journal article
Presidents Have Problems Too: The Logic of Intra-Branch Delegation in East Asian DemocraciesBritish Journal of Political Science
Vol. 37, No. 4 (Oct., 2007)
, pp. 659-684 (26 pages)
Published By: Cambridge University Press
//www.jstor.org/stable/4497317
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Abstract
This article addresses the codification of formal rules and procedures of governance through Administrative Procedure Acts (APAs). The recent enactment of APAs in two new democracies, South Korea and Taiwan, highlights an apparent paradox. Because administrative reform limits the executive's power, it is clear why legislatures in separation-of-power systems would favour APAs. But it is less clear why presidents would support them. Why would a president accept a law designed to restrict her ability to act freely? The answer is that presidents have agency problems too. The more intra-branch conflict they face during their administrations, the more likely they will support administrative reform. Thus, instead of tying the hands of future administrations, presidents also use APAs to overcome current control problems. Three recently democratized East Asian countries, two with APAs (South Korea and Taiwan) and one without (Philippines), support this 'reining in' theory. Conflict within the executive branch may be an important ingredient in democratic consolidation. APAs result from political struggle.
Journal Information
The British Journal of Political Science is a broadly based journal aiming to cover developments across a wide range of countries and specialisms. Contributions are drawn from all fields of political science (including political theory, political behaviour, public policy and international relations), and articles from scholars in related disciplines (sociology, social psychology, economics and philosophy) appear frequently. With a reputation established over 50 years of publication, the British Journal of Political Science is widely recognised as one of the premier journals in its field. Instructions for Contributors at Cambridge Journals Online
Publisher Information
Cambridge University Press (www.cambridge.org) is the publishing division of the University of Cambridge, one of the world’s leading research institutions and winner of 81 Nobel Prizes. Cambridge University Press is committed by its charter to disseminate knowledge as widely as possible across the globe. It publishes over 2,500 books a year for distribution in more than 200 countries. Cambridge Journals publishes over 250 peer-reviewed academic journals across a wide range of subject areas, in print and online. Many of these journals are the leading academic publications in their fields and together they form one of the most valuable and comprehensive bodies of research available today. For more information, visit //journals.cambridge.org.
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