A trade secret: All three elements are required; if any element ceases to exist, then the trade
secret will also cease to exist. Otherwise there is no limit on the amount of time a trade secret is protected. The Economic Espionage Act of 1996 criminalizes trade theft under two sets of circumstances. Economic espionage refers to the theft of a trade secret
“intending or knowing that the offense will benefit any foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent.” The second offense — the theft of trade secrets — addresses theft “that is related to a product or service used in or intended for use in interstate or foreign commerce, to the economic benefit of anyone other than the owner thereof, and intending or knowing that the offense will, injure any owner of that trade secret.” These crimes are prosecuted by the Department of Justice
and are punishable by imprisonment and/or fines. The Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA) amended the Economic Espionage Act to establish a private civil cause of action for the misappropriation of a trade secret. This cause of action provides trade secret owners with a uniform, reliable, and predictable way to protect their valuable trade secrets anywhere in the country. The DTSA does not
preempt existing state trade secret law, thus giving trade secret owners the option of state or federal venues. U.S. courts can protect a trade secret by (a) ordering that the misappropriation stop, (b) that the secret be protected from public exposure, and (c) in extraordinary circumstances, ordering the seizure of the misappropriated trade secret. At the conclusion of a trade secret case, courts can award damages, court costs, reasonable attorneys' fees and a permanent injunction, if
warranted. Trade secret protection is a complement to patent protection. Patents require the inventor to provide a detailed and enabling disclosure about the invention in exchange for the right to exclude others from practicing the invention for a limited period of time. Patents expire, and when that happens the information contained within is no longer protected.
However, unlike trade secrets, patents may protect against independent discovery. Patent protection also eliminates the need to maintain secrecy. Protection of trade secrets
Trade secrets versus patents
While the definition of protectable “information” is very broad under trade secret law, there are more limitations on what can be protected by a patent. If a given invention is eligible for either patent or trade secret protection, then the decision on how to protect that invention depends on business considerations and weighing the relative benefits of each type of intellectual property protection.
Trade secrets resources
Other resources:Trade
Secrets
Trade Secrets Video
A three-minute video produced by the USPTO provides a brief, yet informative introduction on what trade secrets are, why you should protect them, how they can impact a business’s bottom line, and their importance as intellectual property.
2017 Trade Secrets Symposium
On May 8, 2017, at the one-year anniversary of the enactment of the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, the USPTO convened a one-day symposium on trade secrets: “Developments in Trade Secret Protection.” Videos of all four panel sessions are available for viewing online.
2015 Trade Secrets Symposium
On January 8, 2015, the USPTO organized a one-day symposium on issues relevant to the protection of trade secrets. Videos of the symposium are available for viewing online.
Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016
Public law 114-153. Dated May 11, 2016. Read the full text of the law here.
The Defend Trade Secrets Act at Five: The Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (October 2021)
On the fifth anniversary of the enactment of the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, this paper looks at the relationship between the act and the “inevitable disclosure” doctrine. The doctrine allows a court to enjoin a former employee from working for
a competitor because the nature of the new job and the knowledge of the employee makes it inevitable that the trade secrets of the former employer will be disclosed.
Abstract
The law of ideas - an uneven patchwork of principles governing the fortunes of an individual whose idea proves profitable in someone else's hands - has fallen victim to scholarly, and perhaps judicial, complacency. Not only has the law long offered inadequate protection for idea-creators, but its meandering development has produced a legal landscape riddled with inconsistency. Much of the doctrine's inadequacy stems from a judicially created threshold demand that the plaintiff demonstrate the submitted idea's concreteness and novelty - a barrier that typically proves impenetrable. This Article argues that these threshold requirements are motivated by two deeper concerns that induce courts to dismiss plaintiffs' claims: a fear of conferring a monopoly in ideas and a desire to circumvent evidentiary and administrative difficulties. It then offers a new functional mode of analysis that promises to bring a much-needed measure of fairness and consistency to the law of ideas, one that more directly and effectively addresses the principal judicial concerns. Under this functional analysis, several traditional causes of action would survive preemption under the Constitution and federal statutes, including in particular the preemption provision of the 1976 Copyright Act, because those causes would be properly limited and could coexist with federal interests.
Journal Information
The Harvard Law Review publishes articles by professors, judges, and practitioners and solicits reviews of important recent books from recognized experts. Each issue also contains pieces by student editors. Published monthly from November through June, the Review has roughly 2,000 pages per volume. All articles--even those by the most respected authorities--are subjected to a rigorous editorial process designed to sharpen and strengthen substance and tone. The November issue contains the Supreme Court Foreword (usually by a prominent constitutional scholar), the faculty Case Comment, twenty-five Case Notes (analyses by third-year students of the most important decisions of the previous Supreme Court Term), and a compilation of Court statistics. The February issue features the annual Developments in the Law project, an in-depth treatment of an important area of the law.
Publisher Information
Founded in 1887 by future Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis, the Harvard Law Review is an entirely student-edited journal that is formally independent of the Harvard Law School. Approximately ninety student editors make all editorial and organizational decisions and, together with a professional business staff of four, carry out day-to-day operations. Aside from serving as an important academic forum for legal scholarship, the Review is designed to be an effective research tool for practicing lawyers and students of the law. The Review also provides opportunities for its members to develop their own editing and writing skills. All student writing is unsigned, reflecting the fact that many members of the Review, in addition to the author and supervising editor, make a contribution to each published piece.
Rights & Usage
This item is part of a JSTOR Collection.
For terms and use, please refer to our Terms and Conditions
Harvard Law Review © 2006 The Harvard Law Review Association
Request Permissions