page iii GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Contents
Page iv GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
United States General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548
Page 1 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
A
July 26, 2002 Lett er
The Honorable Tom Daschle United States Senate
Dear Senator Daschle: As requested, we are reporting on the United States*
ability to prevent the introduction of foot and mouth disease. This report
contains recommendations to the U. S. Department of Agriculture on the
need to develop a process to expeditiously communicate information on
foreign disease outbreaks to the Customs Service, improve some of the
preventive measures used in the United States, and
develop plans and timetables to address any outstanding issues that could
impede a U. S. response. As agreed with your office, unless you publicly
announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this
report until 30 days from the date of this letter. We will then send
copies to other appropriate congressional committees; the Secretary of
Agriculture; the Commissioner of Customs; and the Director, Office of
Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others
upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
the GAO Web site at http:// www. gao. gov. If you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report, please call me at (202) 512- 3841. Key
contributors to this report are listed in appendix VII.
Sincerely yours, Lawrence J. Dyckman Director, Natural Resources and
Environment
Page 2 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Executive Summary Page 3 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Executive Summary Page 4 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Executive Summary Page 5 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Executive Summary Page 6 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Executive Summary Page 7 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Executive Summary Page 8 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Executive Summary Page 9 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Executive Summary Page 10 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Executive Summary Page 11 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Page 12 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Chapter 1
Chapter 1 Introduction
Page 13 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Chapter 1 Introduction
Page 14 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Chapter 1 Introduction
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Chapter 1 Introduction
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Chapter 1 Introduction
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Chapter 1 Introduction
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Chapter 1 Introduction
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Page 20 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Chapter 1 Introduction
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Page 22 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Chapter 1 Introduction
Page 23 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Chapter 1 Introduction
Page 24 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Chapter 1 Introduction
Page 25 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Chapter 1 Introduction
Page 26 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Page 27 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Chapter 2
Chapter 2 USDA Has Adequate Processes to Obtain Information on Foreign FMD
Outbreaks, but
Dissemination to Customs Can Be Improved Page 28 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and
Mouth Disease
Chapter 2 USDA Has Adequate Processes to Obtain Information on Foreign FMD
Outbreaks, but
Dissemination to Customs Can Be Improved Page 29 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and
Mouth Disease
Chapter 2 USDA Has Adequate Processes to Obtain Information on Foreign FMD
Outbreaks, but
Dissemination to Customs Can Be Improved Page 30 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and
Mouth Disease
Chapter 2 USDA Has Adequate Processes to Obtain Information on Foreign FMD
Outbreaks, but
Dissemination to Customs Can Be Improved Page 31 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and
Mouth Disease
Chapter 2 USDA Has Adequate Processes to Obtain Information on Foreign FMD
Outbreaks, but
Dissemination to Customs Can Be Improved Page 32 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and
Mouth Disease
Chapter 2 USDA Has Adequate Processes to Obtain Information on Foreign FMD
Outbreaks, but
Dissemination to Customs Can Be Improved Page 33 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and
Mouth Disease
Chapter 2 USDA Has Adequate Processes to Obtain Information on Foreign FMD
Outbreaks, but
Dissemination to Customs Can Be Improved Page 34 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and
Mouth Disease
Page 35 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Chapter 3
Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible
Page 36 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible
Page 37 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible
Page 38 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible
Page 39 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible
Page 40 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible
Page 41 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible
Page 42 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible
Page 43 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible
Page 44 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible
Page 45 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible
Page 46 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible
Page 47 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible
Page 48 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible
Page 49 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible
Page 50 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible
Page 51 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible
Page 52 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Page 53 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Chapter 4
Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak
Page 54 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak
Page 55 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak
Page 56 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak
Page 57 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak
Page 58 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak
Page 59 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak
Page 60 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak
Page 61 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak
Page 62 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak
Page 63 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak
Page 64 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak
Page 65 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak
Page 66 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak
Page 67 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak
Page 68 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Page 69 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Appendix I
Appendix I Countries Considered FMD- Free by the United States
Page 70 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Page 71 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Appendix II
Appendix II Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Canada
Page 72 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Appendix II Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Canada
Page 73 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Appendix II Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Canada
Page 74 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Appendix II Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Canada
Page 75 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Appendix II Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Canada
Page 76 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Appendix II Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Canada
Page 77 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Appendix II Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Canada
Page 78 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Appendix II Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Canada
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Page 80 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Appendix III
Appendix III Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Mexico
Page 81 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Appendix III Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Mexico
Page 82 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Appendix III Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Mexico
Page 83 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Appendix III Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Mexico
Page 84 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Appendix III Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Mexico
Page 85 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Appendix III Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Mexico
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Page 87 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Appendix IV
Appendix IV Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into the
United Kingdom
Page 88 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Appendix IV Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into the
United Kingdom
Page 89 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Appendix IV Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into the
United Kingdom
Page 90 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Appendix IV Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into the
United Kingdom
Page 91 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Appendix IV Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into the
United Kingdom
Page 92 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Appendix IV Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into the
United Kingdom
Page 93 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Appendix IV Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into the
United Kingdom
Page 94 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Appendix IV Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into the
United Kingdom
Page 95 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Page 96 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Appendix V
Appendix V Comments from the U. S. Department of Agriculture
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Appendix V Comments from the U. S. Department of Agriculture
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Appendix V Comments from the U. S. Department of Agriculture
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Page 100 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Appendix VI
Page 101 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease
Appendix VII
United States General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548- 0001
Official Business Penalty for Private Use $300
Address Service Requested Presorted Standard
Postage & Fees Paid GAO Permit No. GI00
*** End of document. ***
Where did the 2001 footFoot-and-mouth was discovered at an Essex abattoir on 19 February 2001 and it quickly spread across the UK. The highly infectious disease, which mainly affected cattle, pigs, sheep and goats, plunged the agricultural industry into its worst crisis for decades.
What caused the footThe consensus is that the FMD virus came from infected or contaminated meat that was part of the swill being fed to pigs at Burnside Farm in Heddon-on-the-Wall. The swill had not been properly heat-sterilized and the virus had thus been allowed to infect the pigs.
Where did foot and mouth disease originate from?Introduction. The earliest description of probable foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) in cattle was made by an Italian monk, Hieronymus Fracastorius, in Venice in 1514. The affected animals refused their feed, the oral mucosa showed redness and the animals had vesicles in the oral cavity and on their feet.
How was the 2001 UK footThe virus can attack any cloven-hoofed animal but was first found in pigs in northern England. It spread rapidly and was easily carried around the UK by people and machinery.
|
The 2001 epidemic of foot and mouth disease in the united kingdom probably originated:
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